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1 Background and research questions 
 
Short-term demand response from electricity consumers is important for deregulated 
competitive electricity markets to function properly.1 An active demand side that 
respond when wholesale prices vary, may contribute to efficiency and reliability, 
reduced price volatility, mitigation of exercise of market power, as well several other 
advantages in the electricity market. Despite this importance, many electricity markets 
are characterized by a rather low response from the demand side. One reason is that 
most consumers do not face time-differentiated prices that reflect the wholesale price 
variation; they have instead prices that are fixed for longer periods of time (weeks, 
months, years). Many of these consumers have chosen these fixed contracts voluntarily, 
for instance in order to ensure more stable and predictable prices. However, many 
consumers have not the possibility to choose differently if they are equipped with an 
electric metering system which can only measure accumulated electricity consumption. 
This metering system makes it impossible to charge the consumers by real-time prices 
corresponding to their actual real-time consumption. As a result, they lack incentives to 
respond to short-term market price fluctuations. This implies that their demand in the 
wholesale market is represented by price insensitive demand curves. 
Lack of demand response may have adverse implications. Electric generators with 
high costs may be utilized to cover demand during short-term peak price periods, even 
though many consumers would use less electricity if they were faced with the actual 
cost of their consumption. Similarly, because consumers neither increase consumption 
during short-term off-peak price periods, some generators are not utilized even though 
they may offer electricity at costs below what many consumers would be willing to pay 
if they had the opportunity to do so. This short-term inefficiency in allocation of 
resources may also have long-term impacts through inefficient investments in 
generation capacity. Moreover, low demand response, accompanied with the special 
                                                 
1
 “Short-term” in this thesis refers to an hourly time-scale, and short-term demand response refers to electricity 
consumption adjustments to prices that vary within the day, or short-term consumption changes as a result of 
incentive payments designed to induce reductions when needed, for instance during high price periods or during 




properties of electricity as a commodity; non-storability, capacity constraints and long 
lead times for new capacity expansions, also contributes to volatile prices. Low demand 
response may furthermore make it easier and more profitable to exercise market power, 
which exacerbates price volatility even more. Increased price volatility increases 
uncertainties regarding long-run average rate of return on capacity investments which in 
turn may reduce the investment level and thus reliability of supply. High and 
unpredictable prices and increased probability for shortage of supply increase the risk of 
political intervention in the market. The likelihood of political intervention may further 
reduce the propensity for investments.  
Most Norwegian households are metered by their accumulated electricity 
consumption. This implies a disconnection between the wholesale market and the retail 
market in which households purchase their power. The rapidly changing costs of 
electricity are not signalled to the consumers, and, consumers’ willingness to pay for 
electricity is not reflected in the market, in the short term. This disconnection may be of 
increasing concern as the overcapacity from the regulated period is diminishing, and as 
Norway and the other Nordic countries now enters a period where tighter conditions 
may be experienced. If consumers instead face prices that are closer to the marginal 
costs of supply through time-differentiated tariffs, and are metered automatically, they 
have incentives to adjust their demand to the varying prices. New enabling technologies 
that can control appliances automatically, such as direct load control of water heaters 
and energy management systems, may further enhance households’ responsiveness to 
short-term price changes. With this infrastructure, information about wholesale prices is 
conveyed to the customers, they have incentives and increased ability to respond to the 
prices, and, information about their responses are conveyed back to the market. 
Increasing demand response in the electricity system by connecting the wholesale and 
the retail market this way may provide several benefits and mitigate the concerns 
described above.   
 
This thesis encompasses several topics. With the objective of studying the 
importance of demand response in the electricity market, it first details the above 
discussion by examining the Norwegian electricity market and by reviewing relevant 
literature. It describes the present wholesale and the end-user market, and discusses why 
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there is a lack of short-term demand response from households, how it can be increased, 
and potential benefits from this. It argues that short-term demand response in the 
electricity market is an important contributor to obtain and maintain an efficient and 
well-functioning market. It also surveys demand response experiments around the 
world. This survey indicates that households do respond when exposed to time-
differentiated prices, and that enabling technologies contribute to increase their 
responses.  
Many of the benefits from demand response programs are influenced by the extent 
to which consumption is adjusted. Estimates of the potential increase in demand 
response that may be achieved are necessary to compare benefits with costs associated 
with the introduction of automatic meter reading, time-differentiated tariffs and direct 
load control. Indications and expectations of Norwegian households’ demand response 
potential may be provided by examining other demand response programs and 
experiments. Such results and experiences enable evaluations on how tariffs, load 
control strategies, information and marketing campaigns, etc., may affect consumers’ 
electricity consumption. However, as will be seen, these estimates may vary due to e.g. 
experimental or region/country specific differences. The results are therefore not 
necessarily transferable to Norwegian conditions. This suggests it is also important to 
conduct own experiments which give the opportunity to evaluate the Norwegian 
demand response potential, and to compare obtained results with results from other 
similar experiments. Together, this information provides a basis for the development of 
effective instruments forming new demand response programs. 
The thesis further study Norwegian households’ demand response potential by 
analysing households participating in a large-scale demand response experiment called 
"End-user flexibility by efficient use of information and communication technology". In 
this experiment, electricity consumers (mostly households) were equipped with 
automatic meter reading and they were offered time-differentiation of both network and 
power tariffs, as well as direct load control of their water heaters. Hourly metering of 
each household’s electricity consumption and hourly measurements of temperature and 
wind speed, number of hours of daylight and household data from a survey, provide a 
large panel data set. In order to evaluate the households’ demand response potential, 
these data are analysed with statistical and econometrical methods.  
Summary 
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The most important research questions analyzed here are: What is the load reduction 
potential from direct load control of residential water heaters? Which customers will 
choose time-differentiated tariffs; those who will adjust their consumption as a result of 
the new tariff, or those who already have a consumption pattern which make it 
favourable to choose the new tariff even without adjusting consumption (sometimes 
called free-riders)? What is households’ electricity consumption response to time-
differentiated prices? And, how much can direct load control contribute to increase the 
responses? 
 
The thesis consists of two parts, where Part 1 gives a summary of the analysis, 
which are presented in Part 2. Part 1 is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
large-scale experiment where the data analysed in the thesis are gathered. Section 3 
briefly sums up the main results from four articles which constitute the main work of 
the thesis, and Section 4 discusses the implications of these results. This discussion 
evaluates how the tariffs and load control offered by the network and the power 
companies separately affect the households’ consumption, as well as the combined 
effect on consumption from these measures. It attempts to discuss the results in light of 
the instruments utilized, and in light of experiences from other similar demand response 
experiments and programs, in order to offer suggestions for future demand response 
programs. Section 5 gives a conclusion. Part 2 presents the four articles, with an 
appendix at the end, describing the methods applied in the analyses in more detail.  
2 The Norwegian large-scale experiment “End-user 
flexibility by efficient use of information and 
communication technology” 
 
A large-scale project was established in 2001 to test automatic meter reading, direct 
load control technology and households’ demand response to new tariffs. Three of the 
articles in this thesis analyses data from this project. This section describes the project 
and the data it provided. 
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"End-user flexibility by efficient use of information and communication technology 
(ICT)" was a large-scale Norwegian project running in the period 2001-2004.2 The 
objective was to increase the end-user flexibility in periods with scarcity of electrical 
energy and power, by:  
• Establishing a decision basis and suggest external conditions for a prioritised 
building of an infrastructure based on ICT-solutions for the future.  
• Develop, test and evaluate different initiatives with basis in network tariff, 
power prices and other market solutions, based on ICT, which stimulates to 
flexibility in consumption.  
 
EBL Kompetanse was the responsible institution towards the Norwegian Research 
Council, with SINTEF Energy Research as executing research establishment. Several 
participants in the Norwegian energy sector constituted a reference group.3 The project 
contained six sub projects, including this doctorate study. 
In the project, two network companies (Buskerud Kraftnett and Skagerak Energi 
Nett) installed automatic meter reading and direct load control technology at 
approximately 5,000 electricity consumers each, mostly residentials. The meters 
allowed for hourly metering of electricity consumption, and the direct load control 
enabled disconnection of load, mostly water heaters. The analyses in this thesis use data 
from one of the network companies, Buskerud Kraftnett. 
Approximately 5,000 electricity customers in the grid area of Buskerud Kraftnett 
had automatic meter reading technology mandatory installed. These customers were 
offered several voluntary options with respect to new network tariffs, power tariffs and 
direct control of load. The tariffs and load control options studied in this thesis are: 
• Customers were offered a discounted network tariff if they allowed for 
disconnection of their water heater in periods the network company defined as 
constrained. 
• At the end of 2002, customers were offered a dynamic critical peak pricing 
(CPP) network rate to be in effect from 2003. This rate had a peak price that 
                                                 
2
 See also http://www.energy.sintef.no/prosjekt/Forbrukerflex/engelsk. 
3
 The reference group consisted of representatives from Buskerud Kraftnett, Skagerak Energi Nett, Østfold Energi 
Nett/ Fortum Distribusjon, Trondheim Energiverk Nett, Helgelandskraft, Istad Nett, NVE, Statnett, EBL 
Kompetanse, Hafslund and Fjordkraft. 
Summary 
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increased with 1 NOK, from a level of 0.15 NOK, in the peak hours from 7 to 11 
am and from 4 to 8 pm on working days with temperatures lower than -8°C.4  
• However, temperatures never fell below -8°C in 2003, so it was not possible to 
measure the customers' price response with this rate. Because of this, it was 
decided to offer a new time-of-use (TOU) tariff to all customers, also to those 
that did not have the CPP rate from before. The customers on the CPP rate were 
automatically transferred to the TOU rate, with the possibility of opting out if 
they did not want this new rate.5 The TOU rate was offered in October 2003, and 
was in effect from November 2003. This rate was quite similar to the CPP rate, 
but the peak price was charged the peak hours independent of temperature.6 
• Customers were offered an hourly spot price tariff from one power company 
(Hafslund).  
• Customers who chose the hourly spot price tariff were offered the possibility of 
automatic disconnecting the water heaters in the normally two most expensive 
spot price hours of the morning and evening (8-10 am and 5-7 pm on working 
days). 
  
All customers were offered all opportunities, and the customers spread from the 
standard network tariff and standard power tariffs to different combinations of the above 
mentioned options. This means that some customers had discounted network and 
standard power contracts, and allowed the network company to disconnect during 
shortage situations. Some had the CPP or the TOU network tariffs in combination with 
their standard power tariff. Some chose CPP or the TOU tariff, and in addition the spot 
price power tariff, with or without disconnection of the water heater in the peak spot 
price hours.  
                                                 
4
 The rate is described further in Article III. 
5
 Approximately 10 percent of the customers opted out of the new TOU rate. 
6
 The TOU rate is described in Article IV. 
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3 Summary of the thesis’ main results 
 
This section gives a brief presentation of the results found in each of the four articles 
in the thesis. The next section attempts to draw some implications based on these 
findings. The first article describes the present wholesale and end-user market in 
Norway, and discusses why there is a lack of short-term demand response from 
households in the electricity market, how it can be increased, potential benefits from 
this, and some evidences on households responsiveness found in demand response 
experiments around the world. The second article estimates the load reduction potential 
from direct load control of residential water heaters using the experimental data. The 
third article studies whether offering time-differentiated tariffs attracts demand 
responsive households, or mainly households who benefit because of their consumption 
pattern, even if they do not have a corresponding demand response. The fourth article 
estimates households’ electricity consumption response to time-differentiated prices in 
three groups that differed with respect to their choice of network and power tariffs and 
direct load control.  
3.1 Article I: Improving the power market performance by automatic 
meter reading and time-differentiated pricing 
 
Because the electric meters installed in Norwegian households only measure 
accumulated electricity consumption, it is not possible for them to face time-
differentiated electricity prices that vary frequently, for instance from hour to hour. 
Instead, the households have prices that are fixed for, at least, weeks at a time. 
Households do consequently not see the continuously varying costs of electricity 
consumption reflected in the wholesale prices, and have thus no incentives to respond to 
these prices. Because of this, households’ short-term demand appears totally inelastic in 
the wholesale market.  
If consumers face the marginal costs of supply through time-differentiated tariffs 
and are metered automatically, they have better incentives to adjust their demand to the 
varying prices. New technologies that can control appliances automatically may further 
assist households’ response to prices. 40 percent of the annual Norwegian electricity 
Summary 
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consumption, where households’ consumption constitute the main part, does not have 
automatic meter reading. If these consumers are provided with this technology, and if 
the consumers that today have monthly average spot price based contracts then continue 
on hourly spot price contracts, the share of Norwegian annual consumption by 
consumers with incentives to be short-term price responsive may double. It is also worth 
noticing that during cold peak periods, when demand response often is most needed, 
this percentage share is likely to be higher due to households’ high temperature 
sensitivity as compared with for instance the large industry. Thus, there is a 
considerable potential for increased short-term demand response in the electricity 
market if these customers are provided with new metering technology.  
Increasing demand response in the electricity system may provide several benefits 
such as improved efficiency, enhanced system reliability, reduced price volatility and 
mitigation of exercise of market power. It may therefore be important to exploit the 
demand response potential among households as we now enter a period where the 
Norwegian and the Nordic electricity consumption approach capacity. 
Experiences from experiments and projects around the world indicates that 
households do respond to short-term changing price signals, and that assistant 
technologies contribute to increase the demand response.  
3.2 Article II: Direct load control of residential water heaters 
 
In this article, a regression model is developed to evaluate the effects on the load 
curve of disconnections and reconnections of residential water heaters. The analysis 
uses a panel data fixed effects regression method to estimate the load control impacts 
(this method is described in the appendix). 
The results show that a disconnection of heaters from the electricity grid for the 
analyzed customer group give an hourly average reduction in load per household of 
between 0.18 kWh/h and 0.60 kWh/h dependent on which hour the disconnection 
occurred, with an average of approximately 0.5 kWh/h. 
The interruption of the natural diversity between the water heaters’ electricity 
consumption during a disconnection causes a payback effect, i.e. a higher consumption 
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in a period after reconnection. For the first hour after reconnection, the average extra 
consumption was found to be up to 0.28 kWh/h, dependent on the hour. It is likely that 
the instantaneous demand at the moment of reconnection is higher than the hourly 
averaged estimates. By using the averaged hourly demand for the subsequent hours after 
reconnection, a simple methodology indicates the excess power demand at the moment 
of reconnection to be 0.36 kW (after disconnection in hour 10).  
3.3 Article III: Households' self-selection of a dynamic electricity tariff 
 
Customers may want to be exposed to higher prices in peak periods in return for 
lower prices in other periods if they are able to adjust their consumption, thus reducing 
their electricity bill. Another reason for choosing such a tariff may be that their 
consumption is normally low during peak price periods and/or high in off-peak price 
periods. With such a consumption pattern, they may reduce their electricity bill simply 
by choosing the differentiated rate, even without a corresponding price response (they 
may, of course, benefit further if they also adjust consumption). For the customers, this 
may be considered as fair as they no longer are subsidizing other customers’ expensive 
peak consumption. However, from the perspective of those offering this tariff, attracting 
mainly the last group to the differentiated rate may not be desirable, since their intention 
often is to increase demand response. It may also lead to lower revenues. Thus, if the 
latter participation motive is prevailing among customers, it may be questioned whether 
companies will be likely to offer such tariffs.  
The article uses a discrete choice model to analyze whether the customers chose the 
new rate because of a higher ability to respond to the price signals, or because of 
favorable consumption pattern (see the appendix for details of the statistical method).  
The results suggest that, on average, the consumption pattern does not influence the 
households' decision of whether to select the time-differentiated critical-peak pricing 
(CPP) rate or the standard rate. On the other hand, ownership of energy management 
systems and wood-burning furnaces increased the probability to join the CPP program. 
Households can utilize such equipment to shift peak consumption to off-peak hours or 
to reduce peak consumption and thus reduce electricity expenditures. These results 
Summary 
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therefore indicate that the offering of CPP tariffs attract customers with potentially 
higher demand response compared to the general population, and the CPP tariff does not 
attract customers that may benefit without making consumption adjustments in a 
significant way, more than it attracts other customers.  
3.4 Article IV: Time-differentiated pricing and direct load control of 
residential electricity consumption 
 
The analysis in the third article does not reveal whether the consumers actually did 
respond to the prices when they were exposed to the new tariff. The demand response 
due to price changes is the topic of the fourth article. The focus is on three different 
household groups, which differed with respect to their choices of tariffs and direct load 
control:  
• Group 1 (TOU/Std): Time-of-use network tariff and standard power tariff, 
without load control. 
• Group 2 (TOU/spot): Time-of-use network tariff and spot price power tariff, 
without load control. 
• Group 3 (TOU/spot/DLC): Time-of-use network tariff and spot price power 
tariff, with load control. 
 
A fixed effect panel data regression model is used to measure the effect of TOU and 
spot pricing of electricity on the daily load curves for households’ participating in the 
experiment (see the appendix for a description of the model and the method).7 The 
contribution from direct load control of water heaters to automatically increase the price 
response is also estimated. 
The results from Group 1 indicate modest consumption reduction to price signals 
(0.055 kWh/h electricity consumption reduction to a price increase of 1 NOK). The 
results from Group 2, show high price response (0.545 kWh/h reduction). Customers in 
Group 3, showed slightly higher responses than the first group (0.077 kWh/h), but not 
as high as one could expect considered they had automatic load control.  
                                                 
7
 Only consumers from which power price information exist are included, i.e., consumers from Hafslund. 
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4 Discussion and implications of the results 
 
This section discusses the results from the articles. It attempts to discuss these 
results in connection with each other and in connection with results found elsewhere, 
and give some implications for the demand response potential in the electricity system. 
It first discusses the results regarding direct load control and time-differentiated pricing 
separately, and then the combined effect of these two measures. 
4.1 Demand response and load control 
 
The results in Article II suggest that disconnections of water heaters may be an 
effective way to reduce peak load, given some physical factors are taken into account. 
Using the estimated average load reduction per customer of approximately 0.5 kWh/h 
for hour 10, the total load reducing potential in Norway from disconnection of water 
heaters can be suggested. Assuming that half of the Norwegian households 
(approximately 1 million households) have allowed for disconnection of their water 
heater, and assuming a 0.2 percent loss in the grid in a peak load situation, the total load 
reduction potential is 600 MWh/h for the whole Norwegian system.8 The results also 
indicate a payback effect when the heaters are reconnected. The average additional 
demand the first hour after reconnection is estimated to 0.24 kWh/h. This means that an 
average additional demand of 288 MWh/h can be expected in the electricity system the 
first hour after a one-hour disconnection. Also, because the heaters were reconnected 
simultaneously, it is likely that the initial peak taking place at the moment the heaters 
are reconnected is higher than the average for the entire hour after the reconnection. The 
result indicates an initial payback of approximately 0.36 kW power demand per 
household, or 432 MW at an aggregated level, at the moment when the heaters are 
reconnected.  
It is illustrative to impose these numbers into the system load curve of 5 February, 
2001, the day with the highest system peak in Norway so far. The load in the peak hour 
(hour 10) would then be reduced from 23,054 MWh/h to 22,454 MWh/h, i.e. a 2.6 
                                                 
8
 Assumptions are based on Graabak and Feilberg (2004). 
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percent reduction. The system load the following hour after reconnection (hour 11) 
would rise from 22,940 MWh/h to 23,228 MWh/h on average. Furthermore, the 
instantaneous payback effect would yield an instant total power demand of 23,432 MW 
(assuming the power demand at the reconnection moment was approximately the 
average of the load in hour 10 and 11; i.e. 23,000 MW). On this day, the new “post-
peak” would thus be at a higher level than the peak that was the target for the load 
reduction. This indicates that direct load control of water heaters may also have an 
unfortunate payback effect that should be monitored and possibly controlled so that a 
new problematic peak is not created. 
To avoid possible post-peak problems, one may disconnect for longer periods, in 
order to wait for lower system load. Then the payback effect may occur at a time when 
the new peak does not create a load problem. However, one should be aware of that the 
longer the disconnection period, the higher the payback effect. Rotational 
disconnections and reconnections of the heaters is another way to circumvent a 
problematic payback effect, as described in Article II. By using this method, the 
operators can better tailor the load control as they need.  
4.2 Demand response and time-differentiated prices 
 
The results in Article III show that the customers choosing the time-differentiated 
tariff were well equipped and held characteristics that made them suited to exploit the 
varying prices. The article suggests that the offering of time-differentiated tariffs is 
likely to increase demand response among residential consumers because the consumers 
choosing the tariff have higher flexibility with respect to the timing of their electricity 
consumption due to certain household characteristics, compared to the customers that 
did not choose the new tariff. In Article IV, the consumers’ price response to the TOU 
tariff was estimated (Group 1 (TOU/Std)).9 The result indicate that the price response 
was lower than the responses found for the two other groups also analysed in this 
article, and also compared to results in many other demand response programs (see the 
                                                 
9
 As explained in Section 2, the peak price of the CPP tariff were never activated due to temperatures that never fell 
below the activating threshold, and the customers did consequently not experience differentiation in their price. 
This group was transferred to the time-of-use (TOU) tariff, and actually constituted the main part of this group. 
Their price response to the TOU tariff was estimated in Article IV, in Group 1 (TOU/Std).  
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review of other programs in Article I). Even if the results in Article III indicate these 
customers’ demand response potential, their revealed response found in Article IV 
suggests it still may not have been optimal for them to adjust consumption.  
One reason for this may be that the customers found the benefits from adjustments 
in consumption too little compared with the inconvenience and costs. The economic 
incentive, i.e. the peak/off-peak price ratio, may have been too small to motivate a 
larger price response for this group. Experiences from other TOU experiments indicate 
that the largest consumption reductions are found where the price ratio are highest 
(Faruqui and Malko, 1983), and according to Braithwait (2000), the ratios need to be in 
the range of 4:1 or 5:1 to induce substantial price response. Although the TOU price 
ratio in the Norwegian experiment alone was high, the total price ratio (when adding the 
network and the power prices) was approximately 3.2:1, and may thus be one 
explanation why the demand response in this experiment is lower than in many other 
experiments analyzed in the literature. This suggests that higher price differentials may 
be considered in future programs utilizing TOU tariffs.10 
The high economic incentive needed to induce customers to respond, further 
suggests that enabling technologies that control loads automatically are important for 
consumption adjustments. For instance, water heaters, heating cables or heating panels 
may be directly controlled without any effort from the customer. Allowing the 
customers to override a control event in case of too high inconvenience may increase 
customers’ acceptance for the demand response program. Simple energy management 
systems such as timers (or more advanced systems) can also be offered along with the 
new tariffs. If such timers are already programmed, it makes it easier for the customers 
to take the device in use.11 It is also worth noticing that signalling lamps or other price 
information systems have given higher responses than those without such assistant 
technology in experiments abroad (see Article I). Providing customers with such 
                                                 
10
 Whether this is consistent with a desire of designing the tariff to reflect expected time-varying network cost is 
another question and will not be dealt with here. A CPP tariff may be better suited for this than the more static 
TOU tariff, because CPP may have higher prices during critical peak periods and lower prices during more normal 
peak periods, while still allowing the average of the prices to reflect expected average costs (see Article I for a 
description of these rates). 
11
 See also Hartway et al. (1999), attributing their large load response findings in a TOU program to the high price 




equipment could possibly increase their awareness of the prices they face and contribute 
to increase their demand response. 
Another aspect worth considering is the information and the educational material 
given the consumers on the various ways to exploit the price structure in order to reduce 
electricity expenditures. If this information was insufficient, it may have lead many 
customers to disregard possible ways to benefit and to believe it was little to gain from 
adjusting consumption. In two experiments that seem to display higher responses than 
in the one analyzed here, and where the enrollment and welcome packages offered the 
customers are available (which they rarely are), the educational material seems to be 
more comprehensive (see Norges Energiverksforbund,12 1989, Vaage, 1995 and CRA, 
2005a, 2005b for the former, and Sæle and Grande, 2004 for the latter experiment). 
Although such a comparison across experiments of the information level and the 
achieved demand response results are complicated by other factors that also influence 
the results, it may serve as an indication of the importance of instructive educational 
information to consumers.13  
Finally, it must be mentioned that the results are average over all the customers in 
each group. No attempts have been made to reveal whether there exist subgroups within 
the sample that exhibit higher price responsiveness. For instance is it likely that 
customers with energy management systems have higher response than those without 
such equipment. It may also be that consumers that differ with respect to their 
consumption pattern prior to the participation in the experiment, as discussed in Article 
III, display differing responses. The high response found in Group 2 (TOU/spot), i.e. 
those with a TOU network tariff and spot price tariff but no load control, also analysed 
in Article IV, indicates that there exist customers highly motivated and able to exploit 
the varying rates by adjusting their consumption.14 This is also supported by several 
papers that find price responses to differ across customers, for instance due to differing 
stock of appliances (see Article I). Thus, designing marketing campaigns directed 
                                                 
12
 This is a former Norwegian time-differentiated pricing experiment conducted from 1984-1987. 
13
 See also Hartway et al. (1999), paying especially high attention to the customer information aspect, and as already 
mentioned, achieving high responses. 
14
 Note that this group consisted of very few households, so that drawing inferences from this group may 
questionable. 
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towards customer segments that are likely to yield high responses may give the highest 
response from those participating (see also Faruqui and George, 2005).  
4.3 Demand response and load control combined with time-differentiated 
prices 
 
It is interesting to study how load control combined with time-differentiated prices 
affected households’ price responses. This is analyzed in Article IV, with Group 3 
(TOU/spot/DLC), i.e. those with a TOU network tariff, and a spot price power contract 
combined with direct load control. The analysis estimates the total price response, from 
both the customers' own efforts to adjust consumption, and, from the assistance of the 
direct load control.15  
The results indicate a total price response which is not as high as one could expect, 
compared with the other two groups analyzed, given the fact they had assistance from 
load control. This may both have to do with the way that the load control events were 
carried out, and with the efforts the customers did on their own to adjust consumption.  
The spot price varied very little within the day in the experiment period, and since 
the water heater disconnections were carried out in conjunction with the peak periods of 
the spot price contract, the effect was that the customers received only small benefits 
when load was shifted from the spot price peak hours to the following off-peak hours. 
The main price differentiation of the customers’ total price was therefore due to the 
TOU tariff. It will thus mainly be the consumption adjustments to the TOU price that 
drive the results in the analysis. The fact that disconnections occurred in the two middle 
hours of the TOU peak periods may thus explain the estimated response. The payback 
effect that occurred after reconnecting the heaters, as described in Article II, appeared 
when the TOU price was still high. This means that load was not shifted entirely out 
from the TOU peak hours to off-peak hours so that the load level during the high price 
period did not change much, with a low estimated response as the result. Although the 
spot price power tariff and the TOU network tariff were two separate products that were 
                                                 
15
 It may not be entirely correct to refer to load reductions due to automatic control as price response, since a 
reduction from a disconnected water heater is the same independent on the price level. However, this enables 
comparison between the analysed groups. 
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offered independently, the customers would have experienced higher benefits if the 
disconnections had been coordinated and timed in accordance with the price structure of 
both contracts. This is important to notice, since in a non-experimental setting, peak 
price periods of two tariffs may be defined in such a way that load control carried out in 
connection with the peak price period of one tariff could shift consumption from off-
peak to peak price periods of the other tariff, and thus offset much of the gains that the 
disconnections can provide.  
Group 3 (TOU/spot/DLC), had nevertheless a somewhat higher total price response 
than the other group discussed in the previous section; Group 1 (TOU/Std). The reason 
for this may be that the control events after all shifted some parts of the energy to the 
off-peak TOU period for some customers in Group 3.16 This means that the customers’ 
own efforts to adjust consumption probably were small in Group 3 too. This may have 
to do with similar conditions as suggested for Group 1.  
5 Conclusions 
 
This thesis analyses factors limiting household demand response in Norway, how to 
increase the response and benefits from that. It is argued that increasing demand 
response may be important to achieve a well-functioning, efficient and reliable 
electricity market. The thesis also analyses the demand response potential in 
households, using data from a large-scale Norwegian time-differentiated pricing and 
direct load control experiment. The results from these analyses indicate that load 
reductions from direct load control of residential water heaters have a potential which 
may contribute to decrease peak load when needed, given some physical factors are 
taken into account. Furthermore, the offering of time-differentiated tariffs seems to 
attract households with a higher potential to respond to price changes than those 
remaining on standard rates. Yet, the demand response from the customers’ owns efforts 
to adjust consumption within the day generally seem to be on average low, although 
some customers display high price sensitivity. 
                                                 
16
 Water heaters that are affected more than one hour during the disconnection period would experience this. See 
Article II, Section 2 for a discussion of how load control affects water heaters. 
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This indicates a demand response potential among the analyzed customers that may 
be better exploited. The experiment and the analyses have pointed out possible ways to 
improve households’ demand response. For instance, marketing campaigns, both before 
and during the demand response program with good information and guidance to the 
households on how to take advantage of the new tariff structures is likely to be 
important. Automatic load control is also an essential contributor. Both direct load 
control performed by external parties such as network or power companies, as well as 
energy management systems such as timers, are likely to contribute to increased 
demand response. The analysis have also pointed at the importance of a coordination 
between separate products such as time-differentiated network and power tariffs and 
direct load control if they are offered by different parties, so that they do not offset each 
other and the combined effect gives the consumers the highest possible benefits from 
participation. 
When evaluating the results from the experiment, one should bear in mind that 
Norwegian customers traditionally have been provided with low electricity prices so 
that the focus on electricity saving may have been low. Changing behavior with respect 
to how and when electricity is used may take time. If the power and energy situation 
continue to tighten, this might change, as seen in the winter 2003/2003 and in 2006. 
Higher and more volatile prices may thus increase customers’ incentives and awareness 
of potential ways to reduce their electricity expenditures by adjusting consumption.  
In a situation where capacity becomes tighter, it may be valuable to have the 
necessary infrastructure in place in order to utilize the demand elasticity. The thesis has 
discussed that even a small increase in price responses may contribute to a well-
functioning market by increasing efficiency, reducing price volatility, mitigating 
exercise of market power and contributing to a reliable power supply.  
Whether the demand responses found in the analyses are sufficient for the benefits 
to exceed the costs associated with new metering infrastructure, tariffs and load control, 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. According to Kolbeinstveit and Tjeldflåt (2006), 60 % 
of the Norwegian annual consumption has now automatic meter reading and they 
amount to 100,000 measuring points out of a total 2.5 million. This means that the 
remaining consumers are many and small. Development of new meters to a higher share 
of this group may therefore provide less benefit compared with the cost from each 
Summary 
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consumer than what might have been the case for those already provided with this 
technology. However, one should note that many of the benefits come through the 
market, and may not directly benefit the one responsible for developing the 
infrastructure, or the customers, who now may require automatic meter reading 
technology but must pay for it (though limited to a maximum price). Although difficult 
to calculate, these benefits may be important to include when cost-benefit analysis are 
conducted and decisions of whether developing automatic meter reading to a higher 
share of the consumers are taken. This is important because the possible situation could 
exist, where cost-benefit analyses conducted by either the responsible institution (e.g. a 
network company) or by single customers show negative results, while an analysis 
including all costs and all benefits for all affected parties could show the opposite. If the 
latter is the case, there may be need for coordination of the development of the 
necessary infrastructure for remaining customers without automatic meter reading. 
Anyway, the costs of the necessary technology have declined recent years, and are 
likely to continue declining (Jørum et al., 2006). At some point, the benefits will 
probably exceed the costs.17 This suggests it is important to continue the research and 
the experiments with demand response so that the infrastructure and the most efficient 
instruments at that time are prepared for implementation. 
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Improving the power market performance by  






In most electricity markets, households’ electricity metering systems only allow prices 
that are fixed for long periods of time (weeks, months, years). Households can therefore 
not choose tariffs reflecting the continuously changing conditions and marginal costs in 
the electricity system. Thus, they have no incentive to adjust their electricity 
consumption in the short-term. This lack of demand response in the market may create 
inefficient allocation of resources in the short term and non-optimal investments in 
capacity in the long term. It may contribute to insufficient reliability of supply, higher 
price volatility and to an electricity system more exposed to exercise of market power. 
This paper discusses how automatic meter reading and direct load control technology 
combined with time-differentiated tariffs can increase demand response and improve the 
functioning of the electricity market. 
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In most electricity markets, the electric metering system installed in households can 
only measure accumulated electricity consumption. Households can consequently only 
choose between tariffs where prices in practice are fixed for longer periods of time.1 
Because these consumers do not, and can not, face the continuously varying costs of 
electricity consumption reflected in the wholesale prices, they have no incentives to 
respond to these prices by consumption adjustments. Because they do no restrict their 
demand if the wholesale price increases in the short-term, their retailers must bid price 
insensitive bids into the wholesale markets, and are thus forced to pay any price in order 
to serve their customers. This situation indicates a disconnection between the wholesale 
and the retail market; information about market conditions, communicated by the 
wholesale prices, is not conveyed to households. And, information about households’ 
actual demand response and their actual willingness to pay for electricity is not reflected 
in the wholesale market, leading to artificially low price elasticities. 2 
This disconnection may contribute to an electricity market that performs less 
efficient than what is possible. When consumers face prices different from the short-
term marginal cost of supply, electric generators with high costs may be utilized to 
cover demand during peak periods, even though many consumers would reduce their 
consumption if they were charged marginal costs. Furthermore, during off-peak periods, 
some generators are not utilized even though they may offer electricity at prices below 
what many consumers are willing to pay. The short-term inefficient allocation of 
resources may also have long-term impacts through inefficient investments in 
generation capacity. Low demand elasticity together with the special properties of 
electricity; non-storability, capacity constraints and long lead times for new expansions, 
may further contribute to volatile prices. This may also make it easier and more 
profitable to exercise market power, which exacerbates price volatility even more. Price 
                                                 
1
 This applies to all consumers without automatic meter reading, i.e. most of the household sector. Also consumers 
with “spot price” based contracts face a price that are fixed for months at a time, because they in reality only see 
the monthly average of the market based spot price. 
2
 Demand response in this paper refers to electricity consumption adjustments to prices that vary within the day, or 
consumption changes as a result of incentive payments designed to induce reductions when needed, for instance 
during high price periods or during periods when the system is constrained.  
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volatility increases uncertainties regarding long-run average rate of return on capacity 
investments. Investors may thus be more reluctant to invest as they require higher prices 
to cover their risk-premium. This may in turn reduce reliability of supply and increase 
the risk of rationing in high-demand periods. High and unpredictable prices and higher 
probability for shortage of supply increase the risk of political intervention in the 
market, which, in turn, may further reduce the propensity for investments. As this paper 
describes, demand response is one important factor that may contribute to a well-
functioning market with the ability of moderating volatility of prices, balancing demand 
and supply, and providing sufficient and timely investment in capacity.  
Increased demand response may be achieved if consumers face prices that are 
closer to the marginal costs of supply through time-differentiated tariffs, and if they are 
metered automatically. Consumers will then have incentives to adjust their demand to 
the varying prices. Enabling technologies that can control appliances, such as direct load 
control of water heaters or energy management systems, may further enhance their price 
responsiveness. With these technologies, information about wholesale prices is 
conveyed to the customers, their incenctives and ability to respond to the prices 
increases, and information about their responses is brought back to the market. This 
connects the wholesale and the retail markets, and as will be described in this paper, 
provides for several benefits.  
Many of these benefits are due to an improved electricity market performance, and 
are distributed among several of the participators in the market. However, the decision 
of whether to develop the new metering infrastructure may often hinge on individual 
(network) companies who may ignore benefits that are not utilized by them directly. If 
they find the costs too high, they may not carry out the development, even if the benefits 
for the society as a whole may exceed the costs. Thus, socially optimal decision on such 
may require governmental intervention. The discussion in this paper is exemplified 
using the Norwegian (and the Nordic) market. It aims to discuss benefits related to the 
introduction of the mentioned technologies, many of which would probably not be 
included in cost-benefit analysis conducted by individual companies, and many of 
which is not included in earlier cost-benefit evaluations in Norway (see for instance 
Grande and Graabak, 2004, Tjeldflåt and Vingås, 2004 and Jørum et al., 2006). 
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Quantifying, and weighing the benefits against related costs, both for the individual 
companies and for the society as a whole, is however beyond the scope of this paper.  
Section 2 gives a short description of the wholesale and the end-user market in 
Norway as a basis for the other topics addressed in this paper. Section 3 discusses the 
performance of the market and why many consider the deregulated market to have 
performed well in terms of efficient operation until now, but also why there is a 
potential for improvement by fully integrating the wholesale and the retail market. It 
discusses the reasons for the lack of short-term demand response in the electricity 
market, and why automatic meter reading and time-differentiated tariffs are necessary 
prerequisites to increase short-term demand response. Section 4 discusses implications 
and benefits in the market of increasing demand response, such as improved efficiency 
and system reliability, reduced price volatility and mitigation of exercise of market 
power, and, in addition, several other benefits. Section 5 reviews results from the 
literature describing experiments where households’ responses to short-term price 
changes have been tested. This is important knowledge since the extent of households’ 
demand response has implications for the benefits from demand response programs. 
Section 6 sums up the discussion and concludes. 
2 The Norwegian electricity market 
 
During the years of the regulated electricity market, central decision makers were 
responsible for maintaining reliability of supply. Risk of shortages of supply was 
limited since the objective of the production capacity planning was to cope with demand 
under nearly all circumstances (Bye and Hope, 2005). Production investment risk was 
low since tariffs were designed to cover the costs, and inefficient investments decisions 
could be recovered by tariff modifications. However, there were indications of 
substantial over-investment in the power sector, and a lack of cost effectiveness in the 
networks.3 One of the main objectives of the deregulation was to increase efficiency and 
achieve a better utilization of the total resources in the power sector by leaving 
investment decisions to the market players (decentralised decision making). The 
                                                 
3
 According to Bye and Halvorsen (1999), efficiency losses in the power market, power production and distribution 
were considerable, and may have added up to 2.5-3 percent of GDP in 1991. 
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Norwegian electricity market was deregulated in 1991. Sweden followed in 1996, and a 
common Norwegian and Swedish Exchange (Nord Pool) was established as the first 
multinational exchange for trade in power contracts in the world. Finland joined in 
1998, Denmark West in 1999 and Denmark East in 2000. The Nordic countries are now 
connected in a common integrated electricity market. In 2005, Nord Pool Spot opened a 
new bidding area in the Vattenfall Europe Transmission control area in Germany 
(www.nordpool.com). This section presents the wholesale and the end-user market in 
Norway. 
2.1 The wholesale market 
 
Any producer in the Nordic area can deliver electricity to the common Nordic 
electricity market. The wholesale market includes power producers, power suppliers, 
retailers, industry and other large undertakings. In the wholesale market, the trade of 
electricity takes place at the Nord Pool exchange and bilaterally between different 
market players. About 40 percent of the physical deliveries are traded at the Nord Pool 
Spot (Glende et al. 2005). The exchange provides a financial market for trading 
contracts for price hedging and risk management, and an Elspot market for trading 
power contracts for next day's physical deliveries. 
At the Nord Pool Elspot, the next day's hourly spot prices are settled on the basis of 
bids from the participators for purchase and sale (a day-ahead market). Each participant 
submits bids to Nord Pool Elspot on bidding forms, and the bids are aggregated to a 
demand and a supply curve for each of the next day's 24 hours. The intersection of the 
demand and the supply curve provides the Elspot system price. The price also 
determines the obligations for each participant to deliver or take power from the central 
grid (see for instance Flatabø et al., 2003, Nord Pool, 2006a). 
The determination of the spot price may lead to a power flow from one area to 
another that exceeds the ability of the network to transfer the electricity. If there are 
bottlenecks, the market is divided into pricing areas and the prices in the surplus areas 
are lowered and the price in the deficit area is increased, until demand and production is 
in balance within each area (Rønningsbak, 2000). 
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Because electricity cannot be economically stored, balance between production and 
consumption must exist at every moment. However, operational difficulties, production 
fall out, bottlenecks in the grid, unexpected shift in temperature or other unforeseen 
events may lead to differences between forecasted deliveries/demand and real 
deliveries/demand. Imbalance between production and consumption is the result. The 
Norwegian system operator (Statnett) has the responsibility of maintaining the balance 
in the Norwegian electricity system and provide for sufficient capacity reserves at every 
time. Statnett uses the Regulating Power Market to keep a stable balance and frequency 
in the electricity system. In this market, producers as well as consumers can bid 
regulating power for either up regulation or down regulation.4 
During cold periods there is a risk that all Norwegian generating capacity is sold in 
the Elspot market. In order to secure sufficient power reserves for the regulating power 
market, a Regulating Power Option Market was established in 2000 (see Walther and 
Vognild, 2005, Glende et al., 2005). Here, Statnett purchases the right to utilize 
generating and demand resources for regulating purposes if needed. Statnett chooses the 
cheapest bids up to the desired amount, which then must be offered in the Regulating 
Power Market the next week.  
2.2 The end-user market 
 
The end-user market includes all buyers of electricity for own consumption, for 
instance industry, commercial buildings, households, etc. Households’ electricity 
consumption constitutes approximately 1/3 of Norway’s total electricity demand (SSB, 
2006a). Approximately 60 percent of the households have standard variable contracts 
(in the third quarter of 2006), 11 percent have fixed price contracts, and 29 percent have 
spot price based tariffs (SSB, 2006b). In the latter case, the consumers are confronted at 
the end of each month with the average hourly spot price, i.e. they do not face hourly 
varying prices. All consumers can change supplier every week. In the other Nordic 
countries, most end-users have fixed price contracts (Kristensen et al., 2004). 
                                                 
4
 Since the Nordic countries have a connected grid, regulating power anywhere in the area can treat imbalances, 
given there are no bottlenecks (see for instance, Wibroe et al., 2002). From 2002, the Nordic system operators 
created a common regulating power market in order to utilize the resources in all countries optimal. 
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End-users in Norway with an annual consumption below 100,000 kWh have meters 
that measure accumulated consumption.5 The consumers with this metering technology 
constitute approximately 40 percent of the total annual electricity consumption 
(Kolbeinstveit and Tjeldflåt, 2006). Since households on average use approximately 
18,000 kWh per year (Halvorsen et al., 2005), i.e. well below the 100,000 kWh 
threshold, they constitute most of the consumers without automatic meter reading.6 
They are required to report their consumption a few times a year (but may report more 
often if they want) and are charged according to their accumulated consumption 
between the meter reading dates. The price these customers pay is a weighed average, 
over the so-called adjusted load profile from all non-hourly metered customers in the 
area for the relevant period.7 Since one single customer has no significant impacts on 
this load profile, he or she will not receive the whole benefit if reducing consumption 
more than other customers do during a high price period. This means the efficient signal 
of hourly spot prices is substantially diluted (see also Fraser, 2001). The result is that at 
what time between the meter reading dates that the consumer uses electricity, does not 
matter for the total bill. The incentive is thus only to save energy for the whole period, 
independent on the time of day/week/month this saving is carried out. Note that this also 
applies to those with spot price based tariffs who only face the average of the hourly 
spot prices.  
3 Potential for improvement in the electricity market 
 
In general, the Nordic market has so far been working well (Flatabø et al., 2003, 
Bergman, 2005, von der Fehr et al., 2005). For instance, the deregulation have yielded a 
downward pressure on the electricity price as excess capacity has been exposed to 
competition in the market, and, prices between customer groups have equalized (Bye 
and Hope, 2005). Tjeldflåt (2005) considers the end-user market to function quite well, 
since customers seem to change retailer when the price differential between retailers is 
                                                 
5
 From 1 January 2005, all customers with an annual consumption above 100,000 kWh were required to have hourly 
metering of consumption. 
6
 The households may require automatic meter reading but they must pay for it themselves, though with a maximum 
price. 
7
 Consumers with fixed price contracts pay only according to their accumulated consumption. 
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high, and because the market share of the dominating retailers has declined recent years. 
Also, according to Statnett (2004), Norway has one of the most efficient and best 
utilized transmission systems for electricity in the world.  
3.1 The disconnected wholesale and retail electricity markets 
 
Increased integration between the retail and the wholesale market may improve the 
functioning of the market further. Figure 3.1 illustrates the existing situation in which 
most households now have no incentives to respond to short-term changes in wholesale 
prices by consumption adjustments. It shows the hourly spot prices in the Oslo pricing 
area during the winter 2002/2003, along with the prices offered through a standard 















































































Figure 3.1. Hourly spot prices (in the Oslo region) and the price offered from a supplier 
through a standard variable price contract in the winter 2002/2003 
 
As seen in the figure, the spot price rose to very high levels in December 2002 and 
the beginning of January 2003, due to a situation with scarcity of energy.8 The standard 
price facing the customers, however, was in parts of this period lower, sometimes only 
about half of the market price. Furthermore, from mid-January until May, the customer 
price was high above the market price, sometimes more than twice. We can see here 
that the standard price did not bring the energy scarcity price signal to the customers at 
                                                 
8
 More on the 2002/03 winter can be found in for instance Bye et al. (2003b), Nordel (2003), Finon et al. (2004), von 
der Fehr et al. (2005), OED (2003). 
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the time the market considered the situation to be constrained. Neither did the standard 
price signal inform the customers when the market considered this situation to be over. 
Also important is the price spike 6 February 2003, where the peak price signalled a 
power shortage situation (see also Figure 3.3). The figure illustrates that consumers 
have little incentive to adjust consumption according to short-term changing market 
prices.9 Because of this, their retailers must bid price insensitive bids into the wholesale 
markets, and are forced to pay any price in order to serve their customers. This is 


















Figure 3.2. The disconnection between the wholesale and the retail markets 
 
The left figure illustrates consumers’ demand curves in off-peak and peak periods 
of the day (Doff and Dpeak), and a standard variable price (Pstd,var) offered by their retailer, 
which can not change in any of the periods. The elastic demand curves indicate that 
consumers are price responsive and willing to adjust consumption on a short notice if 
they were given this opportunity (the assumption that consumers are price responsive is 
supported in the review in Section 5). However, their price does not change in the short-
term. Consequently, their demand appears inelastic in the wholesale market both in the 
off-peak as well as in the peak periods. The figure to the right illustrates this with two 
perfectly inelastic demand curves (assuming all customers are completely inelastic).  
                                                 
9
 We know that tacit collusion between consumers may give some market response, thus changing the load profile 
and costs for the consumers, while each consumer alone will not have this impact. However, it is questionable 
whether consumers will act like this, for instance due to lack of knowledge regarding the load profiling effects and 
due to free rider problems from consumers benefiting from others tacit collusive behaviour. 
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This situation indicates a disconnection between the wholesale and the retail 
market; information about short-term changing market conditions is not received by 
consumers. And, information about consumers’ actual demand response and their 
willingness to pay for electricity is not reflected in their demand curves in the wholesale 
market. 
The actual demand curves at the Nord Pool are however not as inelastic as they 
appear in Figure 3.2, because some customers with automatic meter reading and time-
differentiated tariffs also are present in the wholesale market. However, Figure 3.3, 
showing the purchase and sales curves at Nord Pool Spot the 6 February 2003, hour 
17:00-18:00, illustrates that the short-term price response still may be limited, as the 

















Figure 3.3. Elspot purchase/sales curves. Hour 17:00-18:00, 6. February 2003, System 
Price NOK 981,14. (Source: Nord Pool Spot AS) 
 
That the demand response is low, is further supported in, for instance, Hansen and 
Bye (2006) who estimated low short-term demand elasticities in a simultaneous 
multimarket model for the Norwegian and the Swedish market. They found the price 
elasticity to be approximately -0.015 in Norway and even smaller in Sweden.11 
                                                 
10
 Note that the threshold for requirement of automatic meter reading was lowered from an annual consumption of 
400,000 kWh to 100,000 kWh in 2005. This increased the amount of the Norwegian annual consumption on this 
metering technology from 50% to 60% (Tjeldflåt and Vingås, 2004). The elasticity may therefore be somewhat 
higher in today’s market than what this figure illustrates. 
11
 The elasticity may be somewhat higher now for the same reason as in the previous footnote. 
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The low elasticity may be a consequence of a too small amount of consumption 
with contracts tied to the spot price, and which also are hourly metered. It may also 
reflect low responses among those customers. For instance, the share of the Norwegian 
electricity consumption in the energy-intensive manufacturing and pulp and paper 
industry with contracts tied to the spot price constitute only approximately 0.2 % (in the 
3rd quarter of 2006, SSB, 2006a, 2006b).12 For mining, quarrying and other 
manufacturing industries this number is approximately 2.6 %. These sectors constitute 
about 45 % of the total Norwegian annual electricity consumption. In addition, 
households and others without automatic meter reading constitute around 40 % of the 
annual consumption.  
The remaining part thus constitutes about 15 percent. A high share of this 
consumption is probably within the consumer group called “Other industry”, i.e. for 
instance, trade, hotels and restaurants, public administration, education, health and 
social work and other service activities. Here, the share of customers tied to spot price 
contracts is a little above 70 percent, and then comprises approximately 10 percent of 
the Norwegian annual consumption. 
Thus, the part of the Norwegian consumption on contracts tied to the spot price 
probably constitutes less than 13 %. Furthermore, some of this consumption probably 
only faces monthly average spot prices, which means this estimate probably is a 
maximum.13 This means that the main part of the Norwegian consumption today has no 
incentives to be short-term responsive. Given the many long-term contracts in the other 
Nordic countries, the share of the total Nordic consumption (approximately 400 TWh) 
with hourly spot price contracts is thus probably only a few percent.  
Since the consumption in “Other industry” constitute the highest share with spot 
price contracts, the elasticity for this group of customers will therefore be important for 
the total response in the Norwegian (and Nordic) market. This group’s price elasticity is 
not known, but, according to Faruqui and George (2002) price elasticities for small to 
medium size commercial and industrial consumers are significantly smaller than for 
                                                 
12
 Assuming that the contracts are evenly distribution among the consumers. 
13
 SSB (2006a and 2006b), only inform that the contracts are “tied to” the spot price, thus it is unknown whether the 
contracts are based on hourly prices or monthly average spot prices. 
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residential consumers, suggesting households could be important contributors to 
increase demand response in the market. 
As mentioned, approximately 40 % of the annual consumption in Norway, with 
households as the largest share, can only choose tariffs with prices that do not reflect the 
short-term marginal cost of supply. Given that those on spot price based contracts today 
continue on hourly spot price contracts if they are provided with automatic meter 
reading, the share of the Norwegian annual consumption with incentives to be short-
term demand responsive could more than double from today’s level.14 
Furthermore, these consumers’ electricity consumption is likely to constitute a 
larger share than 40 % during cold periods due to their high temperature sensitivity 
(compared with for instance large industry). This means that a significant share of the 
market has no possibility to be responsive to prices in periods when demand response 
often is needed most. 
3.2 Connecting the markets and increasing demand response with 
automatic meter reading and time-differentiated tariffs  
 
The previous discussion indicates that there may be a considerable contribution to 
increased demand response by letting the customers without automatic meter reading to 
be fully integrated in the wholesale market. One way to achieve this is to provide 
customers with automatic meter reading so that they can choose electricity tariffs 
reflecting wholesale price variations. Furthermore, installation of notification systems 
able to signal the current price level on displays or by signal lamps, and possibilities for 
direct control of loads, may also increase consumers’ demand response. 
With such equipment installed, retailers can offer a range of new tariffs and 
products to the electricity customers.15 For instance, a spot price contract may be 
popular among customers with a high risk tolerance who does not want to pay the “price 
                                                 
14
 Assuming the remaining part of the 40 % share is made up of consumers in the sector “Other industry”. 
15
 See also Mauldin, 1997, Eakin and Faruqui, 2000, Long et al., 2000, Camfield et al., 2002, Irastorza, 2005. 
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insurance premium” related to for instance a fixed price contract.16 Customers with spot 
price contracts can expect a lower electricity bill than with a fixed price contract 
(Faruqui et al., 2002). Besides, if they can control and reduce their electricity 
consumption in peak hours, they may provide themselves with physical risk insurance 
towards the price volatility by being demand responsive (Hirst, 2002b). 
In between the pure spot price contract, where most of the risk is placed on the 
consumer, and the fixed price contract where the main risk is placed on the supplier, 
there may emerge a variety of new kinds of contracts that fit different customers' 
tolerance for risk and ability to respond to time-differentiation in price. An example is 
the time-of-use tariff (TOU), which has prices that vary by blocks of time within the 
day, but are fixed and known by customers in advance independently of the conditions 
in the electricity system (see for instance Faruqui and George, 2002). This tariff is 
however quite static. If the system is unconstrained, the TOU peak price may be much 
higher than the wholesale price, and if the system is constrained, a higher price than the 
TOU peak price may be needed to signal the market condition and wholesale prices. A 
more dynamic tariff, able to reflect the spot price and the conditions in the electricity 
system more accurately, is the critical-peak pricing (CPP). This tariff can increase the 
peak price if the system is severely constrained, and is thus a hybrid between the TOU 
and the spot price tariff. The TOU and the CPP tariffs are more predictable for the 
consumers than the hourly spot price at the same time as they provide incentives for 
consumption adjustments. The CPP rate lessens the price and quantity risk for the 
retailer compared with the TOU rate because of the possibility to impose a critical peak 
price during special circumstances.  
Another interesting tariff is a two-part real-time pricing (RTP) contract. This tariff 
offers consumers a fixed price for an agreed volume and the spot price for deviations 
from this volume. If the consumer uses less than what is agreed on, the consumer will 
be paid back the spot price for the deviation. If the consumer uses more, he pays the 
                                                 
16
 A fixed price contract ensures a known price a year or more in advance and protects customers from possible 
volatile prices in the wholesale market and reduces the risk for unforeseen expenditures during the contract period. 
However, offering a fixed price contract exposes the retailer for price and quantity risk, as procurement costs at the 
wholesale market and the customers' consumption level is unknown. Thus, the retailer charges more than the 
expected average wholesale price for the contract period to account for this uncertainty, or hedges at the financial 
market through for instance forward contracts. See for instance, Hirst, 2002b, Gersten, 1999, Woo et al., 2004, 
Nord Pool, 2006b, Deng and Oren, 2006. 
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spot price for the deviation. Other versions of this tariff may also price the deviation 
somewhere between the fixed price and the spot price (see for instance Braithwait and 
Eakin, 2002, Horowitz and Woo, 2006 or Hunt, 2002).17 Consumers may also be offered 
a spot price contract with a cap at some level agreed on by the retailer and customer. 
Both retailers and customers expose themselves for financial risk dependent on the 
electricity contract agreed on (Sioshansi, 2002, Solem et al., 2003a). Figure 3.4 




























Figure 3.4. Electricity tariffs with differing risk on the customer or retailer. (Adapted 
from Eakin and Faruqui, 2000) 
 
Due to differing risk taking preferences among the customers, they are likely to 
diversify to the different tariffs. The retailer can hedge some of its risk at the financial 
markets, thereby contributing to more predictable prices also for producers. 
In addition, retailers may offer direct load control of appliances in order to assist 
end-users' price response, as a mean of attracting customers. Agreements can be made 
where load control is carried out at some predefined price levels, power consumption 
levels or in predefined periods in combination with any of the above mentioned 
contracts, to reduce or shift consumption when desired (see for instance Solem et al., 
2003a,b). 
                                                 
17
 Trondheim Energiverk in Norway is currently offering a version of a two-part RTP tariff to residential customers, 
see www.tev.no. 
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When wholesale prices are conveyed to the customers and they adjust consumption 
to the varying prices, their retailers will bid price sensitive bids into the wholesale 
market. The two disconnected markets are then better integrated. 
4 Benefits from increased demand response 
 
There are a number of benefits that may be released with time-differentiated 
pricing, automatic meter reading and direct load control. This section discusses the 
following; improved economic efficiency in the electricity market, increased system 
reliability, reduced price volatility, mitigation of market power, and other benefits. 
4.1 Improved economic efficiency in the electricity market 
 
A market is most efficient when customers pay the marginal cost and make 
consumption decisions based on their marginal valuation of the commodity. For the 
electricity market, this means that consumers pay the wholesale hourly spot prices for 
their hourly consumption. The inefficiencies in the disconnection of the wholesale and 
the end-user markets arise when customer prices deviate from the wholesale prices. 
When customers pay less than the market price during peak periods, production 
technologies with high costs may be used to cover demand, even though many 
consumers would not find it worthwhile to consume electricity if they had been charged 
the marginal cost of this supply (see also Amundsen et al., 1996, Lafferty et al., 2001, 
Borenstein, 2002b, DOE, 2006). When customers pay more than the market price 
during off-peak periods, generators are not utilized even though many consumers would 
find the electricity production worth the costs. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates demand and supply curves for two different periods of the 
day; one peak and one off-peak period, in an electricity market where the customers are 
metered hourly and charged wholesale prices.  
 














Figure 4.1. A connected market with demand responsive consumers with time-
differentiated tariffs 
 
The figure describes a connected market, as opposed to the situation in Section 3.1. 
Customers are confronted with the prices in the wholesale market and make 
consumption decisions according to their willingness to pay. Because the information 
about the customers’ demand responsiveness is brought to the wholesale market, their 
demand curves will no longer appear vertical as is also shown in the figure. The market 
therefore clears at other consumption and price levels than before. During a high 
demand period, this occurs at a lower consumption and price level (Q'peak,P'peak) than in 
the situation with no demand response (Qpeak,Ppeak). During a low demand period, the 
market clears at (Q'off,P'off), i.e. at a higher consumption and price level than in the 
situation with no demand response (Qoff,Poff). The efficiency gains that arise when 
customers face marginal prices rather than fixed prices are illustrated in the figure as the 
shaded areas (for two different periods of the day).18  
As seen in Figure 3.1, there is almost always a divergence between the customer 
price and the wholesale price. In a tightening Norwegian and Nordic electricity market, 
where prices may fluctuate more, efficiency gains from time-differentiated tariffs and 
                                                 
18
 The standard variable tariff and the spot price based tariff are able to bring the customer price closer to the 
wholesale price than a fixed price contract for a year is. However, in today’s market, the wholesale prices may rise 
without the prices in these contracts following closely. The deviation between customer price and wholesale price 
may thus be substantial, also for these contract types, as was described in Section 3.1 (see Figure 3.1). 
Furthermore, none of these contracts have the possibility to reflect short-term price spikes as the one exemplified 6 
February 2003. 
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increased short-term demand response from households may thus have an increasing 
potential. 
4.2 Increased system reliability 
 
Reliability of supply in the power system is often characterised by system adequacy 
and security. Adequacy relates to the ability of the system to provide consumers’ 
demand at all times, while security relates to the ability of the system to handle 
disturbances (Oren, 2005). The Norwegian electricity market organisation is often 
referred to as an energy-only market, which means that generators are paid only for 
their produced energy.19 Under ideal conditions, energy-only markets are claimed to 
provide an adequate level of supply (Eltra et al., 2002, Oren, 2005). This level is where 
the cost of new capacity equals the willingness to pay for such capacity (von der Fehr et 
al., 2005).  
However, there are concerns regarding the energy-only market’s ability to provide 
sufficient investments.20 It is argued that the markets may suffer from inadequate 
capacity levels due to a number of conditions which may contribute to inefficient 
market performance. As Morey (2001) puts it, the question seems not to be whether a 
competitive market can provide adequate capacity, but whether a competitive wholesale 
power market can be achieved. One of the conditions that may contribute to inefficient 
market performance is lack of demand response.  
One of the reasons for this is that in the deregulated energy-only market framework, 
investments in generators (and demand side measures) are based on expectations of 
future energy prices (and maybe on income from the Regulating Power Market and 
Regulating Power Option Market). This means that the market model relies heavily on 
price signals, and consequently that the economic integrity of pricing mechanisms 
within the market rules is paramount (Fraser, 2001). Prices should provide the correct 
incentives for long-term investments decision and signal how much total capacity, and 
                                                 
19
 This is because no additional capacity mechanisms to ensure sufficient generation capacity exist. However, there 
may be payment for other services also, such as the Regulating Power Market or the Regulating Power Option 
Market. It may therefore not be entirely correct to refer to the Norwegian market as an energy-only market 
(Botterud and Korpås, 2004). 
20
 See, for instance, Doorman, 2000, Agerholm et al., 2004, Botterud and Korpås, 2006, de Vries, 2003, 2004, Stoft, 
2002, 2003, Eltra et al., 2002, Vázquez et al., 2002, Nordel, 2002. 
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which type of capacity, to build. However, when wholesale prices are not seen by the 
customers and their actual willingness to pay for supply of electricity is not reflected in 
the price in the market, the level of investments may consequently deviate from the 
most efficient one. Stoft (2003) argues that markets lacking demand responsiveness to 
prices learn nothing from high prices about consumer preferences for reliability. The 
required information simply does not exist when consumers’ trade off between 
consuming and not consuming at different price levels is not revealed in the market.  
Furthermore, because of the inelasticity of consumers and because it is impossible 
to prevent any customers from consuming electricity when they want, there is a chance 
that the demand and supply curve may fail to intersect (see Stoft, 2002, calling this a 
result of the two “Demand-Side Flaws”: lack of metering and real-time billing, and, lack 
of real-time control of power flow to specific customers). Any actions directed towards 
reducing the probability of disruptions of supply will, according to Jaffe and Felder 
(1996), create positive externalities. They argue that resource adequacy is a public good 
and will be underprovided in the market. Others argue that uncertainties deteriorate the 
willingness to invest. For instance, Agerholm et al. (2004) point out uncertainties about 
the price of electricity, and whether price caps or other changes to the market 
framework might be imposed by regulators.21 Stoft (2003) mentions the business risk 
associated with high price volatility as another factor. The long-run average rate of 
return is difficult to predict, so investors want a higher risk-premium on these risky 
investments. According to de Vries and Hakvoort (2004), it is not unlikely that investors 
will choose a risk-averse strategy, taken into account many of these (unquantifiable) 
uncertainties. Doorman (2000) argues that uncertainty is especially harmful for peaking 
                                                 
21
 Agerholm et al. (2004) also mention conditions which not necessarily are related to lack of demand response, for 
instance uncertainties about prices of other fuels and whether environmental restrictions (CO2 targets and prices), 
taxes or other changes to the framework might be imposed by regulators. It has also been maintained that the 
electricity market does not perform efficiently if entry barriers are high enough to prevent investments by new 
entrants. Incumbent producers may exploit this by under-investing in capacity in order to raise prices (Vázquez et 
al., 2002, Eltra et al., 2002). High entry barriers may be the case in the Nordic countries since, according to for 
instance Bye et al. (2003a) and TU (2006), public regulations here make it very difficult to establish new capacity. 
Furthermore, according to for instance Nordel (2004b), one of the prerequisites for the market to work is that risk 
can be kept at a reasonable level. Risk may be overcome by hedging at the financial markets (Stoft, 2003). 
However, financial contracts at Nord Pool can not be purchased for more than four years ahead which may not be 
sufficient for investment hedging purposes given long lead times and life times of generators. Furthermore, existing 
standard financial instruments are based on a flat profile which means e.g. peaking units possibly may lack a 
hedging product that otherwise, according to Nordel (2004b), could have secured more predictable revenues during 
peak periods. 
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generators, since the generator with the highest marginal cost will have to cover its 
investment during a few short periods where all generators run at their capacity limits. 
Given risk-aversion among investors, investments may thus only occur when very high 
prices can be expected, and if there are no risks of price caps (see also Vázquez et al., 
2002). However, as discussed in Finon et al. (2004), while high prices may be necessary 
to trigger investment, politicians may find them unacceptable. For instance, during the 
high-price period in 2002/03 politicians threatened to reregulate the Norwegian market 
(Bye and Hope, 2005). Politicians may especially find high prices unacceptable if they 
suspect high prices to be a result of abuse of market power by companies that are taking 
advantage of insufficient demand response (Oren, 2005, see also Section 4.4). And, if 
there is a risk that politicians may intervene in the price formation, investments may be 
postponed (Nordel, 2004a). 
The above discussion indicates several conditions that may cause the investment 
level to deviate from the most efficient one. Whether this is the situation in Norway will 
not be evaluated here. However, as illustrated by Glende et al. (2005), we note that the 
peak load in Norway has been steadily increasing the last years, while the generating 
capacity has not increased to the same extent, resulting in a gradually deteriorating 
capacity balance. Others, for instance Bye and Hope (2005), Grande et al. (2001) and 
von der Fehr et al. (2005), have also emphasized the tighter market conditions that now 
may be seen, and that ensuring adequate capacity is an important challenge. Statnett 
(2006b) points out that the power sector in Norway has never before been on the way 
into an investment phase with the organization of the sector that we have today, which 
confronts the sector with new challenges. Statnett asserts that within the sector 
organization and the policy we have today, it is not likely that new overcapacity will 
systematically be built; a situation with little or scarce capacity will be persistent.  
Some forecasts of the power balance in Norway and the whole Nordel area may 
further illustrate this. For the previous winter (2005/06), Norway as well as the whole 
Nordel area (the Nordic countries), were forecasted to have a deficit in the power 
balance in a very cold winter day, so that import to maintain balance between demand 
and supply could have been necessary (Statnett, 2005a, Nordel, 2005c). For the present 
winter (2006/07), both Norway and the Nordel area are forecasted to have a surplus in 
the power balance (Statnett, 2006a, Nordel, 2006b). Forecasts for the 2008/09 winter 
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again indicates the need for import in case of a very cold winter day for Norway and the 
whole Nordel area, while the situation in 2009/10 indicates surplus for Norway but a 
deficit in the power balance for the Nordel area (Nordel, 2005a, 2006a). These forecasts 
indicate that the demand and supply levels the next years will alternate around what 
may be regarded as a tighter balance. 
Hunt (2002) and Fraser (2001) maintain that the lack of demand response is the 
reason for the worries about reliability and the need for capacity markets, installed 
capacity requirements, price caps and other holdovers from the period of regulation, 
seen in many countries.22 Demand response is an important factor that may improve the 
functioning of the market and mitigate many of the concerns discussed above. One of 
the consequences with inelastic demand accompanied by increasing peak power 
consumption and lack of investments in supply, is that failure of market clearing in the 
day-ahead as well as in the regulating market may occur (Stridbæk, 2003). This is 










Figure 4.2.  Demand response may avoid rationing 
 
                                                 
22
 Due to the concerns of the inability of the energy-only market to ensure adequate supply levels, additional 
instruments and different organizations of the market have been proposed and are in use in different markets 
around the world in order to meet the shortcomings of the energy-only market or in order to make the markets 
more complete. Capacity obligations, capacity payments, proxy market pricing or capacity subscription (see a 
discussion of these in Doorman, 2000), consumer response options (Stridbæk, 2003), and reliability contracts based 
on financial call options (Vázquez et al., 2002) are some examples. 
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The figure indicates two different situations. The first is where inelastic demand 
(Qpeak) exceeds available capacity (Q’peak), for instance due to extreme cold, generator 
outages etc. With inelastic demand, involuntary disconnection of customers with the 
amount of Qpeak- Q’peak may be necessary to maintain the power balance. This may lead 
to substantial loss of load costs, and may also be considered socially unacceptable. In 
addition, physical rationing is inefficient since all disconnected customers are equally 
affected, regardless of their willingness to pay for the electricity (Faruqui et al., 2002). 23  
Instead of resorting to involuntary rationing, this situation can therefore be 
managed by voluntary adjustments to high prices, as indicated in the second situation 
where demand response is present in the wholesale market with an elastic demand 
curve. Demand response ensures market clearing at Q’peak, and thus helps balancing 
demand and supply. This implies that periods of under-investments of capacity in the 
market leads to higher prices rather than rationing of customers. As Fraser (2001) 
explains, if customers’ willingness to pay is brought through to the wholesale market, 
each customer actually declares a maximum reservation price (i.e., each customer’s 
value of lost load), which the customer is prepared to pay. The demand curve then 
becomes an ordered list of individual customer value of lost loads. Some argue that 
when customers ration themselves in this way, the public good characteristic of system 
adequacy is turned into a private one (IEA, 2003, Oren, 2005). The second situation also 
illustrates that the elastic demand curve may ensure clearing above marginal cost of the 
last unit, which may be necessary for generators to cover their fixed costs (see for 
instance Fraser, 2001 or Stoft, 2002).  
According to Hunt (2002), California had to employ rolling blackouts with a 
shortage of only 300 MW in a system of 50,000 MW, which means that a very small 
reduction in demand was needed to avoid the blackouts. Others have also pointed out 
that one of the key factors of the problems in California’s market was the absence of 
demand response (Faruqui and George, 2002, Fraser, 2001).  
Increased demand response provides flatter daily load shapes, and a better 
utilization of the capacity for both generators and the networks. With lower peaks, the 
                                                 
23
 The average interruption cost for the total of Norwegian consumption is estimated at about 4 /kWh interrupted 
(Glende et al., 2005). Typically average outage cost used for system planning purposes in the US, range from $2.5 
to $5/kWh (Boisvert et al., 2002, DOE, 2006). 
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transmission or generator capacity may not need to be dimensioned for the same 
extreme demand that may only occur for a few hours a year. The necessity of expanding 
the transmission system or building new peak power plants may thus be less, or deferred 
(Borenstein, 2002b, DOE, 2006, Earle and Faruqui, 2006).  
Another advantage with demand responsive customers is that their bidding in the 
day-ahead market implies that demand during extreme situations is less than without 
demand response (see Figure 4.1). This may have reliability benefits since additional 
supplies become available for the Regulating Power Market to meet possible 
contingencies (see also Hirst, 2002a, Braithwait and Eakin, 2002). Some of these 
resources may be better suited for fast response in this market. Opportunities for 
retailers or network companies to aggregate reductions from certain types of load and 
sell this into the Regulating Power Market may also provide the system operator with 
more competition and cheaper prices in this balancing market (see Grande et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, as Braithwait and Eakin (2002) maintain, when the market performance is 
improved and load becomes more stable, the desired or needed reserve requirement may 
decrease.  
It may also be less expensive and less time consuming to activate demand response 
and strengthen the peak load balance compared to investment in generating capacity 
(Earle and Faruqui, 2006, Nordel 2004a). Furthermore, Earle and Faruqui argue how 
implementing the necessary infrastructure for demand response, before an actual 
capacity shortage situation occurs, may have an option value. As they put it; it might be 
valuable to pay an insurance premium today as a hedge against future outages (see also 
Stridbæk (2003), arguing in the same line).  
Finally, demand response may reduce price volatility, thus contributing to reduce 
investors’ uncertainty regarding investments in new capacity which may contribute to 
more timely investments. This will be discussed in the next section. 
Overall, we can see that demand response may contribute to benefits and reduced 
costs of maintaining a reliable and well-functioning electricity system. Those savings 
may eventually be distributed among several participators in the electricity market and 
may benefit all customers; those on time-differentiated tariffs and those on traditional 
tariffs.  
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4.3 Reduced prices and price volatility 
 
Highly volatile spot prices in the day-ahead market may occur due to the 
inelasticity of demand in the wholesale market, the non-storable property of electricity, 
uncertainty regarding demand that vary by time of year, week and day, available 
production and transmission capacity, bottlenecks and possible exercise of market 
























Figure 4.3. Different hourly spot prices for different days in the Oslo area 
 
As seen in the figure, prices may vary significantly during the day and between 
seasons. For instance, during 5 February 2001, prices increased substantially, indicating 
a power capacity shortage situation. We also see that prices were constantly high during 
6 January 2003 due to the energy scarcity situation. Also shown is the peak price 
situation 6 February 2003, discussed in Section 3.1. Examples of low prices are 16 July 
2000 and 9 May 2004. Although these examples indicate significant price variation, 
prices traditionally vary little within the day in Norway. This may however change if 
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the capacity situation continues to tighten, and also as a result of new transmission 
capacity to countries with thermal power production. 
Several analyses and simulations support that demand responsiveness provides 
lower prices during peak periods, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. For instance, Boisvert et 
al. (2002) analyses how price responsive load contributed to relieve the electricity 
system at a time when electricity peak demand reached all time high levels, using data 
from demand response programs in the state of New York. They found that the increase 
in demand response reduced prices and price volatility in both the day-ahead market and 
the real-time market. The authors claim that only a little price responsive load can go a 
long way toward reducing prices and price volatility. Caves et al. (2000) simulated the 
market impacts of demand and supply shocks in the Midwest in the USA under a 
scenario where only 10 percent of the load had a spot price based contract. The 
simulations show that prices would be reduced by as much as 73 percent from the 
highest prices. Jaske (2002) reported results from an experiment performed by CalPX, 
which operated a day-ahead market in the USA. By re-simulating market prices with 
hypothetical load reductions from price responsive load, they found the price to 
decrease by approximately 28, 58 and 75 percent for load reductions of 5, 10 and 15 
percent in the peak price hour, respectively. Simulations performed by Nordel have 
shown that demand response in one region of the Nordic countries will contribute to 
stabilize the spot prices also in other regions (Kristensen et al., 2004). See also 
Braithwait and Faruqui (2001) or Hirst (2002b) for similar computations. 
Furthermore, with respect to Figure 3.3 showing the market cross for the hour 
17:00-18:00, 6 February; if for instance 600 MW less demand (approximately 3 percent 
of the total cleared demand) were bid into the Elspot market at some predefined level 
because of customers demand response, let’s say at prices above 500 NOK, this could 
have been enough to clear the market at nearly half the price this hour. Pettersen (2004) 
also shows how demand response may even out prices, not only between peak and off-
peak periods of the day, but also between seasons.  
As described in the previous section, investments in peaking units are highly risky 
because they need market clearing above their marginal cost, which occurs in 
constrained situations only. The length and height of the price peaks must be high 
enough to recover the investment costs. The more elastic demand is, the less volatile are 
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the price, and the less is the uncertainties with respect to future income from 
investments in generators. Increasing demand response may therefore contribute to 
increased propensity to invest. Since the likelihood of extreme prices also is reduced, 
the chance for political interventions in the market by for instance imposing price caps 
may also be less. This further reduces investors’ uncertainty. Reduced volatility further 
reduces the retailers' price risk, which may lead to lower hedging costs at the financial 
markets. This provides benefits that in the next turn may be passed on to the consumers 
through lower tariff rates (Boisvert et al., 2002, Braithwait and Eakin, 2002, DOE, 
2006). Lowering peak prices may ultimately also lower average prices, which may 
benefit also consumers who choose standard variable or fixed price contracts (Boisvert 
et al., 2002, Hirst, 2002b). However, as pointed out by Ruff (2002), bill reductions due 
to lower peak prices are rent transfers, not necessarily social benefits. Notwithstanding, 
many (for instance politicians) regard lower peak prices as benefits.  
4.4 Mitigation of market power 
 
In periods when peak demand approaches the limits of the production capacity, the 
market may clear at the steep part of the supply curve, as happened 6 February 2003 
(see Figure 3.3). Then, producers with a significant market share may withhold enough 
power from the market to shift the supply curve to the left, and achieve higher price 
levels.24 Taking 6 February 2003 as an example; if less than 3 percent of the total supply 
bid at the Nord Pool Spot was held back between 17:00-18:00, the price could have 
been doubled. However, the gains for producers of such attempts to exercise market 
power depend on the trade-off between selling less power to a higher price and selling 
more power to a lower price. The gain is higher if raising the price has little short-term 
impact on the demand. That is, with a significant share of consumption coming from 
consumers facing prices that do not vary by time of the day, the incentive for exercising 
market power is higher. On the other hand, with time-differentiated prices conveying 
real-time prices to demand responsive customers, companies holding back power from 
the market will have smaller impacts on the wholesale price. This reduces the 
                                                 
24
 Bye and Hope (2005) points out that any producer on the margin (in restricted price areas), even a small firm, may 
also exercise market power. 
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profitability of exercising market power (see also Borenstein, 2000, Borenstein et al., 
2000, DOE, 2006). 
Another point is that when firms exercise market power, prices deviate from the 
cost of production. Reducing market power therefore contributes not only to reduced 
price volatility and price spikes, it reduces wealth transfer from customers to suppliers, 
and reduces efficiency losses in the market that occur from the difference of what the 
customers pay and the marginal production cost (Borenstein, 2002a, Lafferty et al, 
2003). Besides, artificially high prices may lead firms, which are dependent on 
electricity, not to establish new businesses (Borenstein et al. 2000). De Vries (2003) and 
Twomey et al. (2005) further remark that since exercise of market power may distort 
prices, investment decisions with respect to new capacity may also be distorted. 
Mitigating market power by increasing demand response can thus also reduce 
uncertainties and improve the basis on which investors make their investment decisions.  
4.5 Other benefits 
 
With automatic meter reading and direct load control technology, the opportunities 
for a retailer to differentiate its products from those of its competitors' is enhanced. 
Customers get more opportunities to choose from and can select the tariffs or products 
that are best designed for their specific wants and needs, and then tolerance for risk.  
More accurate meter reading and billing of the customers, also prevent possible 
tactic meter reading by customers, and reduce the costs for customers as they no longer 
need to read and report their consumption manually.  
Environmental benefits may also arise if increased demand response leads to a 
reduction in peak period emission that weighs up against possible increases in off-peak 
production emissions (Holland and Mansur, 2004, 2006). Holland and Mansur find that 
the impact on the emissions of SO2, NOX and CO2 depends on the generation 
technology characteristics of the region they analyses. Another benefit is that new 
power plants or transmission lines with environmental impacts may not be needed if 
peak load is reduced. 
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In addition, some claim that energy efficiency may follow from demand response 
programs. For instance, Faruqui (1983) surveyed 12 TOU experiments and found that 
overall reduction in daily consumption generally occurs. In Puget Sound Energy Time-
of-Use pilot program (PSE, 2003) it was documented a 1 percent average decline in 
total monthly energy use by TOU pricing participants. An IEA (2003) publication 
suggests that typical residential programs deliver approximately 2 percent reductions in 
energy consumed. 
Since increased demand response provides a less varying demand, it will give more 
continuous utilization of generators, hence reducing starting and stopping of peak 
production, which tend to increase wear and tear for the generators (TU, 2005). 
Reduced demand during peak periods also reduces losses in the grid (Haugen et al., 
2004). 
Finally, under the existing load profile billing system, customers with little 
electricity consumption during peak periods and much electricity in the off-peak periods 
actually subsidize those with "the opposite" consumption pattern (Borenstein, 2002b, 
Borenstein, 2005). Instead of mainly paying the off-peak prices, as the customers would 
do with a time-differentiated price, a part of the customers' off-peak consumption is also 
charged the peak price, according to the adjusted load profile. Hunt (2002) remarks, “It 
is hard to think of any other industry where products whose price varies so widely are 
bundled together for sale”. Many customers consider this unfair, and may therefore 
want to be charged by time-differentiated tariffs.  
5 Evidences of households’ demand responsiveness  
 
The release of many of the benefits depends on the consumers’ demand 
responsiveness. It has therefore been important to quantify price elasticities by 
conducting time-differentiated pricing experiments. This section reviews some of the 
literature analysing data from these experiments. 
In some European countries, time-differentiated electricity rates have been tested or 
been in use for some decades, while the U.S.' interest for demand response programs 
Article I  
52 
grew in the 1970’s, partly due to the oil crisis and a growing environmental concern 
(Eto, 1996). 25  
Papers analysing consumers' responses to time-differentiated prices were few 
before researchers analysed a series of 16 experiments carried out in the US in the late 
1970’s and 80’s. Two annuals of Journal of Econometrics were in its entirety devoted to 
many of these analyses (Aigner, 1984, Lawrence and Aigner, 1979). Since then, an 
extensive literature has developed on residential consumer response to variable pricing. 
Also, literature on load control of e.g. water heaters has been published, although not to 
the same extent. This review will therefore mainly focus on the time-differentiated 
pricing literature, but will also describe some experiments including load control. 
Furthermore, this review focuses on residential electricity consumers only.26  
The first experiments usually featured the TOU rate. However, due to the static 
properties of this rate as described in Section 3.2 (it is constant in each time block 
regardless of varying conditions in the electricity system), more dynamic rates, such as 
real-time market prices or the CPP rate, have been tested recently. Most of the papers on 
customers' responses to time-differentiated pricing have therefore analyzed TOU 
programs. Very few papers where end-users at the household level have been offered 
spot price tariffs, are published.  
Usually, the results from analyses of consumers' responses are reported in terms of 
elasticities. The most common is the own price elasticity (usually only referred to as the 
price elasticity) and the elasticity of substitution. The own price elasticity is defined as 
the percentage change in quantity demanded, divided by the percentage change in price. 
The elasticity of substitution is the negative of the percentage change in the ratio of 
peak to off-peak consumption, divided by the percentage change in the ratio of the peak 
to the off-peak price.27 
                                                 
25
 For instance, time-of-use (TOU) rates have been reported in use as early as 1913 (Mountain and Lawson, 1995), 
and water heater load control as early as 1934 (Hastings, 1980). Since 1965, French households have been offered 
the choice between a standard flat rate and a rate with two daily pricing periods (Aubin et al., 1995), in the UK a 
large TOU tariff experiment was conducted in 1966/67 (Hawdon, 1992) and Finland has offered consumers a TOU 
rate since 1970 (Kärkkäinen, 2005).  
26
 For papers analyzing or reviewing commercial and industrial customers, see for instance Aigner and Hirschberg 
(1985), Aigner et al. (1994), Faruqui and George (2005), Ham, Mountain and Chan (1997), Hopper et al. (2006), 
Mak and Chapman (1993), Schwarz et al. (2002).  
27
 According to King and Chatterjee (2003), an elasticity of substitution of 0.17 is consistent with a peak-period own 
price elasticity of approximately -0.3. 
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5.1 TOU experiments 
 
The results from the analyses of the 16 U.S. projects conducted in the 1970/80's 
differed, and questions were raised how to transfer the results to other regions, which 
was one of the intentions with the experiments (Aigner, 1984, Lawrence and Aigner, 
1979). Initiatives were therefore taken to investigate whether consistency could be 
found across the experiments if the differences between the experimental characteristics 
where controlled for. Caves et al. (1984) reviewed several of the experiments and 
selected five with sufficiently high quality that could be used to pool the data. Their 
analyses found consistent price responses across the experiments when the effects from 
weather, appliance holdings and household characteristics were controlled for. They 
found the substitution elasticity to vary depending on the stock of electric appliances in 
the homes. For a typical customer the elasticity was 0.14, for a household with no major 
appliances it was 0.07, while a household with all major electric appliances had a 
substitution elasticity of 0.21. Baladi et al. (1998) report similar findings from a later 
U.S. experiment. 
A Norwegian TOU electricity pricing experiment took place during the period from 
1984 to 1987 and included 374 households that volunteered for the experiment. Vaage 
(1995) found the results to be quite comparable with the results from the U.S. 
experiments. The elasticity of substitution varied between 0.13 in the winter and 0.24 in 
the spring, with an average over the whole period of 0.18. Hence, price responses were 
highest in the part of the year that is considered as off-peak period. Furthermore, 
nighttime consumption was more elastic than daytime consumption. Vaage also tested 
whether the elasticity changed during the two years the consumers faced the TOU rate. 
Although the substitution elasticity showed a slight increase from the first to the second 
year, he evaluated it to be too small to be given any weigh. Hauge (1993) analyzed data 
from the same experiment, and found somewhat higher responses, and also that 
responses were higher in households with a higher total consumption of electricity, 
living in detached houses and with alternative heating sources. 
In Great Britain, a TOU pricing experiment took place from April 1989 to March 
1990. Henley and Peirson (1998) analyzed data from this project, and found that 
consumers reduced daytime consumption in response to the prices and that the price 
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response was dependent on temperature (price elasticity was highest at 10°C). They 
reported price elasticities of -0.10 and -0.25 at 10°C. In an earlier work, Henley and 
Peirson (1994) found that responses were different depending on the customers' 
consumption strata, with higher responses in the highest strata. 
Train and Mehrez (1994) analysed a TOU tariff experiment in California in 1985 
and 1986. They estimated price elasticities of –0.15 in the peak and –0.25 in the off-
peak period, and also found that peak and off-peak consumption are substitutes because 
of positive cross-price elasticities. 
Filippini (1995a) analyzed panel data from 21 cities in Switzerland, from the period 
1987 to 1990, where consumers faced a time-of-use tariff or a two-part tariff. Unlike 
most other studies, which use micro data, this study was based on aggregated cross-
sections data at city or state level. Filippini found elasticities that are much higher than 
in most other studies. He found peak elasticities to range from -1.29 to -1.50 and off-
peak elasticities from -2.36 to -2.42. Another analysis by Filippini (1995b), this time 
using micro data, confirmed the previous results with estimated elasticities in the same 
range. 
In a Japanese TOU experiment in Japan, Matsukawa (2001) found price elasticities 
close to those in Filippini (1995). However, contrary to the Swiss results, Matsukawa 
found peak elasticities (-0.70 to -0.77) to exceed off-peak elasticities (-0.51 to -0.72). 
A residential TOU program carried out by Puget Sound Energy in the USA in 
2001/2002 showed a shifting of 5 – 6 percent of the customers’ consumption out of 
high-priced periods (Williamson, 2002). This result must be seen in light of very low 
price differentials in the experiment, which gave limited incentives for the consumers to 
shift their energy use. 
These results indicate that customers do respond to time-differentiated prices, but 
the extent to which they respond varies between the experiments. According to 
Braithwait and Eakin (2002), the average elasticity of substitution from traditional TOU 
programs is about 0.15. According to King and Chatterjee (2003), the average own price 
elasticity from all types of programs (including CPP and automated thermostat control 
programs, discussed in the next section) is -0.3.  
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5.2 Dynamic pricing and direct load control experiments 
 
Dynamic rates have often been combined with signal lamps or enabling 
technologies. For instance, Räsänen et al. (1995) analysed data from a voluntary 
dynamic pricing experiment in Finland during 1988-1993. A yellow signal lamp warned 
the customers one day in advance that the critical peak price could be charged their 
usage, and a red lamp signaled the customers during the peak hours that the critical peak 
price was actually in effect. Räsänen et al. found it important to analyze impacts of the 
rates at an individual customer level, since the customers' responses differ. In their data 
they found an active and a passive response group. The passive group reduced their 
consumption in peak period with 16 to 26 percent while the active group showed strong 
responses with 60 to 71 percent reductions.  
Elecricité de France has for a long time offered their electricity consumers time-of-
use tariffs. From 1996 the French electric utility also introduced critical-peak price 
tariffs for its residential consumers. Prior to this introduction, from 1989 to 1992, they 
conducted an experiment with this so-called tempo-tariff. With this tariff, the year is 
divided into 22 red, 43 white and 300 blue days, and each day has a peak and an off-
peak period. The red days charged electricity consumption the highest prices and the 
largest peak/off-peak price ratios, and the white days the lowest prices and smallest 
ratios. As in the Finnish experiment, the end-users were notified with a signal lamp of 
the next day's price structure at the end of each day. The prices accompanied with each 
of the days were fixed and known for the customers, but the colour of the days was 
unknown until the evening before. Aubin et al. (1995) found high elasticities in this 
experiment, with a peak price elasticity of -0.79 and off-peak elasticity of -0.28.  
A large-scale project in the USA tested a real-time market price on households, 
with a notification by e-mail or phone if the next day's price exceeded USD 0.10. The 
analysis of the data found price elasticity of -0.04. This somewhat low result must be 
seen in light of prices that were not particularly high in the test period (Summit Blue 
Consulting, 2004). 
The above experiments did not assist the consumers' load reductions by 
automatically controlling loads. Other experiments have done this by offering enabling 
technologies such as direct load control, combined with time-differentiated pricing in 
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order to enhance the consumers' price response. King (2004) made a survey of programs 
with dynamic pricing of electricity and/or with automated control. The intention of the 
survey was to compare the peak demand reducing performance of programs with only 
dynamic pricing or with only automated control, with programs that combined those 
two demand response measures. He found load reductions for programs that integrated 
dynamic pricing with automated load control to be on average 53 percent larger than 
load reductions in programs with only load control. He further found the integrated 
programs to give 102 percent larger reductions compared with programs with only 
dynamic pricing. 
An example of one such project is a program in the USA that used a critical-peak 
price tariff together with an interactive communication system. This system allowed the 
utility to send a signal to the consumers when critical prices were expected and also 
allowed the customers to program and schedule some of their appliances in order to 
modify the consumption according to the prices. Braithwait (2000) analyzed data from 
the project and found elasticities of substitution of approximately 0.3.  
Hartway et al. (1999) found load reductions of up to 1.95 kW (approximately 35 
percent reduction) in another program in the USA. They attributed these high responses 
to the high price differential (6.5:1), and to customers’ programming of their air 
conditioners using an advanced energy management system.  
The results from the recently finished Statewide Pricing Pilot in California (Faruqui 
and George, 2005, CRA, 2005) further illustrate the same results. Although 
comparisons between the different customer groups in the program should be made with 
care, the results showed that customers with enabling technologies responded more than 
customers without this equipment. 
6 Conclusions 
 
Increasing short-term demand response in the Norwegian electricity market may 
increase efficiency, improve system reliability, decrease price volatility and mitigate 
exercise of market power. These market performance improvements may contribute to 
lessen uncertainties for investors of new capacity due to a market framework that may 
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become more predictable, thus providing more timely and correct investments 
decisions. These benefits may prove valuable as the Norwegian and the Nordic market 
now enter a period with tighter conditions and with uncertainties regarding new 
investments in electricity production.  
Approximately 40 percent of the annual electricity consumption, and probably 
more than 40 percent of the power consumption during cold peak periods, is metered by 
technologies that can only measure accumulated consumption. This prohibits the use of 
time-differentiated electricity tariffs that reflect wholesale prices because such tariffs 
require automatic meter reading. Consequently, households only face prices that are 
fixed for long periods of time, and have no incentives to adjust consumption according 
to the short-term varying market conditions signalled in the wholesale prices. This 
consumer group will therefore to a limited extent contribute to achieve the benefits 
described in this paper. Experiences from around the world have shown that households 
are responsive to the price. This suggests that households better integrated into the 
electricity market can be important contributors to increase demand response, and thus 
to improve the functioning and increase the efficiency of the Norwegian and the Nordic 
market. 
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In Norway there is a growing concern that electricity production and transmission may 
not meet the demand in peak-load situations. It is therefore important to evaluate the 
potential of different demand side measures that may contribute to reduce peak load. 
This paper analyses data from an experiment where residential water heaters were 
automatically disconnected during peak periods of the day. A model of hourly 
electricity consumption is used to evaluate the effects on the load of the disconnections. 
The results indicate an average consumption reduction per household of approximately 
0.5 kWh/h during disconnection, and an additional average increase in consumption the 
following hour, due to the payback effect, of approximately 0.2 kWh/h. 
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Peak electricity consumption in Norway has been increasing, and is expected to 
continue to increase in the years to come (Glende et al., 2005). However, since 
deregulation of the electricity market in 1991, new investment in power generation has 
been at a low level (Bye and Hope, 2005). Periods with extreme cold weather have 
revealed a vulnerable production and distribution system, as consumption in such peak 
situations has been close to capacity. This calls for a flexible demand side with the 
potential of reducing loads in peak situations to relieve the constrained system. Demand 
response may consequently defer the need for costly augmentation of the electricity grid 
or power production.  
Direct load control and time-differentiated tariffs are two measures to obtain 
demand response that have been tested and used worldwide. A direct load control 
programme often involves customers who are willing to offer electricity-consuming 
appliances for load reduction if they are compensated economically. Traditional 
interruptible programmes have paid their customers in advance for participating, for 
example, through rate discounts. An example is an air conditioner and water heater load 
programme in the USA, where customers are provided with discounts on their 
electricity bill if they participate in the programme (Xcel Energy, 2005). The customers 
receive $US6 for each month in the summer if they allow 15–20 minutes cycling of 
their air conditioner in the hot summer months and an additional $US2 each month for 
the whole year if they allow their water heaters to be disconnected for six-hour periods 
on hot summer days or cold winter days. The utility is only allowed to control the 
appliances for a maximum of 300 hours per year. In 2001, when approximately 280,000 
residential customers were on the programme, electricity consumption was reduced by 
330 MW in peak situations. Another example where water heaters are under direct 
control is an Australian programme involving 355,000 water heaters. This control 
reduces peak electricity consumption by 389 MW. The incentive for the customers to 
participate in the programme is lower rates for their water heating (Charles River 
Associates, 2003). A direct load control programme in the USA controls air 
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conditioning, central electric heaters, electric water heaters and swimming pool pumps. 
A total of 800,000 controlled points provides 1,000 MW of demand reduction in normal 
operation, and 2,000 MW in emergency situations (Malemezian, 2004). 
Direct load control is often combined with time-differentiated pricing, such as time-
of-use or dynamic pricing, to assist reduction of consumption during high-priced peak 
periods. King (2004) found load reductions for programmes that integrated dynamic 
pricing with automated load control to be on average 53% larger than load reductions in 
programmes with load control alone. He further found the integrated programmes give 
102% larger reductions than programmes with only dynamic pricing, i.e., over twice the 
reduction. 
Water heaters constitute approximately 10% of the electricity consumption in 
Norwegian households (Larsen and Nesbakken, 2005). Direct load control of water 
heaters may therefore have a large demand response potential which is important to 
quantify. This paper provides such estimates by studying data from a large-scale 
Norwegian project where load control of residential water heaters was applied. Hourly 
measurement of the electricity consumption from 475 households, number of hours of 
daylight each day, and the local temperature and wind speed in a six-month period from 
November 2003 to May 2004, provide a large panel data set that we analyse with 
statistical methods. We develop a fixed effects regression model of hourly electricity 
consumption and use it to evaluate the impact of the water heater control on households’ 
load curves.  
The results from the analysis show significant electricity consumption reductions 
during disconnections of the water heaters. The results also indicate additional 
consumption when the heaters are reconnected due to the so-called “payback” or “cold 
load pickup” effect (which is explained in the next section) which may cause a new 
peak in the electricity system, suggesting cycling the control events may be necessary. 
Section 2 describes factors that may influence the load reducing potential and the 
payback effect experienced when applying direct load control of water heaters, Section 
3 describes the experiment and the data that are analysed and Section 4 describes the 




2 Water heaters and load control 
 
When water heaters are used for direct load control, essentially all of the energy not 
supplied to the heaters when they are disconnected from the electricity supply will be 
required when they are reconnected. When switched on, all affected heaters that were 
supposed to be on during the control period, will start recovering from the interruption 
at the same time. Unless handled properly, this payback effect may have the undesired 
effect of creating a new peak in the electricity system. It is thus useful to discuss some 
causes for the effects experienced when water heaters are used for load control. This 
section describes some of these factors. 
A water heater is used to heat and store hot water. A typical Norwegian residential 
water heater holds 200 litres and has a rated heating element capacity of 2 kW. The heat 
loss from a tank is approximately 0.1 kWh/h at a temperature of 75°C (HiO, 2005). It 
takes approximately 2.3 hours for a full heated tank to drop in temperature by 1°C in 
stand-by mode, i.e., when no hot water is drawn from the tank. The water heater’s 
thermostat is usually a bimetallic strip with a dead-band of approximately 4°C. This 
means that the heating element will start operating when temperature falls below 73°C 
and stop operating when the temperature exceeds 77°C. Due to the thermostat’s dead-
band, a full heated tank in stand-by mode will require approximately nine hours before 
the thermostat activates the heating element as a result of heat loss. Orphelin and Adnot 
(1999) found that most heaters are operating due to the households’ usage of water 
rather than due to heat losses. 
When a household uses hot water, the water is drawn from the top of the tank. At 
the same time, cold water refills at the bottom of the tank. The thermostat is placed a 
few centimetres above the bottom, and will respond to a temperature drop by activating 
the heating element. A hand wash may use only a few litres of hot water. The energy 
use is accordingly low, and a heater will need to operate for only a few minutes to 
restore the energy used.1 A large family may use all the hot water, approximately 14 
kWh, when all members are showering, which requires the heating element to operate 
                                                 
1
 However, small amounts of water use may not activate the heating element. This is explained below. 
Direct load control of residential water heaters 
73 
for seven hours afterwards. Those two examples may represent a range of energy use 
due to hot water use during morning hours in different households. 
Because hot water can be stored for long periods of time without significant heat 
loss in a well-insulated tank, it is well suited to heat water at one period of the day and 
use this water at another period. Direct load control of water heaters has therefore been 
widely applied to reduce peak load. The idea is to turn off the electricity supply to a 
large number of heaters during peak periods. If all heaters have elements of 2 kW-rated 
capacity, the maximum theoretical load reduction achievable is 2 kWh/h per heater. 
However, the average reduction of load per household is likely to be less, due to 
diversity with respect to the timing of the hot water usage between households. 
Two principle outlines of energy recover in water heaters, with and without 
disconnections of the heaters, in hypothetical household groups with different usage 
(high and low) of hot water are shown in parts (a) and (b) of Figure 2.1. The heating 
element capacity is assumed to be the same for all households. For illustrative purposes 
it is assumed that the starting point for hot water usage is distributed uniformly over the 
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Figure 2.1. Energy recovering of water heaters with and without disconnections for 
households with a high level of hot water consumption, 1,…,n (a), and low level 




Figure 2.1 shows water heaters of two household groups with n households in each 
group. There is one heater at each “line”. The shaded and the white areas indicate the 
operating period for the heaters under normal conditions if a disconnection is not made. 
The shaded area indicates the period of hot water use (it is assumed that the heaters start 
operating immediately after hot water is drawn, i.e., at the beginning of the shaded 
area). The households use hot water at different times; in each group, number 1 starts 
consuming hot water first and number n last. A disconnection starts at t0 and finishes at 
t1, when the heaters are reconnected. The black area indicates the period when the 
heaters recover energy in the situation where a disconnection has occurred. The black 
area is simply the part of the energy recovery period that could not be accomplished due 
to the disconnection and which is postponed compared to the normal situation, without 
the disconnection. Approximately the same amount of energy that would normally be 
consumed during a disconnection will be consumed after the heater is reconnected.2 
This demand will be added to the system load and give rise to consumption that would 
normally not exist if load control did not occur. This payback effect is therefore the 
result of a disturbance in the natural diversity of the heaters used for load control (see 
for example Rau and Graham (1979) and van Tonder and Lane (1996) for a similar 
discussion). 
Figure 2.1(a) shows households with a high level of hot water usage. It can be seen 
that the disconnection affects the first water heater only slightly. The heater has nearly 
finished recovering the energy loss when it is disconnected; the final part of its 
restoration of the energy must wait until the heater is reconnected. Disconnection of this 
water heater will contribute little to load reduction in the electricity system. 
Nevertheless, the heater will contribute with its full-rated capacity at the time of 
reconnection, although only for a short time. To some extent, this will also be the case 
for the second and third heaters. The heaters in the middle of the figure will, however, 
contribute to a reduction with their rated capacity during the entire disconnection 
period. In addition, as these heaters start operating close to the time of disconnection 
and have a long recovery period, their payback contribution occurs after t1. At every 
                                                 
2
 There will be a very small energy saving effect as the heaters are left for a period at a lower temperature than they 
otherwise would have been. 
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moment during the disconnection period, it can be seen that the disconnection affects 10 
heaters. When reconnected, only five heaters contribute to the payback effect at every 
moment until t3. In this example the power demand added to the system load after a 
disconnection is therefore only half the size of the reduced power demand during the 
disconnection. The system load curve will return to normal shape after t3, when all 
heaters affected by the load control have restored the energy consumed by the hot water 
use. 
Figure 2.1(b) shows households with a low level of hot water consumption. Their 
contribution to load reduction in the electricity system is small, and the disconnection 
has no effect on most of the heaters. For those that are affected, only one heater is 
disconnected in a certain time interval whereas five heaters will start operating 
simultaneously when reconnected, giving a payback effect from t1 to t2. The power 
demand added to the system load after a disconnection is five times the size of the 
reduced power demand during the disconnection. Furthermore, the size of the payback 
is the same as from the high hot water consumers in Figure 2.1(a). The system load 
curve will however quickly return to normal shape (after t2), when all heaters affected 
by the load control have restored the energy consumed by the hot water usages. 
Parts (a) and (b) of Figure 2.2 illustrate the discussion above with load curves 
during a day with and without disconnection of water heaters for the two customer 
groups. 
 





           






 (a) (b) 
Figure 2.2. Load curves with and without disconnection for households with a high level of 
hot water consumption (a), and low level of hot water consumption (b) 
 
time t0 t1 t3 time t0 t2 t1 
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These simplified examples indicate some effects experienced when water heaters 
are used in load control programmes. Consumption is shifted out of the disconnection 
period to a later period. The payback effect will then give rise to extra consumption in 
the system load that would not have taken place otherwise. The figure illustrates that the 
low hot water consumers contribute little to reducing the load during the disconnection, 
but still create a high, although brief, peak when reconnected. This suggests that 
households with the highest consumption of hot water may be the target group in a 
direct load control programme. 
The above discussion illustrates some effects that may occur due to differing 
amounts of hot water consumption among households in a direct water heater load 
control programme. Further, the capacity of the heating elements of the water heaters 
will influence the effects. Given two consumer groups of equal size and with similar 
amounts of hot water consumption distributed equally over time, heaters with a low-
rated heating element capacity will require a longer time to restore energy than those 
with high capacity, and the demand during restoration will be smaller. The group of 
heaters with a high heating element capacity will contribute the same demand reduction 
during the disconnection as those with the low-element capacity, but will yield a higher 
payback demand, although over a shorter period of time, before water temperature is 
restored. 
The inlet temperature of water to the tanks also influences the impact on the load 
curve from control events. Low inlet temperature will contribute to longer heating 
periods and vice versa. 
The frequency of hot water use may contribute to different impacts from load 
control, depending on the region where it is applied. A survey of Norwegians’ 
showering habits revealed that the frequency of showers differed between regions. For 
example, the percentages of citizens showering daily differed from 31% in one region to 
66% in another region (Pettersen, 2006). 
The timing of the households’ hot water consumption may also be important. Most 
people in Norway start their day from 5 to 8 am (Vaage, 2002). This suggests that a 
large share of the water heaters in Norway are operating around these morning hours 
(around 7 to 9 am). For the evening, the proportion of people that are home from work 
and have a meal is highest around 4 to 5 pm. The proportion of households performing 
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household work is highest around 6 pm. Disconnections occurring around those two 
periods of the day (morning and afternoon) may then give the largest consumption 
reductions since this will probably affect a high proportion of the households’ heaters. 
The design of the heater may also be important. A tank will always contain a 
volume of water below the heating element that remains unheated, and this unheated 
volume will be larger if the heating element is installed horizontally than if it is tilted 
downwards inside the tank (the thermostat is placed above the element for both 
designs). When hot water is drawn, the unheated water will be pushed upwards and 
activate the thermostat. Therefore, because the unheated water is just below the 
thermostat in the horizontal design, use of even small volumes of hot water will activate 
the thermostat. In the downward-tilted design, the unheated water is further below and 
larger volumes of hot water use are allowed before the cold water reaches and activates 
the thermostat. Furthermore, some heaters are designed with a cold-water distributor, 
which decreases the velocity of the inlet water so that the water at the bottom is blended 
to a lesser degree. This allows larger volumes of hot water to be drawn without 
activating the heater. 
The length of a disconnection will also influence the size of the initial payback 
demand from all households affected by the control event, since a longer disconnection 
period affects more heaters. 
Therefore, load control carried out in different areas may give different load 
reductions and different payback effects if, for example, hot water consumption 
behaviour, types of water heaters, etc., differ between areas due to differing 
demographic characteristics of the households (see also Gustavson et al. (1993), for a 
discussion of some of these factors). 
3 Experimental data 
 
The project “End-user Flexibility by Efficient Use of Information and 
Communication Technology” (2001–2004) was a Norwegian large-scale project where 
automatic meter reading and direct load control technology were installed at electricity 
consumers’ premises (chiefly residential). We used data from this project to study the 
effect on households’ loads caused by direct load control of their water heaters. 
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3.1 Direct load control of water heaters 
 
The automatic meter reading and direct load control technology enabled hourly 
metering of each household’s electricity consumption throughout the test period and 
direct control of their water heaters. The automatic load disconnections were performed 
by a common signal from the network company to a relay in each household’s fuse box. 
The relay disconnected the heaters from the electricity until a new signal was sent for 
reconnection. This was tested on 12 different test days in hour 10 (9–10 am). There 
were also two test weeks with disconnections at different hours in the morning and the 
afternoon in order to study the load control impact for different hours. For two days 
disconnections were tested in hour 8 (7–8 am) and hour 17 (4–5 pm), two days in hour 9 
and hour 18, two days in hour 10 and hour 19, and two days in hour 11 and hour 20. If 
the households in the sample inquired, they were told they could find information on the 
timing of the tests on a web page, but no information was given directly. One can 
therefore assume that most did not know when the tests occurred, and therefore did not 
take any precautionary actions to compensate for the electricity being disconnected. 
3.2 The data 
 
We used a sample of households that had been exposed to automatic disconnection 
of their water heaters but had not faced time-differentiated tariffs. The households could 
voluntarily choose whether they wanted to participate. The sample consisted of 475 
households where hourly electricity consumption for each customer had been metered 
in the period from 3 November 2003 to 30 April 2004 (which corresponds to 180 days 
or 4,320 hours). Totally, the panel data set (unbalanced) consists of approximately 1.4 
million hourly observations.3 
In addition to electricity prices and individual consumption data, we use 
information on numbers of hours of daylight each day, and temperature and wind on an 
hourly basis. Summary statistics of the data are shown in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
3
 Missing observations occurred due to technical problems with the metering system. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the data 
Variable  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Energy [kWh/h]  2.8 1.6 0.1 17.3 
Price [NOK] 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.6 
Temp [°C] 0.5 5.6 –16.3 16.7 
Wind [m/s] 1.5 0.8 0.3 6.6 
Daylight [hours] 9.0 2.8 5.9 15.2 
Note: NOK 1 ≈ EUR 0.12  
 
The variation in the weather variables was high with temperatures from –16 to 
+16°C, and wind speed approaching 7 m/s (hourly average). This variation captures 
much of the temperature and wind conditions that are often experienced in these seasons 
in Norway. The number of hours of daylight each day varies from 5.9 (in December) to 
15.2 (in April), with an average of nine hours. 
4 Method and model 
 
The aim of the analysis was to quantify the average load reducing potential from 
load control of the households’ water heaters and the size of the payback effect due to 
simultaneous reconnection of the heaters. 
We used a regression model capable of predicting the average residential 
consumption for every hour throughout the test period. The disconnection and payback 
effects were captured by dummy variables for the hours in question. The households’ 
price response and the effect on consumption from variations in outside temperature and 
wind speed, number of hours of daylight, and the cyclical consumption patterns due to 
times of day, week and year are also accounted for in the regression. 
4.1 Econometric specification 
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i = 1,…,475, t= 1,....,4296, C = {17nov–21nov,18dec,19dec,14jan–16jan,15mar–





yit  = hourly electricity consumption [kWh/h] at time t for household i; 
Dch,t   = dummy variables for the hour of disconnection, i.e., 1 if t is 
disconnection hour h, 0 otherwise; 
Rch+1,t   = dummy variables for the hour following a disconnection, i.e., 1 if t is 
in reconnection hour h + 1, 0 otherwise; 
Rc10+j,t  =  dummy variables for the five hours following a disconnection in 
hour 10, i.e., 1 if t is in reconnection hour 10 + j, j = 1,…,5, 0 
otherwise; 
pit  =  electricity price [NOK] for household i at time t ; 
Tt  =  temperature [ºC] at time t; 
2
tT   =  temperature, squared [ºC]2 at time t; 
TMAt  =  moving average of temperature in the previous 24 hours [ºC] at time 
t; 
2
tTMA   =  moving average of temperature in the previous 24 hours, squared 
[ºC]2 at time t; 
Wt  =  wind [m/s] at time t; 
tWMA   =  moving average of wind last 24 hours [m/s] at time t; 
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dlt  =  daylight variables; 1 between sunrise and sunset, 0 otherwise; 
Dwd,wdh,t =  dummy variables; 1 if t is in hour wdh of a weekday, 0 otherwise; 
Dwe,weh,t =  dummy variables; 1 if t is in hour weh of a weekend or holiday, 0 
otherwise; 
Dd,t  =  dummy variables; 1 if t is in day d of the week, 0 otherwise; 
Dm,t  =  dummy variables; 1 if t is in month m of the year, 0 otherwise; 
DHd,t  =  dummy variables; 1 if t is in a holiday, 0 otherwise; 
Ddlc,t  =  dummy variable is 1 if t is in a day dlc where direct load control is 
carried out, 0 otherwise; 
γi  =  fixed time-invariant effect for household i; and 
εit  =  a genuine error term, assumed to be independently distributed across 
i and t with a constant variance.4 
 
To capture the drop in consumption caused by a disconnection we used dummy 
variables for the period in question. In addition, to capture the size of the expected 
payback effect in the hour of reconnection, we included a dummy variable for these 
hours. For the 12 days with disconnection in hour 10 we also included dummy variables 
for each of the five hours after the reconnection to study how long the payback effect 
lasts, and its size.5 The parameters of interest are therefore the coefficients for the 
disconnection (δDc) and reconnection (δRc) variables. The estimates of the coefficients 
related to the dummy variables may be interpreted as deviations from the normal 
consumption and they indicate directly the difference in kWh/h from the alternative of 
no disconnection. To isolate these effects it is important to control any other factors that 
may interfere with the dummy variables. The most important factors influencing 
electricity consumption included in the model are described briefly below. 
A fixed periodic/cyclical pattern, that often is assumed caused by the lifestyle of the 
households, can be modelled using dummy variables (Granger et al., 1979; Pardo et al., 
                                                 
4
 The Huber/White/sandwich estimator was used to obtain robust estimates of the asymptotic variance–covariance 
matrix of the estimated parameters (StataCorp, 2005). 
5
 The ability to estimate accurately the load control impact with the chosen model depends on the accuracy of the 
predictions of the load curve for the days of the load control events. We found that the model fits very well for the 
average of the 12 days with disconnections in hour 10, but has a somewhat poorer fit for the two test weeks with 




2002) or trigonometric terms (Al-Zayer and Al-Ibrahim, 1996; Granger et al., 1979), or 
by the use of splines (Hendricks et al., 1979; Harvey and Koopman, 1993). We 
modelled the cyclical patterns with dummy variables; one set with dummy variables for 
the 24 hours of the working days and one set for the 24 hours of the non-working days. 
In addition, we controlled for the possible different levels in use between the different 
days of the week with day dummy variables, and with the same argument for the 
months we introduce monthly dummy variables. To avoid multicollinearity, the 
weekend hour 01–, Monday–, and November dummy variables were excluded. Dummy 
variables were also included for each of the days where load control was applied to 
adjust the consumption curve level for those days to obtain a better fit. 
A rich literature on the temperature’s effect on electricity consumption suggests 
that the impact of a temperature change has non-linear, as well as delayed effects; see, 
for example, Henley and Peirson (1997, 1998), Granger et al. (1979), Harvey and 
Koopman (1993), Ramanathan et al. (1997) and Pardo et al. (2002). Following Granger 
et al. (1979) we allowed for the current temperature by one term and its possible non-
linear influence by a squared term. To account for the delayed effect of a temperature 
change we introduced a 24-hour moving average term, and also the square of this 
variable. Although most of the above studies have focused on temperature as the key 
weather variable, wind may also be important as it can increase a building’s heat loss 
(SINTEF, 1996). Both a current term and a 24-hour moving average term were 
included. Because the customers in the sample are located within the same area 
(Drammen), we assumed all dwellings to be exposed to the same weather conditions. 
Daylight is also likely to influence the consumption of electricity, as it decreases 
the need for electric lights and electric heating (see, for example, Johnsen (2001)). To 
allow for varying impact of daylight over the seasons, one variable for each month is 
included. Each variable was given the value 1 in the hours between sunrise and sunset 
for the existing month, and 0 otherwise.6 
Other seasonal changes, such as the change in humidity, rain or other seasonal 
factors, are picked up by the monthly dummy variables. In addition, because electricity 
                                                 
6
 In the sunrise or sunset hour, the value of a daylight variable is equal to the share of the hour that it is daylight, i.e., 
between 0 and 1. 
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prices are expected to influence behaviour when they vary, a price variable was 
included in the model.7 
Differing time-invariant characteristics of the households may cause different 
consumption patterns. Such variables can be assumed constant during the six months 
the experiment lasted. We do not comment on their impact on consumption because our 
choice of model presented in the next section allows for such time-invariant variables. 
4.2 Fixed effects estimation 
 
It is likely that the consumption pattern of the households will differ due to 
differences in, for example, dwelling size, age and standard of the dwelling, heating 
systems, number of members in the families, income, education, attitude to 
environmental issues, etc. All such variables cannot possibly be obtained, and omission 
of some in the model may influence the estimates of the other parameters of interest. 
The cross section time series dimension of the data invites us to take the household-
specific factors into consideration by the use of a fixed-effects model. To present this 
idea, consider the simple model 
 
it it i ity X β γ ε= + + , (4.2) 
 
where yit represents consumption of electricity, Xit the vector of explanatory variables 
from (4.1), β is the vector of coefficients for the variables, and γi can be interpreted as 
fixed unobserved time-invariant household-specific effects.8 If the covariance between 
Xit and γi is non-zero, an ordinary least-squares estimation, where household-specific 
effects are neglected, will give biased estimators of β (Hsiao, 2003). However, by 
subtracting from each observation its household-specific mean, we can eliminate the 
effect of the unobserved household-specific effects. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )it i it i it iy y X X β ε ε⋅ ⋅ ⋅− = − + − , (4.3) 
                                                 
7
 Prices vary between households, due to differing types of contracts. 
8





where iy ⋅ , iX ⋅ , and iε ⋅ indicate the mean value of the variables for each household. The 
transformation removes the household-specific effects. β can then be estimated 
consistently without bias by ordinary least squares on the transformed variables. The 
use of ordinary least squares on (4.3) is therefore robust to correlation between Xit and 
γi, which is not the case when ordinary least squares is used on (4.2) and γi is omitted 




The results from the fixed effects regression using Stata are shown in Table 2 
(StataCorp, 2005). 
                                                 
9
 Note that the regressions are performed with the software Stata, which uses an alternative but equivalent 
formulation by introducing an intercept (see StataCorp, 2005 and Gould, 2001). The intercept represents the 
average value of the fixed effects. 
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Table 2. Results from the fixed effects (within) regression 
Variables Estimate t-value p-value
Dc hour 8 –0.466 –14.62 0.000
Dc hour 9 –0.580 –18.69 0.000
Dc hour 10 –0.497 –33.91 0.000
Dc hour 11 –0.355 –10.70 0.000
Dc hour 17 –0.414 –11.57 0.000
Dc hour 18 –0.489 –14.00 0.000
Dc hour 19 –0.596 –17.85 0.000
Dc hour 20 –0.178 –4.47 0.000
Rc hour 8+1 0.284 7.23 0.000
Rc hour 9+1 0.158 4.12 0.000
Rc hour 10+1 0.239 13.60 0.000
Rc hour 10+2 0.097 5.48 0.000
Rc hour 10+3 0.045 2.61 0.009
Rc hour 10+4 0.019 1.12 0.262
Rc hour 10+5 0.002 0.10 0.918
Rc hour 11+1 0.147 3.78 0.000
Rc hour 17+1 0.240 5.80 0.000
Rc hour 18+1 0.196 4.83 0.000
Rc hour 19+1 0.134 3.14 0.002
Rc hour 20+1 –0.017 –0.41 0.679
Price –0.246 –9.23 0.000
Temp –0.024 –65.18 0.000
Temp2 –0.001 –25.22 0.000
TempMA –0.043 –101.74 0.000
TempMA2 0.000 0.38 0.706
Wind 0.014 11.03 0.000
WindMA 0.069 31.59 0.000
Daylight: November –0.072 –10.75 0.000
Daylight: December –0.043 –6.83 0.000
Daylight: January –0.084 –13.20 0.000
Daylight: February –0.147 –25.72 0.000
Daylight: March –0.128 –24.97 0.000
Daylight: April –0.056 –10.57 0.000
Constant 2.529 123.13 0.000
R2:  within   = 0.2251 F(109,1498051) = 3740.91  
  between  = 0.0047 Prob > F = 0.0000 
  overall  = 0.1124 
Note: the effects of the holiday, control day, cyclical hour, day and month dummy variables are reported 




The results show that most of the explanatory variables are highly significant. The 
hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are jointly 0, which is tested using an F-
statistic, is rejected (see the bottom of the table). 
First we comment on the results for the load control in the two test weeks with 
control in different morning and afternoon hours, then we examine the impact of load 
control for the 12 days with disconnections in hour 10. 
5.1 Results for load control in different hours in two test weeks 
 
The estimates reported in Table 2 for the automatic load disconnection dummy 
variables all show the expected negative signs indicating consumption reductions, and 
all the reconnection dummies but the estimate for hour 20 are positive, indicating a 
payback effect in the first hour after a disconnection.10 Figure 5.1 plots the estimates 
from Table 2 for the morning disconnections and the hour immediately after the 
disconnection when the water heaters are reconnected to the electricity supply. Figure 



























Figure 5.1. Predicted effects (kWh/h) of disconnections and reconnections in the morning 
hours 
 
                                                 
10
 The positive reconnection estimate of hour 20 is an anomaly and probably due to a small deviation between the 
predicted and the real load curve. However, the estimate is far from significant. 




























Figure 5.2. Predicted effects (kWh/h) of disconnections and reconnections in the evening 
hours 
 
Our findings suggest that when a common signal for automatic disconnection of the 
water heaters is sent, one can anticipate an average load reduction of between 0.36 and 
0.58 kWh/h per household for the morning hours, depending on the hour, and between 
0.18 and 0.60 kWh/h in the afternoon, depending on which hour disconnections occur. 
Graabak and Feilberg (2004), analysing the impact of load control in one of the test 
weeks, found similar, but somewhat smaller effects.11 Our results show that 
disconnection in hour 9 in the morning and in hour 19 in the evening give the largest 
load reductions. 
Assuming an average load reduction per customer of 0.5 kWh/h, the total load 
reducing potential in Norway from this measure can be inferred. Given that half of the 
Norwegian households (approximately 1 million) have their water heaters disconnected, 
and assuming 20% losses in the grid in a peak load situation, the potential is 0.5 kWh/h 
* 1,000,000 * 1.2 = 600 MWh/h reduction of load for the whole Norwegian system 
(assumptions correspond to those used by Graabak and Feilberg, 2004). For 
comparison, the maximum measured load in Norway is 23,054 MWh/h in hour 10, 5 
February 2001. This suggests that consumption could be lowered to 22,454 MWh/h this 
hour. 
                                                 
11
 The differences between their results and ours may be due to different analysis methods (they compared load 
curves with those of a reference group) and they studied only one of the two test weeks. 
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The positive coefficients for the hour following a reconnection of the water heaters 
indicate the size of the payback effect, i.e., the electricity use that will be added to the 
system load curve after load control has occurred. We see that disconnections lead to 
surplus consumption of between 0.15 and 0.28 kWh/h in the morning and between 012 
and 0.24 kWh/h in the evening, when the heaters are reconnected.13 Assuming the 
payback effect to be 0.24 kWh/h, the aggregated extra average demand for the 
Norwegian system can be inferred using a similar calculation to the above; 288 MWh/h 
for the first hour after the disconnection in hour 10. Imposing this value into the same 
day as above suggests that consumption could increase from 22,940 MWh/h (the load in 
hour 11 in the Norwegian system 5 February 2001) to approximately 23,230 MWh/h, 
that is, to a higher level than the previous peak. 
To illustrate how the automatic load control may affect the daily load curve for the 
households in this study, Figure 5.3 shows the predicted mean hourly electricity use for 
one of the test days with disconnection in hour 8 and in hour 17. The payback effect is 













Figure 5.3. Predicted consumption for one day with disconnection in hour 8 and 17, with 
and without predicted disconnection and reconnection terms 
 
                                                 
12
 Assuming the negative estimate of –0.017 is not logical. It is likely to be at least 0.  
13
 Graabak and Feilberg (2004) found payback effects of between 0.09 and 0.29 kWh/h for the morning hours, and 
between 0.06 and 0.37 kWh/h for the evening hours. 
Direct load control of residential water heaters 
89 
As shown in Figure 5.3, disconnections cause significant reductions in 
consumption. In addition, the post-peak in the hour after the water heaters have been 
reconnected is evident. 
5.2 Results for load control in hour 10 in twelve test days 
 
Section 2 indicates that the size of the post-peak is likely to be largest in the first 
minutes after reconnection and then diminish. However, since our data are measured 
with an hourly sampling frequency, we only know the average effects over hourly 
intervals and not the instantaneous power demand at the moment the heaters are 
reconnected, or the following evolvement of the payback effect. Nevertheless, we know 
the likely range for the instantaneous power demand. Since most heaters in Norway 
have heating elements with rated capacities of 2 kW, the maximum possible average 
payback demand at reconnection is likely not to be higher than 2 kW. In addition, using 
hour 10 as an example, we know from the estimated hourly average payback demand 
for the first hour after a disconnection, that the additional power demand is not likely to 
be less than 0.239 kW. 
Nevertheless, our estimates for the five hours after the hour 10 disconnections 
allow us to indicate the payback size at the time of reconnection. From Table 2 we can 
see that the hourly payback is highest in the first hour and diminishes over the following 
hours. The estimates for the fourth and fifth hours are not significantly different from 0. 
We can then anticipate that it will take at least three hours before all energy is restored, 
on average, in all the water heaters affected by the disconnection. This supports our 
description in Section 2 regarding the distribution of the time the water heaters use to 
restore the energy in the tanks; some heaters use a short time to recover from an energy 
loss, whereas others require a longer time. 
We indicate a possible real-time power demand curve after reconnection by plotting 
the estimates for four hours after reconnection and fitting a simple exponential trend 
line to the hourly estimates (the fifth hour is excluded as it is highly insignificant). The 
intersection with the y-axis for the trend line will indicate the size of the instantaneous 
water heater demand at the moment of reconnection. There is a high degree of 
uncertainty related to this curve and its intersection, so one must be cautious about 
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transferring our results from the hour 10 disconnections to other hours of the day or to 
other customer areas. Nonetheless, it is useful as a starting point for discussion and as 
an illustration of how the real payback demand curve may look. In addition, bear in 
mind that we use averaged data for 12 days to indicate the instantaneous payback effect, 
which makes it likely that some of these 12 days experienced higher instantaneous 
peaks. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the hourly averaged estimates for the subsequent four hours 




















Figure 5.4. Estimated average payback consumption for four hours following a 
disconnection, and a fitted exponential trend curve, the potential real-time 
payback power demand 
 
Using the four estimates to fit the exponential trend line, we find the power demand 
at the time of reconnection to be approximately 0.36 kW.14 By visual inspection, the 
area (i.e., the energy use) under the trend line for each hour is quite similar to the area 
under the hourly estimates. This indicates that the trend line is sensible. 
In the literature, the payback effect has been described using data from actual field 
tests and by simulation models. For example, Bische and Sella (1985) found that a load 
shedding of 25 MW of water heaters can build up to an initial payback demand of 80–
90 MW. Another example is found in Lee and Wilkins (1983). Using their model, water 
                                                 
14
 Using only the three estimates that are significant at the 10% level, we find it to be 0.35 kW, and if all five 
estimates are used, the intersection is at 0.57 kW. 
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heater electricity consumption 15 minutes after a one-hour disconnection would be 
nearly twice the size that would have occurred if no load control had been applied, and 
three times the size after a two-hour disconnection.15 The plots in Reed et al. (1989) 
indicate that the percentage of water heaters operating can be approximately 2.5 times 
higher immediately after a two-hour disconnection than if no disconnection is applied. 
In Ryan et al. (1989), the payback effect is approximately three to four times higher 
than the normal water heater load, after a four-hour disconnection. 
Compared with the instantaneous power demand at the moment of reconnection 
found in this literature, our indication of the water heater power demand immediately 
after a reconnection seems to be quite low. The size of the payback demand found is 
approximately 0.7 times higher than water heater electricity consumption during normal 
operation, while the examples from the literature range from two to four times higher.16 
One reason may be that the rated power of the heating elements in water heaters used in 
experiments abroad is higher than in Norway. For example, heating elements with rated 
power of 4.5 kW are common in the USA (Orphelin and Adnot, 1999). Norwegian 
households, which usually have 2 kW heating elements, will then have comparably 
lower instantaneous power demand and longer recovering periods for the same amount 
of hot water use. Another reason is probably that some of the disconnections referred to 
have a longer disconnection period. 
Whether payback effects due to load control of residential water heaters induce new 
so-called post-peaks in the electricity system higher than the targeted peak depends on 
the total load in the system. If the total load curve has a pattern such that the load is low 
enough in the same period as the post-peak appears, it may offset the payback effect. 
However, this may vary from day to day, depending on a number of variables, as, for 
example, temperature. A strategy to control the payback effect is to divide the heaters 
into groups and cycle the control events between the groups, i.e., disconnect and 
reconnect the groups at different times during the control period. The principle is that 
when some heaters are reconnected, others will be allowed to recover. By disconnecting 
one or more groups of heaters when the system load reaches a pre-defined level and 
                                                 
15
 Displaced energy during disconnection is assumed to be 0.5 kWh/h. 
16
 The value 0.7 is found by dividing the power demand (0.36 kW) by the disconnected demand (0.5 kWh/h) for hour 




reconnecting on a first-off first-on basis when the load is sufficiently low again, load 
reductions can be achieved while a critical post-peak can be avoided (van Tonder and 
Lane, 1996; see also Bische and Sella (1985), Lee and Wilkins (1983), Rau and Graham 
(1979), Salehfar and Patton (1989), Weller (1988) and Gomes et al. (1999) for 
descriptions of cycling strategies). 
5.3 Results for temperature, wind and daylight 
 
From the other results shown in Table 2 we first see the importance of controlling 
for the current and moving average temperature, as the estimates are highly significant. 
There is a decreasing impact from a temperature change on electricity consumption for 
the current term when temperature falls. The moving average of temperature influences 
consumption only linearly because the squared term is insignificant. Second, the wind 
speed coefficients are highly significant, indicating that increased wind speed increases 
energy use, as expected. Third, the estimates attached to the hours of daylight variables 
are negative, which indicates that more daylight reduces electricity consumption, as 
expected. Fourth, the price coefficient indicates that a price increase of 0.01 NOK/kWh 
will decrease consumption by 0.003 kWh/h. 
6 Conclusions 
 
Estimates of the impact of load reduction indicate that direct load control of 
households’ water heaters can be an effective tool in decreasing peak load consumption. 
Disconnection of the heaters from the electricity grid for the sample of households 
analyzed in this paper can be expected to give an average reduction in load per 
household of between 0.36 kWh/h and 0.58 kWh/h in the morning hours and between 
0.18 kWh/h and 0.60 kWh/h in the evening hours. As described in this paper, the 
interruption of the natural diversity of the water heater electricity consumption during a 
disconnection gives rise to a payback effect, which leads to an additional consumption 
in a period after reconnection. For the first hour after a reconnection we found that the 
average extra consumption can reach up to 0.28 kWh/h per household. Note that the 
data are measured on an hourly sampling frequency, and that the instantaneous demand 
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at the instant of reconnection is likely to be higher than the hourly estimates of the 
payback effect. By using the hourly payback demand estimates for the subsequent hours 
after disconnection in hour 10, we have indicated an average power demand per 
household at the instant of reconnection to be 0.36 kW more than it would be if no load 
control had been applied. This payback demand may have the adverse consequence of 
causing a new peak in the system, which suggests it may be necessary to re-establish the 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Results from the fixed effects regression 
Coefficient Variable Explanation Estimate t-value p-value 
δDc,8 Dc8 Dummy, disconnection, hour 8 –0.466 –14.62 0.000 
δDc,9 Dc9 Dummy, disconnection, hour 9 –0.580 –18.69 0.000 
δDc,10 Dc10 Dummy, disconnection, hour 10 –0.497 –33.91 0.000 
δDc,11 Dc11 Dummy, disconnection, hour 11 –0.355 –10.70 0.000 
δDc,17 Dc17 Dummy, disconnection, hour 17 –0.414 –11.57 0.000 
δDc,18 Dc18 Dummy, disconnection, hour 18 –0.489 –14.00 0.000 
δDc,19 Dc19 Dummy, disconnection, hour 19 –0.596 –17.85 0.000 
δDc,20 Dc20 Dummy, disconnection, hour 20 –0.178 –4.47 0.000 
δRc,8+1 Rc8+1 Dummy, reconnection, hour 8+1 0.284 7.23 0.000 
δRc,9+1 Rc9+1 Dummy, reconnection, hour 9+1 0.158 4.12 0.000 
δRc,10+1 Rc10+1 Dummy, reconnection, hour 10+1 0.239 13.60 0.000 
δRc,10+2 Rc10+2 Dummy, reconnection, hour 10+2 0.097 5.48 0.000 
δRc,10+3 Rc10+3 Dummy, reconnection, hour 10+3 0.045 2.61 0.009 
δRc,10+4 Rc10+4 Dummy, reconnection, hour 10+4 0.019 1.12 0.262 
δRc,10+5 Rc10+5 Dummy, reconnection, hour 10+5 0.002 0.10 0.918 
δRc,11+1 Rc11+1 Dummy, reconnection, hour 11+1 0.147 3.78 0.000 
δRc,17+1 Rc17+1 Dummy, reconnection, hour 17+1 0.240 5.80 0.000 
δRc,18+1 Rc18+1 Dummy, reconnection, hour 18+1 0.196 4.83 0.000 
δRc,19+1 Rc19+1 Dummy, reconnection, hour 19+1 0.134 3.14 0.002 
δRc,20+1 Rc20+1 Dummy, reconnection, hour 20+1 –0.017 –0.41 0.679 
βp  p Price –0.246 –9.23 0.000 
βT T Temperature –0.024 –65.18 0.000 
βT2 T2 Temperature, squared –0.001 –25.22 0.000 
βTMA TMA Temperature, moving average –0.043 –101.74 0.000 
βTMA2 TMA2 Temperature, moving average, squared 0.000 0.38 0.706 




βWMA WMA Wind, moving average 0.069 31.59 0.000 
βdl,nov Dnov dl Daylight: November –0.072 –10.75 0.000 
βdl,dec Ddec dl Daylight: December –0.043 –6.83 0.000 
βdl,jan Djan dl Daylight: January –0.084 –13.20 0.000 
βdl,feb Dfeb dl Daylight: February –0.147 –25.72 0.000 
βdl,mar Dmar dl Daylight: March –0.128 –24.97 0.000 
βdl,apr Dapr dl Daylight: April –0.056 –10.57 0.000 
βwd,2 Dwd,2 Dummy, weekday, hour 2 –0.138 –23.67 0.000 
βwd,3 Dwd,3 Dummy, weekday, hour 3 –0.191 –33.32 0.000 
βwd,4 Dwd,4 Dummy, weekday, hour 4 –0.195 –34.29 0.000 
βwd,5 Dwd,5 Dummy, weekday, hour 5 –0.175 –30.63 0.000 
βwd,6 Dwd,6 Dummy, weekday, hour 6 –0.073 –12.49 0.000 
βwd,7 Dwd,7 Dummy, weekday, hour 7 0.163 26.21 0.000 
βwd,8 Dwd,8 Dummy, weekday, hour 8 0.477 70.06 0.000 
βwd,9 Dwd,9 Dummy, weekday, hour 9 0.538 75.55 0.000 
βwd,10 Dwd,10 Dummy, weekday, hour 10 0.505 64.08 0.000 
βwd,11 Dwd,11 Dummy, weekday, hour 11 0.429 54.08 0.000 
βwd,12 Dwd,12 Dummy, weekday, hour 12 0.374 47.27 0.000 
βwd,13 Dwd,13 Dummy, weekday, hour 13 0.308 39.31 0.000 
βwd,14 Dwd,14 Dummy, weekday, hour 14 0.286 36.57 0.000 
βwd,15 Dwd,15 Dummy, weekday, hour 15 0.343 43.36 0.000 
βwd,16 Dwd,16 Dummy, weekday, hour 16 0.458 61.53 0.000 
βwd,17 Dwd,17 Dummy, weekday, hour 17 0.617 86.13 0.000 
βwd,18 Dwd,18 Dummy, weekday, hour 18 0.699 98.69 0.000 
βwd,19 Dwd,19 Dummy, weekday, hour 19 0.708 101.48 0.000 
βwd,20 Dwd,20 Dummy, weekday, hour 20 0.707 102.31 0.000 
βwd,21 Dwd,21 Dummy, weekday, hour 21 0.685 102.03 0.000 
βwd,22 Dwd,22 Dummy, weekday, hour 22 0.627 95.62 0.000 
βwd,23 Dwd,23 Dummy, weekday, hour 23 0.473 74.43 0.000 
βwd,24 Dwd,24 Dummy, weekday, hour 24 0.240 38.62 0.000 
βwe,2 Dwe,2 Dummy, weekend, hour 2 –0.143 –17.10 0.000 
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βwe,3 Dwe,3 Dummy, weekend, hour 3 –0.214 –26.01 0.000 
βwe,4 Dwe,4 Dummy, weekend, hour 4 –0.247 –30.42 0.000 
βwe,5 Dwe,5 Dummy, weekend, hour 5 –0.257 –31.86 0.000 
βwe,6 Dwe,6 Dummy, weekend, hour 6 –0.229 –28.31 0.000 
βwe,7 Dwe,7 Dummy, weekend, hour 7 –0.158 –19.14 0.000 
βwe,8 Dwe,8 Dummy, weekend, hour 8 –0.033 –3.84 0.000 
βwe,9 Dwe,9 Dummy, weekend, hour 9 0.185 20.11 0.000 
βwe,10 Dwe,10 Dummy, weekend, hour 10 0.451 44.60 0.000 
βwe,11 Dwe,11 Dummy, weekend, hour 11 0.620 58.78 0.000 
βwe,12 Dwe,12 Dummy, weekend, hour 12 0.663 62.28 0.000 
βwe,13 Dwe,13 Dummy, weekend, hour 13 0.641 60.34 0.000 
βwe,14 Dwe,14 Dummy, weekend, hour 14 0.600 56.42 0.000 
βwe,15 Dwe,15 Dummy, weekend, hour 15 0.605 57.00 0.000 
βwe,16 Dwe,16 Dummy, weekend, hour 16 0.628 61.63 0.000 
βwe,17 Dwe,17 Dummy, weekend, hour 17 0.660 65.81 0.000 
βwe,18 Dwe,18 Dummy, weekend, hour 18 0.686 68.50 0.000 
βwe,19 Dwe,19 Dummy, weekend, hour 19 0.700 70.16 0.000 
βwe,20 Dwe,20 Dummy, weekend, hour 20 0.675 68.73 0.000 
βwe,21 Dwe,21 Dummy, weekend, hour 21 0.599 63.55 0.000 
βwe,22 Dwe,22 Dummy, weekend, hour 22 0.500 54.53 0.000 
βwe,23 Dwe,23 Dummy, weekend, hour 23 0.362 40.58 0.000 
βwe,24 Dwe,24 Dummy, weekend, hour 24 0.175 19.56 0.000 
βtue Dtue Dummy, Tuesday 0.013 4.06 0.000 
βwed Dwed Dummy, Wednesday 0.023 7.47 0.000 
βthu Dthu Dummy, Thursday –0.001 –0.28 0.782 
βfri Dfri Dummy, Friday –0.007 –2.19 0.028 
βsat Dsat Dummy, Saturday 0.055 6.95 0.000 
βsun Dsun Dummy, Sunday 0.095 12.09 0.000 
βdec Ddec Dummy, December 0.085 22.65 0.000 
βjan Djan Dummy, January 0.156 36.39 0.000 
βfeb Dfeb Dummy, February 0.036 8.43 0.000 
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βmar Dmar Dummy, March –0.046 –10.43 0.000 
βapr Dapr Dummy, April –0.249 –48.23 0.000 
βHd DHd Dummy, Holiday 0.096 11.94 0.000 
β17nov D17nov Dummy, control day, 17 November –0.064 –5.19 0.000 
β18nov D18nov Dummy, control day, 18 November –0.047 –3.83 0.000 
β19nov D19nov Dummy, control day, 19 November 0.033 2.84 0.004 
β20nov D20nov Dummy, control day, 20 November 0.004 0.35 0.729 
β21nov D21nov Dummy, control day, 21 November 0.040 3.21 0.001 
β18dec D18dec Dummy, control day, 18 December 0.010 1.05 0.295 
β19dec D19dec Dummy, control day, 19 December 0.081 8.19 0.000 
β14jan D14jan Dummy, control day, 14 January –0.044 –4.28 0.000 
β15jan D15jan Dummy, control day, 15 January –0.115 –10.52 0.000 
β16jan D16jan Dummy, control day, 16 January –0.141 –11.05 0.000 
β15mar D15mar Dummy, control day, 15 March 0.031 2.95 0.003 
β16mar D16mar Dummy, control day, 16 March 0.026 2.48 0.013 
β17mar D17mar Dummy, control day, 17 March –0.041 –3.96 0.000 
β18mar D18mar Dummy, control day, 18 March –0.066 –6.22 0.000 
β26apr D26apr Dummy, control day, 26 April 0.084 7.03 0.000 
β27apr D27apr Dummy, control day, 27 April 0.151 12.89 0.000 
β28apr D28apr Dummy, control day, 28 April 0.030 2.61 0.009 
β29apr D29apr Dummy, control day, 29 April –0.060 –5.24 0.000 
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Offering electricity consumers time-differentiated tariffs may increase demand 
responsiveness, thereby reducing peak consumption. However, one concern is that time-
differentiated tariffs may also attract consumers who benefit because of their 
consumption pattern, even without a corresponding demand response. A discrete choice 
model applied to data from a residential dynamic pricing experiment indicates that 
higher demand flexibility increases the propensity of a household to select dynamic 
tariffs, while consumption patterns do not influence the tariff choice. The offering of 
dynamic time-differentiated tariffs is then likely to increase the demand response among 
residential consumers. 
 
                                                 
*
 An earlier version of this paper can be found in the Proceedings of the 28th Annual IAEE International Conference, 
Taipei, 3-6 June. A later version is published in the Statistics Norway’s Discussion Paper series (see 
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Deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market in 1991 improved efficiency (Bye 
and Halvorsen, 1999), but the continued reliance on tariffs with prices fixed for long 
periods of time lessens demand response among end-users and may prevent the 
realisation of further efficiency gains. Increased demand response may decrease 
consumption during constrained peak periods and flatten load curves, deferring or 
avoiding the need for costly investment in production and transmission capacity. It may 
also reduce average power prices, stabilize volatile spot prices, improve system 
reliability, and decrease the likelihood of exercise of market power (Caves et al., 2000, 
Braithwait and Eakin, 2002, Schwartz, 2003, Kristensen et al., 2004). 
A number of different approaches can be used to increase demand response. One is 
to offer residential electricity consumers time-differentiated tariffs. These tariffs charge 
electricity consumers high prices in peak-load periods and low prices in off-peak 
periods, i.e., they better reflect wholesale real-time price variations than flat rates. 
Examples of tariffs are the time-of-use (TOU) rate, where prices vary by hours-of-the-
day blocks. Another is the more dynamic critical peak pricing (CPP) rate, where higher 
prices may be imposed if the system is severely constrained as in cold winter periods. In 
these instances, end-users have incentives to respond to short-term price variations by 
reducing peak consumption or by shifting peak consumption to off-peak periods. 
An important question is the extent to which voluntary time-differentiated rates 
attract price responsive customers. One would expect responsive customers to choose 
rates according to their ability to shift or reduce consumption, and thereby reduce 
electricity expenditure (Caves et al., 2000). Experiments with optional TOU rates have 
indicated that customers choosing this rate are more price responsive than the rest of the 
population as a whole (Aigner and Ghali, 1989, Train and Mehrez, 1994, Caves et al., 
1989). 
However, one concern with voluntary time-differentiated rate programs is that 
customers who benefit without any demand response also may choose to participate. 
Typically, these are customers with low electricity consumption in peak-price periods 
and high electricity consumption during off-peak periods. If most participating 
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customers have such favourable consumption patterns and little price response, 
differentiated rates may not be an efficient tool to increase demand response. 
Furthermore, revenues for the utility offering the rate may decrease because the 
participating customers pay less for electricity than before, while the cost of providing 
electricity remains the same. In turn, revenue losses are imposed on the utility or its 
shareholders, or shifted to the remaining customers through an increase in the general 
rate (Train and Mehrez, 1994). Such an outcome may well be justified as consumers 
selecting the differentiated rates are released from subsidizing other customers' 
expensive peak consumption (PLMA, 2002). However, if an increase in the standard 
rate is the result, it may be politically difficult to implement because of opposition from 
customers harmed through the rate increase (Williamson, 2002).1  
Aigner and Ghali (1989) found evidence of participation based on favourable 
consumption patterns in their analyses of five TOU experiments. High peak-period 
consumption in the pre-experiment period resulted in a lower participation rate and 
higher off-peak consumption resulted in the opposite. Train et al. (1987) found similar 
results. Their results indicated that the probability of choosing TOU rates decreased if 
the electricity costs under these rates increased compared with the costs on a standard 
rate. Patric (1990), Train and Mehrez (1994) and Matsukawa (2001) also found that 
consumers volunteering for TOU rates possessed more favourable load shapes than 
consumers on standard rates.  
However, the literature is inconclusive regarding customer participation as based on 
favourable load patterns. Caves et al. (1989), for example, found that consumption 
patterns do not influence the customers' choice of a TOU rate. Analysing data from a 
voluntary TOU experiment, and comparing their findings with earlier mandatory TOU 
programs, they found that volunteers do not take greater advantage of participation 
without shifting usage than the rest of the population. In a Canadian TOU program, 
Mountain and Lawson (1995) calculated monetary savings and losses for customers 
choosing TOU rates and standard rates, assuming no change in consumption patterns. 
They found no difference with respect to the distribution of savings. Baladi et al. (1998) 
                                                 
1
 MacKie-Mason (1990) and Train (1991) have shown that optional TOU rates can be designed that require those 
choosing the rate to adjust consumption in order to benefit, while others will not be negatively influenced by 
introduction of the new rate. However, designing such rates requires knowledge of all customers' consumption 
patterns, which utilities may not always have. 
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compared consumption patterns of volunteers and non-volunteers from a pre-test period 
in a TOU experiment, and concluded that on-peak consumption shares were 
indistinguishable. 
The lack of consensus concerning participation and consumption patterns calls for 
further study in new tariff programs. Further, to the author's knowledge, the extent of 
participation in time-differentiated programs based on load patterns and/or price 
responsiveness has only been investigated in the context of TOU programs. Compared 
with traditional TOU pricing, dynamic pricing schemes may entail more uncertainty for 
end-users with respect to the frequency and the timing of high peak prices. 
Consequently, it is more difficult for electricity consumers to assess whether they will 
benefit from the dynamic rate without load shifting. It may be hypothesized that this 
uncertainty will reduce the extent of customer participation based on consumption 
patterns, and increase instead the extent of participation based on the customers' ability 
and willingness to respond to the price signals. Since dynamic pricing (e.g. critical peak 
pricing) of electricity has recently been the subject of much interest (see, for instance, 
Faruqui and George (2002, 2005), Herter (2007)), there is a need for further 
examination of dynamic rate programs. 
This paper investigates these questions using data from a Norwegian residential 
dynamic pricing experiment. A qualitative response model is used to test whether the 
customers' choice between the dynamic rate and the standard rate was influenced by 
their consumption patterns. The model is also used to test whether the group that 
chooses the dynamic rate differs from the group that retains a standard rate with respect 
to the ownership of appliances suited for load reduction or shifting. In addition, socio-
economic characteristics of the households are included in the econometric model in 
order to reveal other important factors that may help explain customers' choices.  
2 The dynamic pricing experiment 
 
In a Norwegian experiment in 2003, households with annual electricity 
consumption above 8,000 kWh had new technology installed that enabled hourly 
automatic metering of consumption. These households were offered a critical peak 
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pricing (CPP) network rate, and could choose between this and the standard rate already 
in place.2  
The CPP network rate had a two-level structure. It was dynamic in the sense that 
peak periods were defined as the hours 8–11 and the hours 17–20 on working days, only 
when temperatures fell below –8°C (during winter). The peak price was approximately 
1.15 NOK/kWh.3 Off-peak periods were defined as all other hours of the year. The off-
peak price was approximately 0.15 NOK/kWh. Summer was defined as the months May 
to October, and winter as November to April. The standard network price was 
approximately 0.20 NOK/kWh; that is, somewhat higher than the off-peak CPP price 
and substantially lower than the peak CPP price. 
The CPP tariff was designed to be revenue neutral for the network company. The 
peak and off-peak prices were chosen so that if the average customer, as defined by the 
average consumption pattern, did not change his or her consumption pattern under the 
CPP rate, electricity revenues would be unchanged, as compared to revenues from the 
average customer on a standard rate. Based on statistical data, peak periods were 
assumed to occur in eighteen days during the winter. Few electricity consumers actually 
have an average consumption pattern. This means that if all customers chose the CPP 
rate, while not changing load patterns, many customers would gain while the rest would 
lose. Williamson (2002), analyzing a TOU rate program found that about half would 
pay less while the other half would pay more than on the fixed rate. 
3 Who will choose the dynamic rate? 
 
 This section discusses the factors that may have influenced customers' choice 
between the CPP and the standard rate, i.e., the customers' load patterns and their ability 
to adjust consumption to the prices.  
                                                 
2
 The total electricity price facing the consumer consists of the network price plus the power price (plus taxes and 
VAT). 
3




3.1 Consumers’ utility functions  
 
Consider two utility maximizing households, A and B, with utility functions UA and 
UB, shown in Figure 3.1. Their budgets for electicity under the standard tariff are 
assumed equal, and are illustrated by the budget line mstd. The figure shows their 









Figure 3.1. Two consumers’ indifference curves and their option between the standard 
and the CPP tariff 
 
Let us assume that the consumers are offered the new CPP tariff. Since the tariff is 
constructed to be revenue neutral for the average consumer (given that consumption is 
not changed under the new tariff), the budget line, mCPP, will pivot around the peak/off-
peak consumption bundle of this consumer, illustrated in the figure by the circle. This 
means that any consumption bundle along mstd under the standard tariff costs the same 
as any consumption bundle along mCPP under the CPP tariff. The question is: which 
consumers will have incentives to select the new tariff? The answer to this question 
depends on the consumer’s consumption pattern, i.e. the ratio of the peak to off-peak 
consumption, and on the ability of the consumer to respond to prices.  
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From Figure 3.1 we see that consumer B has a peak/off-peak consumption ratio 
which is lower than for the average consumer. It is clear that consumer B will benefit by 
simply choosing the new rate, even without adjusting consumption. By selecting the 
CPP tariff, consumer B can, for instance, continue consuming the same amount of peak 
and off-peak electricity as under the standard tariff and spend the profit on other goods 
(not shown in this figure), or the consumer may increase peak and/or off-peak electricity 
consumption until the new budget constraint is reached at a higher utility level than 
before. Consumer A, however, has a peak/off-peak consumption ratio which is higher 
than for the average consumer. Whether the consumer may benefit from switching tariff 
depends on the utility function, i.e. how price responsive the consumer’s consumption 






























Figure 3.2. The choice of tariffs for consumer A, with two possible sets of indifference 




As we can see at point a in the figure, consumer A consumes std,offQ in the the off-
peak period and std,onQ  in the peak period under the standard tariff. If the consumer does 
not have the ability to adjust consumption, this consumption pattern does not induce the 
consumer to be better off by simply choosing the CPP tariff. Whether the consumer is 
flexible in consumption is revealed by his or hers indifference curve. The figure 
illustrates two alternative sets of indifference curves that consumer A may have; one set 
where peak and off-peak consumption are perfect complements (Uinflexible), i.e., the 
consumer has no possibility to shift load from peak to off-peak periods, and another set 
where peak and off-peak consumption are substitutes (Uflexible), i.e. the consumer is price 
responsive. 
We can see that with the price inresponsive indifference curves, inflexible1U and 
inflexible
2U , consumer A can not benefit from choosing the CPP rate, because the new 
utility maximizing consumption bundle would be at a lower utility level (point b), while 
expenditures remain unchanged.  
However, with the price responsive indifference curves flexible1U  and 
flexible
2U , the 
consumer can adjust consumption by shifting peak consumption to off-peak periods, 
and increase or decrease peak and off-peak consumption. For instance, by selecting the 
CPP tariff, the consumer may choose to remain at the same expenditure level in order to 
achieve a higher utility level, by consuming  CPP,off1Q  and CPP,on1Q  (point c), or the 
consumer may choose to remain at the same utility level in order to achieve lower 
electricity expenditures, by consuming CPP,off2Q  and CPP,on2Q  (point d), and instead spend 
the profit on other goods. The shaded area indicates the possible peak and off-peak 
consumption bundles where the consumer will benefit on sticking to the CPP rate 
instead of switching to the standard rate. Which consumption bundle the consumer 
actually chooses, also depend on the trade-off between electricity and all other goods. 
Note that the consumption at point d represents the compensated (Hicksian) demand and 
that the difference between the consumption expenditures in point c and d equals the 
compensating variation (see e.g. Varian, 1992).  
Now, let us look at consumer B, who is analogously illustrated with two sets of 
indifference curves, in Figure 3.3. 




























Figure 3.3. The choice of tariffs for consumer B, with two possible sets of indifference 
curves indicating flexible and inflexible consumption 
 
Consumer B consumes std,offQ and std,onQ  under the standard tariff in the off-peak 
and peak periods, respectively (point a). We see that by simply choosing the CPP tariff, 
the consumer will benefit independent of the shape of the indifference curves, i.e., the 
consumer will benefit even with completely inflexible consumption.  
Notice that this consumer may actually increase peak consumption (as well as off-
peak consumption) compared with the case under the standard tariff due to the decrease 
in electricity expenditures (income effect). For instance, the consumer may increase 
peak and off-peak consumption so that the expenditures under the CPP tariff are 
unchanged from what they were under the standard tariff (point b or c, dependent on the 
utility function). If most of the consumers selecting the CPP tariff behave like this, the 
network company may experience an increase, instead of a decrease, in peak 
consumption, while the revenue from the consumers remains unchanged. However, the 
final consumption bundle for the consumer when maximizing utility, given the new 
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prices, also depends on the trade-off between electricity and all other goods, and will be 
somewhere within the shaded area.  
3.2 Compensating variation 
 
The discussion above suggests it is important to understand which kind of 
consumer that will choose the CPP tariff since this has implications for the result from a 
time-differentiated pricing program. Let VCPP and Vstd indicate the indirect utility for a 
household choosing either the CPP rate or the standard rate, respectively, and ∆V = 
VCPP- Vstd the difference in indirect utility between the two tariffs. The consumers’ 
decision criteria are that they will choose the CPP rate if the indirect utility exceeds 
indirect utility under the standard rate, i.e. they select the CPP rate if ∆V>0. As a 
measure of the change in indirect utility, we use the compensating variation which 
measures how much money the consumer would need when facing CPP peak/off-peak 
prices to be as well off as the consumer was at the standard price tariff (see Varian, 
1992). The compensating variation measures the income that the consumer needs to be 
compensated for the change of tariff. By using this measure, we can find the sign of the 
difference between indirect utility on the CPP and the standard rate. If the compensating 
variation is positive, the consumer is better off choosing the CPP rate. If it is negative, 
the consumer will choose the standard rate.4 This is illustrated in Figure 3.4, for 
consumer A with positive and negative compensating variation (CV) in the left and 
right picture, respectively. The sign of the CV thus depends on the sign of the indirect 
utility change in the choice between the different tariffs. For consumer B, the 
compensating variation will always be positive, and the consumer will always be better 
off choosing the CPP. 
 
                                                 
4
 Other costs related to the selection of the CPP rate, such as differences in the fixed costs of the two rates, or 
transaction costs related to the inconvenience of switching to the new rate, may also influence the choice. 
However, the rates had equal fixed costs, and for simplicity, we disregard transaction and other costs. 
 




































Figure 3.4. Compensating variation for consumer A with two different shapes of 
indifference curves. The left diagram illustrates the consumer with flexible 
consumption and a positive compensating variation (CV). The right diagram 
illustrates the consumer with a less flexible consumption and negative CV 
 
In the figure, stdY  denotes the expenditures under the standard rate, CPP1Y  denotes 
the expenditures if the consumer maximizes utility under the CPP rate assuming 
expenditures on electricity to remain unchanged, and CPP2Y  denotes the expenditures at 
the new CPP rate assuming the utility to be at the same level as on the standard tariff. 
The difference between CPP1Y  and 
CPP
2Y  equals the compensating variation by 
definition.  
In the following we assume that CPP1Y  equals 
stdY , because electricity expenditures 
under each tariff alternative are equal along the two budget lines of the two rates, and, 
for simplicity, we drop the subscripts and write CPP,onQ  instead of CPP,on2Q  and  CPP,offQ  
instead of CPP,off2Q . 
The consumer will select the CPP rate if he gain utility from changing, that is if 




( ) ( )
CPP CPP std CPP
1 2 2
std std,off std,on CPP,off CPP,off CPP,on CPP,on
CV Y Y Y Y
p Q Q p Q p Q 0
= − = −
= + − + > ,   (3.1) 
 
where stdp  is the standard rate electricity price, CPP,offp  is the CPP off-peak price 
and CPP,onp  is the CPP peak price. std,offQ  and std,onQ  denote annual consumption under 
the standard rate in the off-peak and peak periods, respectively, CPP,offQ  and CPP,onQ  
denote annual consumption under the CPP rate in the off-peak and peak periods, 
respectively.  
The consumer’s choice between the tariffs is based on the consumption pattern they 
normally have under the standard rate, and on the ability to adjust consumption to the 
CPP tariff structure. Thus, when considering the CPP option, the consumers anticipate 
their consumption pattern under this rate to be similar to what it is under the standard 
rate, with the exception that consumption may be adjusted to the price variations. 
Consumption under the CPP rate will then be given as: 
 
CPP,off std,off CPP,offQ Q Q= + ∆  and CPP,on std,on CPP,onQ Q Q= + ∆ ,  (3.2) 
 
i.e., consumption under the CPP rate equals consumption under the standard rate, 
plus adjustments in consumption to the CPP prices ( CPP,offQ∆  and CPP,onQ∆ ), in off-peak 
and peak periods, respectively. Inserting (3.2) in (3.1) and rearranging suggests that the 
CPP rate will be selected if: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )std CPP,off std,off CPP,on std std,on CPP,off CPP,off CPP,on CPP,onCV p p Q p p Q p Q p Q 0= − − − − ∆ + ∆ > .  (3.3) 
 
The different terms in expression (3.3) imply that whether the consumer selects the 
CPP rate depends on the expenditure savings if off-peak consumption is charged by the 
CPP off-peak price instead of the standard price ( ( )std CPP,off std,offp p Q− ), the extra 
expenditure if peak consumption is charged by the CPP peak price instead of the 
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standard price ( ( )CPP,on std std,onp p Q− ), and on the household's ability to shift, increase 
and reduce consumption in order to benefit ( CPP,off CPP,off CPP,on CPP,onp Q p Q∆ + ∆ ). The last 
two terms are collected into a single 'adjustment' term: 
 
CPP CPP,off CPP,off CPP,on CPP,onadj p Q p Q= ∆ + ∆ .      (3.4) 
 
Inserting (3.4) in (3.3) and rearranging, we find that the consumer will choose the 
CPP tariff if: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
std CPP,off std,on CPP
std,offCPP,on std CPP,on std std,off
p p Q adj




.     (3.5) 
 
The inequality (3.5) conveniently expresses the fact that the consumer's choice 
depends on the ratio of the differences between the standard price and the off-peak CPP 
price to the difference between the peak price and the standard price (first term), the 
ratio of consumption in peak hours to the consumption in off-peak hours (second term), 
and the customer's ability to adjust consumpion (third term). This means that the 
consumer will consider all prices (i.e. the price ratio), and then select the CPP rate if: i) 
the consumption ratio is small enough; and/or ii) if the benefits related to consumption 
adjustment are sufficiently high.  
We now discuss the consumption ratio term and the consumption adjustment term 
on the right hand side of the inequality (3.5) in further detail to evaluate which 
customers may benefit from choosing the CPP rate, and which may not. We will also 
discuss whether it is likely that the customers' knowledge and information level is 




3.3 The consumption ratio 
 
As discussed, peak consumption consists of the sum of consumption in the hours 8–
11 and 17–20 on working days in the winter when the temperature is below –8 °C. Off-
peak consumption then consists of total electricity consumption in other winter hours 
and in all summer hours. 
A household will benefit from the CPP rate, given an unchanged consumption 
pattern, if its consumption ratio is lower than the price ratio. As the price ratio is 
calculated using the consumption pattern of an average customer, we may also put this 
differently; a household will benefit if its consumption ratio is lower than the 
consumption ratio of the average customer. It is clear that low on-peak consumption or 
high off-peak consumption contributes ceteris paribus to a consumption ratio that may 
be smaller than that of the average consumer. 
It is likely that certain household electricity consumption behaviour affects normal 
load patterns. For instance, households who normally lower their electricity 
consumption during night hours may not benefit, unless they change their consumption 
pattern. This is because the off-peak consumption in night hours in the winter will be 
smaller, thereby giving a higher ratio. If these households are unwilling to change their 
way of using electricity for heating, the probability they will not choose the CPP rate 
increases. Likewise, lower electricity use during off-peak weekends in winter will 
contribute to a higher ratio. Households who normally use little electricity during 
daytime are likely to have ratios in their favour, and thus benefit from choosing the CPP 
rate, even without changing their pattern of consumption. 
3.4 Consumption adjustments 
 
Consider a customer with an equal or larger peak/off-peak consumption ratio than 
the average customer. The only way this customer can benefit from the CPP rate is by 
shifting peak consumption to the off-peak period, and/or reducing and/or increasing 
consumption in the off-peak and peak period.5 Of course, customers with smaller 
                                                 
5
 We disregard other possible benefits such as automatic meter reading, which is both convenient and time-saving. 
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consumption ratios than price ratios may benefit further from consumption adjustments 
if they choose the CPP rate. However, whether consumption is flexible enough and 
suited for adjustment to the price will vary across households as illustrated by the two 
kinds of indifference curves for consumer A in Figure 3.2 and 3.4. Accordingly, it is 
likely that certain household characteristics will increase their propensity to select the 
new rate offered, and vice versa. 
For instance, consumers with energy management systems can program their 
electric heaters in order to shift peak consumption to off-peak hours. These households 
can more easily take advantage of the CPP rate and save money on their electricity bill 
than other households. One can then expect ownership of energy management systems 
to increase the propensity of households to choose the CPP rate. 
Another way of taking advantage of the price structure is to reduce peak electricity 
consumption through heating the dwelling with a wood-burning stove instead of 
electricity. Some households do not normally use oil/paraffin/gas furnaces, even if 
already owned, and may decide to do so once they select the CPP rate. Ownership of 
alternative heating equipment may therefore increase a household's interest in the 
alternative rate.  
Furthermore, households who only use electricity for space heating may find it 
easier to adjust consumption than those without electricity for heating at all, as a higher 
consumption level may increase flexibility (for instance, Mountain and Lawson (1995) 
found price responses to be larger for households with electric heating, air conditioning 
and electric water heating, compared with households without these appliances). Such 
households may have a higher probability of choosing the CPP rate. 
The timing of use of electric appliances, such as washing machines, dishwashers, 
vacuum cleaners, televisions, personal computers, electric cookers, outdoor electric 
ground heating, engine heaters, etc., may easily be shifted from peak to off-peak hours. 
Consequently, we may expect households with a large stock of electric appliances to be 
more interested in the CPP rate than those with fewer appliances. This is supported by 
studies elsewhere that have found households with relatively more appliances to have 
higher price responses (see, for instance, Caves et al. 1984, Baladi et al., 1998). 
The income of the household can also influence the willingness to participate in the 
CPP rate program. Households in the highest income groups may care less about their 
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electricity bill if it constitutes only a small part of total expenditure. Hence, we may 
expect customers in the lowest income groups to have the highest propensity to choose 
the CPP tariff since they are likely to be most price responsive (see for instance Reiss 
and White (2005)).  
3.5 Information level 
 
All things considered, the decision on selecting the CPP rate is a difficult task for 
consumers. The uncertainty with respect to how many peak hours will be charged the 
peak price during the winter season introduces a problem for the household when trying 
to calculate which rate will yield most benefits. Moreover, customers do not usually 
have any information on how much electricity they normally use each day, week or 
year. This makes it difficult in practice to undertake the necessary calculations. Besides, 
it is unlikely that every household will actually undertake these calculations. On the 
other hand, customers may rely on a rule of thumb to assess whether they wish to use 
the CPP rate. If they know their consumption is small during the hours of the day when 
the peak price may be activated, they may believe that they will benefit from choosing 
the rate. However, such consumers may be a minority in the population, as electricity 
consumption may not be of major concern to most households. It may be more likely 
that most customers will base their decision on information and knowledge they actually 
have, i.e. their ability and willingness to adjust consumption according to varying 
prices.  
4 Econometric specification 
 
The households' decision to select the CPP rate or the standard rate is formulated 
with a discrete choice participation model. This statistical model is used to test whether 
there are statistically significant differences between two groups that have chosen 
differently between the rates, with respect to their characteristics. 
Let the indirect utility V for a customer under each of the rates depend on the 
consumption pattern of the customer (i.e. consumption in the off-peak and peak 
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periods), electricity prices, income, and other household characteristics. Then ∆V = 
VCPP - Vstd
 
indicates the difference in a household's indirect utility between choosing the 
CPP rate and the standard rate. A household will choose the CPP rate if ∆V>0, i.e. if the 
indirect utility on the CPP rate is higher than on the standard rate. The utilities are 
unobservable, but in a linear random utility framework we observe the choice between 
the two rate alternatives, and this choice is assumed to reveal the one with the greatest 
utility (see e.g. Greene, 2003). Let 
 
1       if V 0 
CPP
0      otherwise
∆ >
=  ,       (4.1) 
 
and VCPP= XβCPP-εCPP, Vstd= Xβstd-εstd, so that ∆V=X(βCPP - βstd) - (εCPP-εstd) = Xβ-ε, 
where X is the deterministic component, ε is the stochastic component which, for 
instance, may represent unobserved preferences for comfort (indoor temperature, 
lighting, amount of hot water spent on showering or bathing, etc.), environmental 
concerns (if they regard peak consumption reductions as an environmental measure), 
transaction costs of a shift of tariff (such as time and effort spent on understanding the 
new rate alternative). β are unknown coefficients to be estimated. As described in 
Section 3, the systematic part of ∆V depends on the difference in expenditures between 
the two rates, CV = Ystd - YCPP. Then customer i's probability of choosing the CPP rate 
is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )std,off std,on CPPi i i i i 1 i 2 i iP CPP 1 P V 0 P X P Q Q Z= = ∆ > = ε < β = ε < α +β +β + γ ,   (4.2) 
 
where std,off1 iQβ  and std,on2 iQβ  gives the effect on utility of consumption in off-peak and 
peak periods under the standard rate. As discussed in Section 3 regarding the 
indifference curves and the consumption ratio, a consumer with high off-peak 
consumption will have a low consumption ratio, and one may expect such a consumer 
to select the CPP rate. The sign of β1 is then hypothesised to be positive. The opposite is 
likely to be true for β2, which is attached to the on-peak consumption variable. The 
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consumption variables in (4.2) will thus pick up the impact of peak and off-peak 
consumption on the propensity to participate separately, instead of in a single ratio term. 
CPP
iZ γ  gives the effect on the utility of consumption adjustments to the prices for each 
household. The vector CPPiZ is approximated by variables indicating the households' 
ability or willingness to reduce or shift consumption in peak periods, i.e. the 
substitability of peak and off-peak consumption revealed by the indifference curves. γ is 
expected to be positive/negative for variables that are likely to increase/decrease a 
household's likelihood of selecting the CPP rate. The stochastic error term (εi) is 
assumed to be logistic and independently distributed. The unknown parameters in (4.2) 
are estimated using a bivariate logit model (see, for instance, Greene, 2003).  
5 The data 
 
In the experiment, automatic meter reading technology provided measurements of 
each customer's hourly electricity consumption. All customers were asked to answer a 
survey by post or Internet that requested socio-demographic information about the 
household. Twenty percent of households responded to the survey (see Andersen et al., 
2004, and Sæle, 2004, for details). The consumption and survey data are used in this 
analysis to investigate systematic differences between households choosing the CPP rate 
and those retaining the standard rate. This section describes the data and the variables 
included in the analysis. 
One objective of the analysis is to study whether the customers' consumption 
patterns have affected their choice of tariff. Data from the experiment period is used as 
an indicator of the consumption pattern before the participation decision was made.6 In 
November and December 2003 (during the experiment period), temperatures never fell 
below –8°C and the peak price was never activated. Hence, customers that chose the 
CPP tariff faced flat off-peak prices, and had no incentive to adjust their daily load 
                                                 
6
 Metering of the households' electricity consumption commenced at the beginning of the experiment period. 
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patterns.7 It is then reasonable to assume that the CPP group (as well as the standard 
group) behaved in the same manner in this period with respect to their consumption 
patterns, as they did prior to the experiment period.  
Consumption during the hours 8–11 and 17–20 in the coldest days in November 
and December are therefore used to approximate peak consumption, while the 
remaining consumption in these months is used to approximate off-peak consumption. 
The number of peak hours used is approximately the same as the number of hours with 
temperatures below –8°C that normally would occur in November and December.8 
Although consumption behaviour for temperatures below –8°C is not measured, 
temperatures lay below zero for several days. This makes it likely that the data still 
reflects any consumption differences between the households. 
The other objective of the analysis is to investigate whether customers who selected 
the CPP rate did so because they are more flexible in consumption when prices vary. As 
indicators of flexibility, characteristics of the households and residences are used, as 
these may influence price responsiveness and the decisions to select the CPP rate (Train 
et al., 1987, Caves et al., 2000). Dummy variables are included to indicate households 
with an energy management system, households with electricity as their only space-
heating source, households with electricity and wood-heating furnaces, households with 
electricity and oil/gas/paraffin and households with oil/gas/paraffin as their only space-
heating source. Dummy variables also indicate whether the household is a single-
member family (zero otherwise), whether there is at least one family member living at 
home (zero otherwise), and whether the total annual income of the household belongs to 
one of four income intervals (zero otherwise). In addition, dwelling size and age are 
included in the analysis as continuous variables. 
Descriptive statistics for 107 households in the group choosing the CPP rate and 
167 households choosing to remain on the standard rate are given in Table 1.  
 
                                                 
7
 The consumers’ total prices consist of the network plus the power prices plus taxes and VAT. The small difference 
in total price due to the difference between the off-peak CPP price and the standard price is assumed to be 
negligible (total price under the CPP and the standard tariff depends on the power tariff, but as an approximation, it 
would be about 0.60 NOK/kWh and 0.65 NOK/kWh, respectively). Moreover, it should not influence the shape of 
the load curve, since none of the rates varies across the day. 
8
 Data from the remainder of the experiment period could not be used due to technical problems with the metering 
system and missing data. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of household electricity consumption and 
characteristics for CPP and standard rate. 
 
Critical peak pricing 
rate 
Standard rate 
Number of households 107 167  
Binary variables Percent Percent  
Energy management system 25.2 10.8  
Heating: No electricity 3.7 10.2  
Heating: Electricity + oil/gas/paraffin 46.7 55.7  
Heating: Electricity + wood 39.3 26.9  
Heating: Only electricity 10.3 7.2  
Dwelling: Detached 75.7 56.3  
Dwelling: Semi-detached 11.2 13.8  
Dwelling: Undetached 8.4 9.6  
Dwelling: Flat 4.7 20.4  
Income: 0–250,000  [NOK] 15.0 26.9  
Income: 250,000–500,000  [NOK] 38.3 30.5  
Income: 500,000–750,000  [NOK] 32.7 25.7  
Income: 750,000–  [NOK] 14.0 16.8  
Single-member family 10.3 26.9  
Living at home 45.3 52.0  
Continuous variables Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Peak consumption [kWh] 104 43 15 216 91 44 5 235 
Off-peak consumption 
[kWh] 
4326 1789 652 8497 3801 1875 243 10161 
Peak/Off-peak cons. ratio 0.024 0.002 0.021 0.029 0.024 0.002 0.017 0.032 
Age of dwelling [in years] 28.5 18.4 4 131 52.0 29.0 9 155 
Dwelling size [m2] 146.3 51.5 40 275 143.8 65.8 40 350 
NOK 1 ~ EUR 0.12 / USD 0.16  
 
Table 1 shows that both mean peak and off-peak electricity consumption is higher 
for the CPP group. However, peak/off-peak consumption ratio is almost the same. The 
share of households with an energy management system in the CPP group (25.2 
percent) is also larger than in the standard group (10.8 percent).  
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Households are divided into four groups with respect to their heating equipment: 
dwellings with no electric heating (which means they use oil, gas or paraffin instead); 
dwellings with electricity and oil/gas/paraffin heating systems; dwellings with 
electricity heating and wood-burning furnaces; and finally, dwellings with electricity 
heating only. The percentage share of households with electricity heating only is 
somewhat larger for the CPP group, and the share of customers with oil/gas/paraffin 
heating in addition to electricity heating is somewhat larger for the group choosing the 
standard rate. The share of households with electricity heating and wood-burning stoves 
is nearly fifty percent larger in the CPP group, and the share of households without 
electricity heating in the CPP group is only a third of the share in the standard group.  
In terms of dwelling type, about three quarters of CPP households, and only about 
half of the households in the standard group, are living in detached houses. The share of 
the households living in flats in the CPP group is about a quarter of the share in the 
standard group. The share of households living in semi-detached and undetached houses 
is quite similar for the two groups. With respect to the total annual income of 
households, we can see the share in the lowest income group (income less than NOK 
250,000) is nearly half in the CPP group compared to the standard group, and somewhat 
larger in the two middlemost income groups. We also see that the two groups do not 
differ significantly for the highest income level.  
The share of households in the CPP group living as a single-member family is 
nearly one third of the standard group. Households where at least one of the family 
members is living at home during the daytime do not differ much between the two 
groups, though the share is somewhat lower in the CPP rate group. Finally, we can see 
that the average age of dwellings for the CPP group is nearly half that of the standard 
group, but the average dwelling size is approximately the same. 
6 Estimation results 
 
As shown in the previous section, the summary statistics indicate differences 
between households choosing the CPP rate and those choosing to remain on the 
standard rate. A cross-section logit model is used to analyse the joint impact of the 
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variables on the participation decision. Results from the estimated logit model, using 
Stata 8.0 (StataCorp, 2003), are presented in Table 2.9  
Table 2. Estimated logit model results. 
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Err. P>|z| 
Energy management system 0.9873 0.4201 0.019 
Peak consumption  –0.0272 0.0232 0.241 
Off-peak consumption 0.0007 0.0005 0.187 
Heating: Electricity + oil/gas/paraffin 0.4444 0.6618 0.502 
Heating: Electricity + wood 1.1778 0.7162 0.100 
Heating: Only electricity 1.6842 0.9033 0.062 
Dwelling: Semi-detached –0.8183 0.5157 0.113 
Dwelling: Undetached –1.3333 0.5966 0.025 
Dwelling: Flat –2.3886 0.6804 0.000 
Income: 0–250,000 [NOK] 0.4991 0.6433 0.438 
Income: 250,000–500,000 [NOK] 0.9920 0.5709 0.082 
Income: 500,000–750,000 [NOK] 0.3358 0.5226 0.521 
Single-member family –0.8991 0.5485 0.101 
Living at home –0.3007 0.3441 0.382 
Dwelling size [m2] –0.0081 0.0040 0.043 
Age of dwelling [in years] –0.0468 0.0107 0.000 
Constant 1.5554 1.1796 0.187 
Log pseudo-likelihood = –130.14876 Wald chi2(16) =  49.95 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2863 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
Note: The left-hand side binary variable is one for households choosing the CPP rate and zero for 
households choosing to remain on the standard rate. Detached dwelling, Heating with only 
oil/gas/paraffin, Multi-member family and Income 750,000– are omitted to avoid multicollinearity. 
 
A positive sign on an estimated coefficient in this table indicates the increased 
propensity of a household to select the CPP rate; negative signs indicate greater 
reluctance to select the CPP rate.  
The peak and off-peak consumption parameter estimates display a negative and a 
positive sign, respectively. This indicates reluctance of consumers with large peak 
and/or low off-peak consumption to choose the CPP rate. Alternatively, it indicates the 
interest of consumers with small peak and/or large off-peak consumption to take 
                                                 
9
 To correct for possible misspecification in the model, the Huber/White/sandwich estimator is used to obtain a robust 
estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameters (StataCorp, 2003). 
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advantage of their consumption pattern by choosing the CPP rate. However, none of the 
estimated coefficients is significant. Jointly testing the two variables' significance with 
an F-test also fails to indicate any statistical significance. This suggests that with respect 
to electricity consumption patterns, households selecting the CPP rate do not differ 
significantly from the households who do not. 
One reason may be that the consumers do not have accurate information about their 
consumption during the day, in either peak or off-peak periods. This complicates the 
task of calculating how their consumption during different parts of the day across a year 
affects expected expenditure. One should also recall the dynamic feature of the CPP 
rate; that is, the peak price is only charged when the temperature is below –8°C. 
Although the customers were informed how often these temperatures normally occur, it 
introduces additional uncertainty, which further complicates the calculation of peak and 
off-peak consumption and its related costs. These uncertainties and difficulties may be 
the main reason why the consumption differences in peak and off-peak periods are 
insignificant. Baladi et al. (1998) suggests another explanation for similar findings: 
instead of making decisions based on accurate consumption information, customers may 
rely on perceived usage patterns, which are not necessarily correct.  
In this case, instead of choosing between rate alternatives based on consumption 
patterns, households may have based their decision on their ability and willingness to 
adjust usage. Estimates for the remaining variables indicate whether this was the case. 
The effect of the energy management system variable, as expected, is positive and 
significant (at the 2 percent level). Since these households display a higher ability to 
shift consumption between peak and off-peak periods, this is likely to be the reason why 
their probability of choosing the CPP rate is higher than other households. This implies 
that the group of customers selecting the rate has greater potential to be demand 
responsive than those selecting the standard rate. However, and as shown in Table 1, 
there are still some households with energy management systems who did not choose 
the CPP rate, even though they possibly could have benefited. This suggests that the 
marketing campaign for the CPP tariff could have focused more on the saving potential 
of energy managing systems. This could then have increased the demand response 
potential from the households on the CPP rate. 
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The results also indicate that households with electricity heating only and 
households with wood-burning furnaces in addition to electricity are significantly more 
interested (at the 10 percent level) in the CPP rate than households without electricity 
heating (those with only oil, gas, paraffin heating). The interest of the former may be 
explained by their higher potential for changing consumption, as they use more 
electricity for heating and then have greater consumption to reduce or shift. The latter 
may be explained by the ability to substitute electricity consumption in peak-price hours 
with wood. The group with electricity heating in addition to oil, gas or paraffin is not 
significantly different from the group with oil/gas/paraffin heating only. These groups 
may be reluctant to participate because their electricity usage is not as flexible as 
households who use electricity, or electricity and wood, to heat their residences. 
The results also indicate that customers living in detached houses are more likely to 
select the CPP rate than households living in other house types. Households living in 
flats were least likely to select the CPP rate. One reason may be that detached houses 
usually have more rooms, which makes it easier to reduce consumption in parts of the 
house that are not frequently in use. Another reason is that households living in 
detached houses are more likely to own more electric appliances than those living in 
other and smaller dwellings (some examples of appliances are listed in Section 3). With 
more appliances, it should be easier to alter the time of usage between price periods. If 
we interpret dwelling types as a proxy for electric appliances excluded in the estimation, 
this may explain why house type significantly affects the choice of CPP. 
In terms of total annual income, the results indicate that households in the second-
to-lowest and lowest income groups are most likely to select the CPP rate, when 
compared with the highest income group. The reason why households with the highest 
income have a lower interest may be that they do not care about saving the relatively 
small share of income used on electricity consumption. However, only the coefficient 
for the second-to-lowest income group differs significantly from that for the highest 
income group.  
The coefficient for single-member families displays a negative sign. Singles are 
assumed less likely to select the CPP rate, as compared to families of two or more 
members.  One possible explanation may be that the adjustments in consumption 
necessary to take advantage of the rate may be more easily accomplished if there are 
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more people in the household, i.e., the time budget spent on making consumption 
adjustments is shared across household members. Another explanation is that more 
members infers higher consumption and with that, higher adjustment potential. The 
estimate is nearly significant at the 10 percent level. 
The effect of the variable that indicates whether people are home during the 
daytime is negative. The reason for this reluctance to choose the CPP rate may be an 
unwillingness to reduce consumption during colder periods during the day as the 
household may have small children or elderly occupants. The estimate is, however, not 
significant. The significant negative estimate of the coefficient for net floor space 
indicates that larger dwellings decrease the likelihood of participation. The size of the 
dwelling (in square metres) is likely correlated with both income and dwelling type, 
which are controlled for in the regression. However, income is defined in quite broad 
intervals, and the income dummy variables may therefore not have picked up all of the 
explanatory power related to the income effect. The negative coefficient may be thought 
of as a further support for higher income groups' low interest in the CPP rate.  
We further show that the age of the dwelling is highly significant with a negative 
sign. This indicates that households in newer dwellings are more likely to choose the 
CPP rate. This variable picks up standard and energy efficiency differences between 
dwellings, e.g., electric floor heating is more common in newer dwellings. With electric 
floor heaters, energy is stored in the floor due to its higher heating capacity. Households 
with these heating systems are more time-of-use flexible, and hence better suited for 
switching consumption between price periods. Newer dwellings also tend to be better 
insulated. This decreases heat loss from the dwelling and lessens the loss of comfort if, 
for instance, electric heaters are turned off during high price periods.  
Finally, the Wald-statistic (which is χ2-distributed with the degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of slope coefficients) is used to test the hypothesis that all 
coefficients (except the intercept) are jointly equal to zero. This hypothesis is rejected at 





This analysis indicates that, on average, the consumption pattern does not influence 
the households' decision on whether to select the critical peak price (CPP) rate or the 
standard rate. Ownership of energy management systems and wood-burning furnaces 
increases the probability of joining the CPP program. Households can use this 
equipment to shift peak consumption to off-peak hours, or to reduce peak consumption 
and reduce electricity expenditures. The results indicate that the offering of CPP tariffs 
may increase the demand response among residential electricity consumers since the 
tariff appears to attract customers with a higher ability to respond to varying prices than 
the population as a whole. Moreover, the CPP tariff does not, on average, appear to 
attract customers that may benefit without making any consumption adjustments 
significantly more than the tariff attracts other consumers. 
One possible explanation for the results is that customers' lack of information and 
knowledge of when and how electricity is used prevents decisions being taken with 
respect to consumption patterns. Instead, their decisions appear to be based on the 
knowledge they have in place, such as their own motivation and ability to be price 
responsive. The data also show that a larger share of households with energy 
management systems and with wood-burning furnaces could have been attracted to the 
CPP rate. This suggests that marketing campaigns may attain a higher share of possible 
price responsive households if a greater effort was made to inform them about the 
expenditure saving potential of the CPP rate. 
Technologies supplying hourly consumption data to households will probably be 
more common in the future. Such technologies may ease the comparison of expenditure 
with different rate alternatives. With such information, it is likely that the customers' 
selection of time-differentiated rates will increasingly be taken on the basis of 
consumption patterns. If customers with advantageous consumption patterns mainly 
choose differentiated tariffs, this may in turn erode the benefits associated with demand 
response programs based on time-differentiated tariffs. On the other hand, new 
technologies are also likely to manage electricity usage in more advanced ways, and 
may offer automatic calculation of the possible savings from price adjustment. This may 
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increase the participation of price responsive customers, which in turn will increase the 
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Time-of-use and real-time spot pricing tariffs in conjunction with direct load control of 
water heaters was offered to residential electricity consumers in a large-scale demand 
response experiment. Hourly data from the experiment on consumption, temperature, 
wind, and hours of daylight comprise a large panel data set, which are analysed with a 
fixed effects regression model. Price responses are estimated for three customer groups, 
which differ with respect to their choices of tariffs and requests for direct load control. 
The results indicate differing responses between the groups depending on their tariff 
combination. 
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Measures to increase demand response in the power system may contribute to 
improve efficiency, maintain reliability and mitigate exercise of market power (DOE, 
2005). Presently, most Norwegian households face electricity prices that might be 
constant over weeks or seasons, and they are charged their energy consumption 
accumulated between meter reading dates occurring only a few times a year. This does 
not encourage consumption reductions during constrained peak periods. If instead 
households face time-differentiated prices, and are metered automatically, they will be 
provided with incentives to reduce electricity usage in peak price periods. 
Time-differentiated tariffs can be designed in various ways. With time-of-use 
(TOU) rates, prices vary by blocks of time within the day and are fixed and known by 
customers in advance. However, the TOU pricing scheme remains quite static because 
the prices in each time block are constant and independent of the conditions in the 
electricity system. With dynamic rates, prices can be adjusted in accordance with the 
system situation. An example of a dynamic rate is critical-peak pricing. This is related 
to the TOU rate, but has the possibility of increasing the peak price to an extra high 
level if the system is severely constrained. Even more dynamic is real-time pricing. 
With this rate, the price can change frequently, e.g., on an hourly basis, to better reflect 
real-time system conditions. The market-based spot price is an example of this (see, for 
instance, Faruqui and George (2002) for a description of these rates). 
Several experiments using time-differentiated pricing of electricity have been 
carried out in recent decades to quantify the responsiveness of end users. A series of 
experiments were conducted in the USA in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although 
results differ, the general findings from the analyses of these experiments are that 
consumers respond to the varying prices (Lawrence and Aigner, 1979, Aigner, 1984). 
Caves et al. (1984) pooled data from five of the experiments and calculated a 
substitution elasticity of about 0.14.1 Later analyses of similar experiments indicate the 
                                                 
1
 The elasticity of substitution is a measure of the percentage change in the ratio of the peak to off-peak consumption 
as a result of a percentage change in the ratio of the peak to the off-peak price. 
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same result: customers do respond to short-term price signals. For instance, Filippini 
(1995) found high price elasticities ranging from –1.25 to –1.41,2 Vaage (1995) found 
elasticities of substitution of about 0.18, Henley and Peirson (1998) reported price 
elasticities of –0.102 and –0.249, Baladi et al. (1998) estimated substitution elasticities 
from 0.127 to 0.173, and Matsukawa (2001) found price elasticities of about –0.7. 
However, despite the fact that customers respond to price signals, the resulting 
benefits have not normally been sufficiently large to justify investment in the costly 
equipment needed for implementing the new tariff schemes (Hawdon, 1992, Braithwait, 
2000). 
This has motivated projects using enabling technologies designed to motivate or aid 
an increase in the price response. This is done either by continuously informing 
consumers of the current price level, or by helping them to reduce consumption by, for 
example, controlling loads automatically. An example is a Finnish dynamic pricing 
experiment that used indicator lamps to warn customers that peak price periods were 
possibly forthcoming or in effect. Räsänen et al. (1995) found customers responded to 
this price signal by reducing consumption during peak periods by up to 71%. The 
“tempo tariff” offered by Electricité de France is an example of an approach using 
critical-peak pricing along with notification to the households of the next day’s prices. 
The price level is signalled to customers by colour signals on their meters. Aubin et al. 
(1995) found high responses in an experiment using the tempo tariff (price elasticity of 
–0.79). A project conducted in the USA used a critical-peak price tariff together with an 
interactive communication system. The system allowed the utility to send a signal to the 
consumers during critical high-price periods. In addition, it allowed customers to 
program and schedule some of their appliances to adjust consumption according to 
prices. Braithwait (2000) analysed data from this project, and found an elasticity of 
substitution of approximately 0.3, considered to be higher than what has been found in 
most other studies of traditional TOU programs. The results from the recently finished 
Statewide Pricing Pilot in California (Faruqui and George, 2005) further illustrate the 
same results. Although comparisons between different customer groups in the 
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 The (own) price elasticity is a measure of the percentage change in consumption as a result of a percentage change 




experiment should be made with care, the results showed that customers with enabling 
technologies responded more than customers without this equipment. 
A Norwegian residential large-scale experiment combined time-differentiated 
tariffs with automatic meter reading and direct load control. The consumers were 
offered a time-of-use tariff and real-time spot prices as incentives to adjust electricity 
consumption according to varying prices. In addition, they were offered price-response 
assistance by direct load control of their water heaters. Ericson (2006b) investigated the 
effect of the automated water heater control on the daily load shape in this experiment. 
The data analysis showed that disconnecting water heaters reduced the load by 
approximately 0.5 kWh/h per household on average.3 
This paper investigates new data from the Norwegian experiment. It aims to 
estimate price responses for three groups of households, which differ in their choice of 
tariffs and requests for direct load control. The panel data set, analysed with a fixed 
effects regression model, was collected over a six-month period. It consists of hourly 
metered data on electricity consumption from 312 households (nearly 800,000 data 
points), along with the number of hours of daylight per day and measurements of local 
temperatures and wind speeds. 
The results indicate that customers with TOU and spot prices, without direct load 
control, were most responsive to the price variation. Customers with TOU and standard 
power tariffs, without direct load control, and customers with TOU and spot prices and 
direct load control of water heaters had smaller responses to the prices. 
2 Experiment and data 
 
“End-user Flexibility by Efficient Use of Information and Communication 
Technology” (2001–2004) was a Norwegian project where automatic meter reading and 
direct load control technology was installed in residential dwellings. The project 
developed and tested the use of time-differentiated network and power tariffs, and direct 
load control of water heaters. The electricity consumption of each household was 
metered every hour from 3 November 2003 to 25 April 2004, i.e., for 4200 hours. 
                                                 
3
 A typical water heater in Norway has a capacity of 200 litres and a heating element of 2 kW. 
 




Before the test period started, all customers had standard flat network tariffs and 
standard power tariffs.4 The project was a voluntary “opt-in” program, and the 
customers were given different participation choices. They could choose a TOU tariff 
from the network company and/or the market based spot price tariff from a power 
company. If they chose the spot price alternative, they had the further option of direct 
load control of their water heaters. The disconnections of the heaters would normally 
occur in the two most expensive spot price hours, every morning and evening. 
Depending on the customers’ choices, they divided into groups with differing 
combinations of standard and/or new tariffs, and with/without direct load control of 
water heaters. 
This paper studies three different samples from the panel of customers. The 
samples are grouped according to their choice of tariff and their choice regarding water 
heater disconnection. Table 1 shows the customer groups, the number of households in 
each group, and the total number of observations in each group. 
                                                 
4
 After the deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market in 1991, vertically integrated power companies were 
separated into generating or trading divisions and network divisions. Customers now face one network tariff from 
their local net supplier, and one power tariff from a power supplier, which can be freely chosen from competing 
companies. Therefore, a consumer's total electricity price will be made up of the network price plus the power price 




Table 1. Customer groups (abbreviations in parentheses), the number of households in 
each group, and the total number of observations in each group 




TOU net tariff & standard power 
tariff (TOU/Std)
 
 171 415,841 
TOU net tariff & 
spot price power tariff (TOU/spot) 7 19,289 
TOU net tariff & 
spot price power tariff &  
direct load control 
(TOU/spot/DLC) 134 343,138 
Note: Approximately 150 of the households in the TOU/Std group are only “semi-volunteers”. They 
originally chose a dynamic tariff that activated high peak prices only when temperatures fell below –8 °C. 
This tariff was terminated at the beginning of January 2004 and the customers were automatically 
transferred to the normal TOU tariff, with the option of opting out if they refused this rate (approximately 
10 percent refused the new tariff). Only observations from the period with the normal TOU tariff (later 
than 5 January 2004) are included in the analysis of those customers. 
2.2 Tariffs 
 
The TOU network tariff had a two-level rate structure with a peak price of 
approximately NOK5 0.91 in hours 8–11 (7 am–11am) and hours 17–20 (4 pm–8 pm) 
on working days, and an off-peak price of approximately NOK 0.03 in all other hours of 
working days, weekends, and holidays.6 The power tariff was the next day’s hourly spot 
prices, settled in the day-ahead market at Nord Pool. Figure 2.1 shows average, 
minimum, and maximum daily spot prices during the test period. 
 
                                                 
5
 NOK 1 ≈ EUR 0.12 and USD 0.15 
6
 Tax and VAT (24%) are not included. In 2003, a tax of approximately NOK 0.10 was added to the power price. In 
2004, this tax was shifted to the network price. 
 
















Figure 2.1. Average, minimum, and maximum daily spot prices from November 2003 to 
May 2004 
 
Figure 2.1 reveals two important characteristics of the spot price during the test 
period. First, the average daily level was quite stable. Over the first 1½ months, the 
price remained at a level of about NOK 0.30 and, for the rest of the period, it remained 
at a level of approximately NOK 0.25. Second, the average difference between the 
minimum and maximum hourly spot price for each day was below NOK 0.03. Only on 
nine days did the difference exceed NOK 0.05 and, on four of those days, the difference 
exceeded NOK 0.10. To exemplify the hourly price variation the consumers were faced 
with, Figure 2.2 shows the spot price for one typical day (15 November) and one non-
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Figure 2.2. Hourly spot price on a typical (15 November) and non-typical day (22 
January), and the TOU tariff 
 
Figure 2.2 clearly shows that, on most days, the spot price provided only small 
incentives for consumers to alter their consumption. In other words, the TOU tariff was 
by far the most powerful price signal when it came to encouraging intra-daily changes 
in electricity consumption, for all three consumer groups. The price ratio (peak 
price/off-peak price) of the TOU rate, disregarding the power rate and taxes, is very 
high. However, as the total price faced by the consumers consists of the network price 
plus the power price plus taxes and VAT, the average total price ratio that the 
consumers actually face is lower (approximately 3.2:1). 
2.3 Direct load control 
 
The disconnections and reconnections of the water heaters’ electricity circuits were 
carried out by direct contact with a relay in each household’s fuse box. The load control 
was a service accompanied with the spot price tariff, and performed in conjunction with 
the hours when the spot price was expected to be highest (hours 9, 10, 18, and 19).   
The load control events were not timed in accordance with the network TOU tariff. 
Because the water heaters were reconnected at the beginning of the last hour of the 
TOU peak price period, the water heater energy restoration for the first hour after 
reconnection did not take place when the TOU price was low, but when the price was 
still high. Thus, the length of a heater’s normal recovery period, without any 
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interruption, determined whether a household gained from the disconnection, also with 
respect to the TOU tariff. If the recovery period normally took one hour or less, all 
consumption would only be shifted to the hour when the TOU price was high and these 
consumers would probably not gain from the load control. On the other hand, if the 
recovery period normally took more than one hour, some of the hot water recovery 
would take place in the low-price period. Consequently, these consumers would shift 
parts of their consumption from TOU peak to off-peak price hours, and gain from the 
load control, not only with respect to the spot price power tariff, but also with respect to 
the TOU network tariff. 
2.4 Household electricity consumption 
 
The time-differentiated tariffs are intended to provide customers with incentives to 
adjust their electricity consumption patterns throughout the day. Figure 2.3 shows the 
average daily load curve (average consumption per hour) in the test period for the three 
groups with differentiated rates and a reference group. The reference group consists of 
754 households that did not volunteer for the new rates. They had no incentives to alter 
their daily load curve, and are included in the figure to enable visual comparisons 




















Figure 2.3. Average daily load curve for the groups with time-differentiated rates and a 
reference group 
 
As seen in Figure 2.3, the reference group with standard network and power tariffs 
has a smooth daily load curve. There are morning and afternoon peaks corresponding to 
the hours when people are usually at home, and off-peak periods in the middle of the 
day and at night, which correspond to the hours when people are at work or asleep. This 
load curve reflects the typical consumption pattern for households that do not face 
variations in price during the day, and thus have no incentive to change their electricity 
consumption behaviour. 
The groups with TOU and standard power tariffs without direct load control 
(TOU/Std) and with TOU and spot prices with direct load control (TOU/spot/DLC) 
have higher overall consumption levels than the reference group. In addition, it appears 
that these two groups consume more electricity in the early morning hours, when the 
price is low, compared with the reference group. This is illustrated by their consumption 
curve which seems to increase more in those hours. Following the same argument, it 
does not appear that these two groups have reduced their consumption in hour 8, which 
is a high-price hour. For the TOU/spot/DLC group, we see the effect of the 
disconnections in hours 9, 10, 18, and 19, when consumption drops. The effect of the 
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reconnections is seen in hours 11 and 20. Consumption increases in these hours owing 
to the postponed water heater recovery.7 
The group with TOU and spot price without direct load control (TOU/spot) differ 
from the other two test groups, as overall consumption level is lower. In addition, their 
consumption pattern is well adjusted to the TOU peak and off-peak prices. Their 
consumption seems to fall substantially in high-price periods and to increase in the low-
price periods. 
As Figure 2.3 shows, the consumption curves of all three groups differ from the 
reference group in their consumption level and/or in their pattern during the day. As the 
customers participated on a voluntarily basis, one could argue that the time-
differentiated tariffs were chosen either by households that could easily alter their 
consumption pattern or by households with a favourable load profile. If the sample 
consisted purely of the former type of customers, the utility could expect a demand 
response from its customers. However, if the sample consisted only of the latter type, 
reductions might actually not have taken place because these customers simply could 
continue their prior consumption behaviour during the experiment, and gain from the 
tariff without changing their consumption. Thus, it is important to know whether this 
type of self-selection is prevalent among the customers. Ericson (2005, 2006a) 
investigated this issue among customers in the TOU/Std group and found that the load 
pattern of this group did not differ significantly from a group that chose to remain on 
their standard tariff. This indicates that self-selection based on favourable load patterns 
is not prevailing and that any load reductions measured in the analyses in the present 
paper is a result of adjustments to the price, at least for the TOU/Std group. 
Summary statistics for electricity consumption for working days are given in Table 
2. 
                                                 
7
 Consumption may remain high in subsequent hours also, but will not be as high as in the first hour after 
reconnection. Among other factors, consumption depends on the level of hot water used in each household and the 
time required to recover lost energy from the hot water consumption. This so-called payback or cold load pickup 
effect resulting from simultaneous reconnections is discussed in, e.g., Gomes et al. (1999), Orphelin and Adnot 
(1999), and van Tonder and Lane (1996). 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of electricity consumption [kWh/h] for the groups 
with time-differentiated tariffs and the reference group (working days) 
Customer group Period Mean Std 
dev. 
Median Min. Max. 
Off-peak 2.12 1.43 1.8 0.1 17.6 Reference  
Peak 2.38 1.59 2.0 0.1 25.8 
Off-peak 2.50 1.48 2.2 0.1 14.7 TOU net tariff & 
standard power tariff 
(TOU/Std) 
Peak 2.78 1.63 2.5 0.1 14.9 
Off-peak 2.23 1.24 2.1 0.1 9.6 TOU net tariff & 
spot price power 
tariff  
(TOU/spot) 
Peak 1.92 0.98 1.7 0.1 8.3 
Off-peak 2.58 1.44 2.3 0.1 16.8 TOU net tariff & 
spot price power 
tariff & direct load 
control 
(TOU/spot/DLC) 
Peak 2.81 1.56 2.5 0.1 15.9 
Note: Peak (hours 8–11, 17–20 in working days) and off-peak (the remaining hours) are related to the 
high and low TOU rate periods, respectively. 
2.5 Temperature and wind data 
 
In addition to the electricity consumption data, hourly observations of average 
outdoor temperature and wind speed, and hours of daylight each day are available. 
These data are shown in Table 3. Temperature and wind data are measured at a central 
point in the vicinity of the customers. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for temperature, wind, and number of daylight hours (all 
days) 
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max. 
Temp [°C] 0.5 5.6 –16.3 16.7 
Wind [m/s] 1.5 0.8 0.3 6.6 
Daylight [hour] 9.0 2.8 5.9 15.2 
 
The variation in the weather variables was high with temperatures from –16 to +16 
ºC and wind speeds reaching up to 6 m/s. This variation captures much of the 
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temperature and wind conditions often experienced in these seasons in Norway. The 
number of hours of daylight each day varied from 5.9 (in December) to 15.2 (in April), 
with an average of nine hours. 
3 Method and model 
 
The regression model presented in this section is developed to predict the electricity 
consumption of customers at every hour during the whole test period. Analyses will be 
performed simultaneously on the three groups with the time-differentiated tariffs: the 
TOU/spot, TOU/Std, and TOU/spot/DLC groups. The goal is to find the extent to which 
the groups responded to the varying prices by adjusting consumption. The price 
responses will be captured in price coefficients, one for each of the three groups, and are 
measured as changes in kWh/h to changes in price (where the hourly price is the sum of 
the network and the power price in each hour, and taxes and VAT). 
Variations in outside temperature and wind speed, number of hours of daylight each 
day, household specific characteristics, and time of day, week, and year are controlled 
for in the regression. As described earlier, self-selection based on an advantageous load 
pattern in the TOU/Std group did not appear to be prevalent, as indicated by the results 
in Ericson (2005, 2006a). This is assumed to be the case for the TOU/spot and the 
TOU/spot/DLC groups also. Hence, no measure for testing or controlling for this is 
included. 
3.1 Econometric specification 
 
In this analysis, the households’ utility is assumed to depend on their consumption 
of electricity and all other goods and services. The consumption of electricity depends 
on the stock of electrical appliances because electricity does not give the household 
utility per se, but has to be used along with such equipment to obtain utility (for 
instance, when preparing hot meals, washing clothes, watching television, and heating 
water or rooms). The households are assumed to maximize their utility given all prices 
and income. This gives the households’ demand for electricity and other goods as a 
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function of all prices, incomes, their stock of appliances, and other household 
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yit = hourly electricity consumption [kWh/h], at time t for household i; 
pit =  electricity price [NOK] for household i, at time t ; 
dlt  =  daylight; 1 between sunrise and sunset, 0 else; 
Tt  =  temperature [ºC], at time t; 
2
tT   =  temperature, squared, at time t; 
TMAt = moving average of temperature last 24 hours, at time t;    
2
tTMA  = moving average of temperature last 24 hours, squared, at time t;   
Wt  = wind [m/s], at time t; 
WMAt = moving average of wind last 24 hours, at time t; 
trigj,t  =  trigonometric terms, taking the value sin(πh/6), sin(πh/8), sin(πh/12), 
cos(πh/6), cos(πh/12), for j=1,…,5, respectively, if t is in hour h of 
the day, for weekends and holidays (see Appendix A for more 
detailed information); 
Di,g  =  dummy variables; 1 if household i belongs to group g, 0 else; 
Dh,t  =  dummy variables; 1 if t is in hour h of the day, 0 else;  
Dd,t  =  dummy variables; 1 if t is in day d of the week, 0 else;  
Dm,t  =  dummy variables; 1 if t is in month m of the year, 0 else; 
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DHd,t  = dummy variable; 1 if t is in a holiday, 0 else; 
γi  =  fixed time invariant effect for household i; and 
εit  =  an error term, assumed to be independently distributed over i and t 
with a constant variance.8 
 
N represents the sum of all households i. T is the same for all groups (4200), 
although missing data will make some time series incomplete (an unbalanced panel). 
The price responses will be captured by one price coefficient for each group as the 
effect of price changes is assumed to be different for the three groups. Further, it is 
necessary to control for other important factors influencing electricity consumption. 
They are discussed briefly below. 
The influence of temperature on energy use is particularly important in countries 
with substantial climatic variations. The effect is well described in the literature, 
although no uniform way of including temperature in the models has been established. 
The different analyses have found that temperature changes may have non-linear, as 
well as delayed effects on electricity consumption. These findings are covered by, e.g., 
Henley and Peirson (1997, 1998), Granger et al. (1979), Harvey and Koopman (1993), 
and Ramanathan et al. (1997). Following Granger et al. (1979), the contemporary 
temperature is controlled for by one term, and its possible non-linear influence by a 
squared term. To account for the delayed effect of a temperature change, a 24-hour 
arithmetic moving average term as well as its squared value in another term is used. 
Wind might influence energy use as it increases a building’s heat loss (SINTEF, 
1996). Both a contemporary term and a 24-hour moving average term are included. 
Because the households in the sample are located within the same area, all dwellings are 
assumed to be exposed to the same weather conditions over the data collection period. 
Daylight is likely to influence the consumption of electricity because it decreases 
the need for electric lights and heating (see, for instance, Johnsen, 2001). To allow for 
different impacts of daylight over the seasons, variables intended to pick up the 
                                                 
8
 The Huber/White/sandwich estimator is used to obtain robust estimates of the asymptotic variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimated parameters (StataCorp, 2003). 
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daylight’s impact in each month is included. Each variable takes the value one in the 
hours between sunrise and sunset in the existing month, and zero otherwise.9 
In high-frequency data like those used here, a large part of the variation in the data 
is caused by seasonal and cyclical patterns. Seasonal factors (e.g. rain, snow, humidity), 
or special periods such as Christmas and New Year, might lead to different consumption 
levels, depending on the season. Cyclical patterns over the week might appear if, e.g., 
consumption is higher on weekends compared with weekdays. Also important, are the 
cyclical patterns of the day. Most people sleep at night, make breakfast and leave for 
work in the morning, and come home for dinner in the afternoon in a more or less 
similar pattern every day, and the electricity consumption reflects this behaviour. All the 
variables explaining these cycles cannot possibly be obtained, but they should still be 
accounted for in the model. Different approaches have been used in the literature to 
control for these patterns. Seasonal and weekly cycles can be controlled for by dummy 
variables (Pardo et al., 2002). Cycles within the day have been treated with dummy 
variables, one dummy for each hour (Granger et al., 1979, Ramanathan et al., 1985), by 
trigonometric terms (Granger et al., 1979), or by cubic splines (Hendricks et al., 1979, 
Harvey and Koopman, 1993). In the current paper, the cyclical patterns are modelled 
with dummies; one set with dummies for the 24 hours of the day.10 As weekends and 
holidays have different consumption patterns compared with working days, 
trigonometric terms are included to allow for shifts in the consumption pattern.11 After 
some experimentation, five variables were found to represent the daily cycle for these 
days; they are defined as sin(πh/6), sin(πh/8), sin(πh/12), cos(πh/6), and cos(πh/12), 
where h is the hour of the day. They do not enter on other days (see Appendix A for a 
more detailed explanation). Possible different levels in usage between the different days 
of the week or months are controlled for by day and month dummies. In addition, a 
                                                 
9
 In the sunrise or sunset hour, the value of a daylight variable is equal to the share of the hour which it is daylight, 
i.e. between 0 and 1. 
10
 Consumption patterns for different working days were found to differ slightly. Regressions with inclusions of 
separate hour dummies for each weekday were tested, and found to increase the estimates of the price responses, 
but only to a small extent. Because such a specification is not very parsimonious, and it is computationally heavy, 
it was not considered worth the extra effort. 
11
 Regressions with inclusions of separate hour dummies for the weekends were also tested. This was found to 
decrease the price response estimates, but only to a small extent. Inclusions of the extra variables were, for the 
same reasons as in the previous footnote, not considered worth the extra effort. 
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holiday dummy is included. To avoid multicollinearity, the hour-01, Monday, and 
November dummies are excluded. 
The households’ specific characteristics (income, stock of appliances, type of 
dwelling, etc.) are important factors that can account for differences in electricity 
consumption behaviour. Such variables are not included in the model, but heterogeneity 
between the households is accounted for by fixed (unobserved) effects with the 
estimation procedure presented in the next session. Therefore, their impact on electricity 
consumption is not commented on further. 
The errors may have an autoregressive structure, where for instance special 
attention is devoted to residual autocorrelation at lag 1 (corresponding to the previous 
period), at lag 24 (corresponding to the same hour the previous day) and at lag 168 
(corresponding to the same hour one week ago). No specification of autoregressive 
structures is done, since our software, Stata, only allow specifications of first-order for 
panel data. The estimators will anyway be consistent, but they are not efficient (Baltagi, 
2001).  
3.2 Estimation method 
 
It is likely that the consumption patterns vary between customers with different 
demographic or household characteristics. For instance, it is likely that households with 
larger dwellings, higher incomes, more electrical appliances, or more family members 
will use more electricity than others. As the experiment lasted only six months, such 
characteristics are assumed to be constant during the test period. The cross section time 
series dimension of the data gives the opportunity to control for such household specific 
time-invariant explanatory variables by the use of a fixed effects panel data model. The 
fixed effects model controls for factors that are anticipated to not change within the 
timeframe of this experiment (see, e.g., Baltagi, 2001). This reduces heteroskedasticity 





The analysis of the three groups’ price responses is performed in one regression, 
with one separate price variable for each group to estimate the response to the total 
hourly price facing the customers. Table 4 shows the results from the fixed effects 
regression using Stata (StataCorp, 2005). 
Table 4. Results from the fixed effects regression 
Variables Estimate t-value p-value 
Price: TOU/spot -0.5453 -35.94 0.000 
Price: TOU/Std -0.0556 -8.58 0.000 
Price: TOU/spot/DLC -0.0771 -11.57 0.000 
Daylight: November -0.0698 -5.54 0.000 
Daylight: December 0.0118 0.88 0.380 
Daylight: January -0.0450 -5.48 0.000 
Daylight: February -0.1277 -17.36 0.000 
Daylight: March -0.1229 -18.28 0.000 
Daylight: April -0.0716 -10.06 0.000 
Temp -0.0286 -58.41 0.000 
Temp2 -0.0008 -20.91 0.000 
TempMA -0.0342 -61.24 0.000 
TempMA2 0.0001 1.87 0.061 
Wind 0.0109 6.08 0.000 
WindMA 0.0463 15.25 0.000 
Constant 2.2923 233.33 0.000 
R2: within  = 0.2024 F(71,777907)    = 2674.74 
between  = 0.0022 p-value for F-test = 0.0000 
overall  = 0.1065   
Note: The results for the holiday and cyclical dummy variables for hours, days, and months, and the 
trigonometric terms are reported in Appendix B. 
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Table 4 shows that the price-response coefficients for the three groups are all 
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, F-tests indicate that the different price 
coefficients are significantly different from each other. 
The results from the TOU/spot group are much higher than those for the other two 
groups. The estimated price response indicates a reduction in electricity usage of 0.545 
kWh/h in response to an increase in price of 1 NOK. Assuming a linear price response 
and calculating the peak price elasticity using average price and electricity consumption 
values, the price elasticity is approximately –0.26.12 Thus, the result is of the same 
magnitude as many of the findings from TOU experiments described in the 
Introduction. This group seems to have a higher ability and willingness to respond to the 
price variations than the other groups analysed in this paper. The TOU/spot group chose 
two independent rates that exposed them to the possibility of high volatility in prices, 
and high prices in the peak periods when consumption usually is higher. They did not 
choose direct load control with its prospective load reducing assistance. An explanation 
for their stronger response might be that these customers chose this riskier combination 
of tariffs because they relied on their own energy-controlling systems that could be 
programmed to exploit the tariff structure. Although this group consisted only of a few 
customers, their response gives an indication of the potential that might exist in 
households that are motivated and able to adjust consumption to varying price signals. 
The estimated coefficients for the other two groups are smaller than for the 
TOU/spot group. For the TOU/Std group, we can see that electricity consumption 
declines by 0.055 kWh/h in response to a price increase of 1 NOK. Thus, the price 
elasticity is calculated to be –0.02. An explanation for the weaker response might be 
that households generally do not give their electricity consumption much attention, and 
want to take intra-daily price changes into account to a small extent only. The result 
may simply reflect that the end users in general are not very price responsive. However, 
it might be that a higher degree of information and frequent reminders of the tariff they 
have chosen are required for customers with a low interest in adjusting their electricity 
consumption. The customers received little information before and during the 
experiment about the various ways they could exploit the electricity rate structures. As 
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these types of rates were new and unknown to the customers, more attention and 
guidance on how to benefit from the varying prices may have increased the price 
response. Another explanation might be that the peak/off-peak price ratio was too small 
to motivate price-responsive behaviour from this group. Experience from earlier TOU 
experiments indicates that the largest consumption reductions are found when the peak 
to off-peak price ratio is highest (Faruqui and Malko, 1983) and that peak to off-peak 
price ratios should be in the range of 4:1 to 5:1 to induce substantial price responses 
(Braithwait, 2000). The price ratio in this experiment was approximately 3.2:1. 
Therefore, it may not have been sufficiently high to motivate the consumers to make 
consumption adjustments. 
The TOU/spot/DLC group had a somewhat stronger response than that of the 
TOU/Std group. Electricity usage was reduced by 0.077 kWh/h in response to a price 
increase of 1 NOK (indicating a price elasticity of approximately –0.03, again assuming 
linear price responses). The estimate must be seen in the light of that the households in 
this group were exposed to automated load control. As was the case for the TOU/spot 
group, customers in this group chose two tariffs, which in combination could expose 
them to substantial price variations within the day. This might suggest that they had a 
high willingness and ability to be price responsive, as was seen in the TOU/spot group. 
However, instead of relying on their own energy-controlling systems to yield benefits 
from the price structure, they may have anticipated that the direct load control offered in 
conjunction with the spot price tariff would take care of their price response. Therefore, 
these customers may have taken little action on their own to respond to the price signals 
(regressions that control for the impact of the load control indicate slightly lower 
responses than for the TOU/Std group, thus indicating that the customers have done 
little efforts to respond to the price changes manually). That the estimate for the 
TOU/spot/DLC group is low, despite the fact that they had load control, may be due to 
that the spot price did not vary much within the day during the experiment. Thus, there 
was little to gain from shifting consumption from peak spot price hours to off-peak spot 
price hours. It may further indicate that a large share of the load was shifted only within 
the TOU peak price periods. It is probable that greater effects for the customers would 
have been experienced if the water heaters had been reconnected at the end of the TOU 
peak price periods instead of when the TOU price was still high. This could be achieved 
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if, e.g., the water heaters had been disconnected for the entire TOU peak price periods. 
If this had occurred, the customers could have achieved benefits from shifting 
consumption out of possible high spot prices as well as the TOU peak prices. The result 
suggests that, if customers have two separate time-differentiated electricity tariffs from 
their network and power supplier, the timing of the load control measures in one of the 
tariffs might take into account the price structure of the other tariff in order to increase 
the benefits for the customers. 
For the other estimates, we can see that the temperature coefficients are all 
significant. The negative contemporary linear and squared terms indicate that 
consumption will increase if the temperature drops from one hour to the next, but a 
temperature drop will have less impact as the weather becomes colder. The negative 
linear and positive squared moving average term indicates that, if the average 
temperature for the previous 24 hours drops, consumption will increase and the increase 
will be greater the colder it is. 
The wind coefficient estimates are both positive and significant. As expected, wind 
increases electricity consumption. 
All daylight variables except that for December are negative and significant. 
However, the December variable is not significant. This means that more daylight will 
decrease electricity consumption, as expected. We see that daylight has a greater impact 
during the months with more hours of light. The reason why daylight in April is 
estimated to cause less of a reduction in consumption as daylight in, say, February or 
March, may be that people heat their dwellings to a lesser degree at that time of the 
year. Thus, daylight does not replace electricity for heating in April to the same extent 
as it does in February and March. 
The F-statistic test related to the hypothesis that all the coefficients except the 
intercept are jointly zero, is reported in Table 4. The hypothesis is clearly rejected, 
which suggests that the model has substantial explanatory power. 
Finally, we mention that regressions were run for each of the groups separately to 
see whether this had an impact on the estimates. These results show price responses of –
0.627 kWh/h for the TOU/spot group, –0.067 kWh/h for the TOU/Std group, and –
0.066 kWh/h for the TOU/spot/DLC group. Thus, the estimates can be said to be robust 
as the responses are small and in the same range regardless of the specification for the 
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A fixed effects panel data model uses data from a Norwegian residential experiment 
to estimate price responses to TOU and spot pricing as well as direct load control of 
water heaters. 
The results show that the customers with TOU and spot price tariffs without direct 
load control responded to a NOK 1 increase in price with a 0.545 kWh/h consumption 
reduction. Customers with a TOU network tariff and standard power tariff without 
disconnections responded to changes in price with a smaller adjustment in consumption 
(0.055 kWh/h). The customers with TOU and spot price tariffs with disconnections of 
water heaters had a somewhat higher response than the latter group (0.077 kWh/h). 
These results indicate that the residential electricity consumers analysed were not 
very price responsive, as only one group with a few customers had a substantial 
response to the prices. However, the results indicate only the average response for all 
customers within each group and no attempts were made to reveal whether there existed 
subgroups with higher price responsiveness. The response found in one of the groups 
indicates that some customers are highly motivated and able to exploit the varying rates 
by adjusting consumption. For instance, it is likely that customers with equipment 
suited to taking advantage of the price structure by reducing or shifting consumption 
would have shown higher responses.  
It may be that the provision of more information to the participating customers 
before and during the experiment on how they could have benefited from the rates could 
have increased the response. Furthermore, the direct load control would most likely 
have resulted in a higher response had the timing of the control events been conducted 
not only in accordance with the spot price power tariff but also in accordance with the 
TOU tariff. This suggests that, if customers have two separate time-differentiated 
electricity tariffs (network and power tariffs), one may consider taking into account the 
price structure of those two contracts when deciding the timing of load control measures 
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in order to increase customers’ economic savings from participation in time 
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This appendix explains how the trigonometric variables accounting for weekend 
and holiday effects are constructed. 
Let Xj be an arbitrary household invariant variable for which one has observations 
Xj1, Xj2, ..., XjT. The variable is measured on an hourly basis. Let us assume that Xj,1 and 
Xj,T correspond to the value of the variable Xj in the first hour of a Monday (the initial 
day) and the last hour of a Sunday (the last day), such that we consider complete weeks. 
Let us collect the observations in a vector, that is 
 
/
j j1 j2 jTX X , X , ..., X =   . 
 
X  may be partitioned in blocks corresponding to the different days, that is 
 
// / /
j j1 j2 jKX B , B , ..., B =   , 
 
where Bjk is a column vector with 24 elements, corresponding to the hours of an 
arbitrary day, and where K=T/24. We have for instance 
 
/
j1 j1 j2 j24B X , X , ..., X =   , 
/
j2 j,25 j,26 j,48B X , X , ..., X =    and 
/
jK j,T 23 j,T 22 j,TB X , X , ..., X− − =   . 
 
For all the cases below one has that Bjk = Bj ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., K.  This means that we 
may write 
 




where Ke  is a column vector with K elements, which all are equal to 1 and where ⊗  
denotes the Kronecker-product. We will consider the five following Bj vectors:   
 
[ ]/1B sin(1 / 6), sin(2 / 6), ..., sin(24 / 6)= π π π , 
[ ]/2B sin(1 / 8), sin(2 / 8), ..., sin(24 /8)= π π π , 
[ ]/3B sin(1 /12), sin(2 /12), ..., sin(24 /12)= π π π , 
[ ]/4B cos(1 / 6), cos(2 / 6), ..., cos(24 / 6)= π π π  and 
[ ]/5B cos(1 /12), cos(2 /12), ..., cos(24 /12)= π π π . 
 
Let furthermore D be a dummy variable with values 1 2 TD ,D ,..., D  such that Dt is 
one if the hour corresponds to an hour on a Saturday, a Sunday or a holiday and zero in 
all other cases. We define the vector D   
 
[ ]/1 2 TD D , D , ..., D= . 
 
We consider the following vectors 
 
j jZ X D, j 1,...,5= =: , 
 




j j,1 j,2 j,TZ Z , Z , ..., Z =   . 
 













β∑  in Eq. (1). 
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Table 5. Results from the fixed effects regression 
Coefficients Variables Explanation Estimate t-value p-value 
δTOU/spot DTOU/spot p Price: TOU/spot -0.5453 -35.94 0.000 
δTOU/Std DTOU/Std p Price: TOU/Std -0.0556 -8.58 0.000 
δTOU/spot/DLC DTOU/spot/DLC p Price: TOU/spot/DLC -0.0771 -11.57 0.000 
βdl,nov Dnov dl Daylight: November -0.0698 -5.54 0.000 
βdl,dec Ddec dl Daylight: December 0.0118 0.88 0.380 
βdl,jan Djan dl Daylight: January -0.0450 -5.48 0.000 
βdl,feb Dfeb dl Daylight: February -0.1277 -17.36 0.000 
βdl,mar Dmar dl Daylight: March -0.1229 -18.28 0.000 
βdl,apr Dapr dl Daylight: April -0.0716 -10.06 0.000 
βT T Temp -0.0286 -58.41 0.000 
βT2 T2 Temp, squared -0.0008 -20.91 0.000 
βTMA TMA Temp, moving average -0.0342 -61.24 0.000 
βTMA2 TMA2 Temp, moving average, squared 0.0001 1.87 0.061 
βW W Wind 0.0109 6.08 0.000 
βWMA WMA Wind, moving average 0.0463 15.25 0.000 
β2 D2 Dummy, hour 2 -0.0955 -14.14 0.000 
β3 D3 Dummy, hour 3 -0.1193 -17.47 0.000 
β4 D4 Dummy, hour 4 -0.0991 -14.42 0.000 
β5 D5 Dummy, hour 5 -0.0410 -5.95 0.000 
β6 D6 Dummy, hour 6 0.0932 13.14 0.000 
β7 D7 Dummy, hour 7 0.3004 39.10 0.000 
β8 D8 Dummy, hour 8 0.5345 51.39 0.000 
β9 D9 Dummy, hour 9 0.5512 50.67 0.000 
β10 D10 Dummy, hour 10 0.5520 47.84 0.000 
β11 D11 Dummy, hour 11 0.6368 54.67 0.000 
β12 D12 Dummy, hour 12 0.4650 47.33 0.000 
β13 D13 Dummy, hour 13 0.3572 36.92 0.000 
β14 D14 Dummy, hour 14 0.3358 34.57 0.000 
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β15 D15 Dummy, hour 15 0.3832 39.04 0.000 
β16 D16 Dummy, hour 16 0.4895 50.81 0.000 
β17 D17 Dummy, hour 17 0.6348 58.32 0.000 
β18 D18 Dummy, hour 18 0.6477 60.73 0.000 
β19 D19 Dummy, hour 19 0.6807 64.94 0.000 
β20 D20 Dummy, hour 20 0.8283 78.68 0.000 
β21 D21 Dummy, hour 21 0.6974 85.37 0.000 
β22 D22 Dummy, hour 22 0.5966 77.34 0.000 
β23 D23 Dummy, hour 23 0.4416 61.07 0.000 
β24 D24 Dummy, hour 24 0.2099 29.26 0.000 
βtrig,1 trig1 Trigonometric term, Sin(πh/6) 0.1120 29.17 0.000 
βtrig,2 trig2 Trigonometric term, Sin(πh/8) 0.2089 11.82 0.000 
βtrig,3 trig3 Trigonometric term, Sin(πh/12) -0.0991 -29.02 0.000 
βtrig,4 trig4 Trigonometric term, Cos(πh/6) 0.2003 19.10 0.000 
βtrig,5 trig5 Trigonometric term, Cos(πh/12) -0.2611 -18.78 0.000 
βtue Dtue Dummy, Tuesday 0.0408 10.08 0.000 
βwed Dwed Dummy, Wednesday 0.0238 5.86 0.000 
βthu Dthu Dummy, Thursday -0.0131 -3.20 0.001 
βfri Dfri Dummy, Friday -0.0048 -1.18 0.239 
βsat Dsat Dummy, Saturday -0.0066 -1.12 0.261 
βsun Dsun Dummy, Sunday 0.0324 5.40 0.000 
βdec Ddec Dummy, December 0.2032 24.60 0.000 
βjan Djan Dummy, January 0.1410 19.29 0.000 
βfeb Dfeb Dummy, February 0.0047 0.66 0.509 
βmar Dmar Dummy, March -0.0422 -5.91 0.000 
βapr Dapr Dummy, April -0.2086 -25.90 0.000 
βHd DHd Dummy, Holiday 0.0345 5.02 0.000 








Article II, III and IV in this thesis analyse observed data from households in the 
experiment "End-user flexibility by efficient use of information and communication 
technology (ICT)". The articles use econometric/statistical methods to study the relation 
between variables of interest. Article II and IV utilize fixed effects panel data models to 
estimate the relation between electricity consumption and variables assumed to have 
explanatory power with respect to the consumption. Article III uses a discrete choice 
logit model to investigate to which extent households’ choices of a new electricity tariff 
are influenced by some household characteristic variables. This Appendix will describe 
the econometric methods in more detail. 
 
                                                 
*
 I would like to thank Erik Biorn and Bente Halvorsen for comments and help. 
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1 Panel data models 
 
When N households are observed over T time periods, one obtain a cross-section 
time-series dimensional data set, also called a panel data set. See, for instance, Biorn 
(2000), Hsiao (2003), Greene (2003) or Wooldridge (2002) for good descriptions of 
panel data models and more details on estimation methods.  
Consider a simple model: 
 








   (1) 
 
where xit and zit are scalars of exogenous variables, α* is a constant, β and ρ are 
coefficients (the variables and the coefficients are generalized to vectors in Section 1.2). 
uit is assumed to be independently, identically distributed over i and t, with mean zero 
and variance σ2.  
An ordinary least-squares estimation gives unbiased and consistent estimators of 
α*, β and ρ. However, if zit is unobserved, and if the covariance between xit and zit are 
nonzero, the ordinary least-squares regression of yit on xit will give biased estimators α* 
and β (Hsiao, 2003).  
1.1 Advantages with panel data 
 
Panel data allows more complicated models than pure cross-sectional or time-series 
data, and may give the opportunity to control for the effects of missing or 
unobserved/unobservable variables. For instance, if the z values are constant through 
time for each household, but vary across households (zit = zi), the effect of z can be 
controlled for. This can be achieved by for instance subtracting the individual means 
from each observation 
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   (2) 
 
where (1/ ) Ti t=1 ity T y⋅ = ∑ , (1/ ) Ti t=1 itx T x⋅ = ∑  and (1/ ) Ti t=1 itu T u⋅ = ∑ . The time invariant z 
variable is then swept away, and a least-squares regression of (2) will now give 
unbiased and consistent estimates of β. The utilization of ordinary least squares on (2) is 
therefore robust to correlation between xit and zi, which is not the case when ordinary 
least squares is used on (1) and zi is omitted from the equation (since it is unobserved). 
The transformation of the data performed is not possible with only cross-sectional 
observations (where T = 1). 
1.2 The fixed effects model 
 
This section will discuss the fixed effects model which is utilized in Article II and 
IV.  











∗ = + + ∼
x β







  (3) 
 
where 1, 2( ,..., )Kβ β β ′=β  is the column vector of coefficients for the K right hand side 
variables in the regression equation, 1 2 K( , ,..., )it it it itx x x=x  is the row vector with 
observations of the K right hand side variables for household i in period t, and where uit 
and xit are independently distributed for all i and t.1 In the context of this thesis, yit is the 
hourly consumption of electricity for household i, xit can for instance represent 
electricity price or temperature, and iα
∗
 represents the effect of all household specific 
variables which can be assumed unchanged for each household during the 6 months 
observation period; for instance income, size of dwelling, members in the household, 
education, attitude to for instance environmental issues, cognitive ability, motivation, 
                                                 
1
 IID(0,σ2) is an abbreviation for independently, identically distributed variables with expectation 0 and variance σ2. 
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etc. It is assumed that differences across households are captured in these household 
specific constant terms. Let us define the following vectors and matrices for household i 
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   
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and let (1,...,1)T ′=e  be the (T × 1) vector with all elements equal to 1, IT the identity 
matrix (all diagonal elements are 1, the rest of the elements are 0) of the order (T × T), 












 = + + 0∼
y e X u
u I
β
   i = 1,…, N.  (4) 
 
The coefficients in (4), iα ∗  and β, can be found by minimizing the sum of the 
squared error terms 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
N N
i i i T i i i T i i
i i
S α α∗ ∗
= =
′
′= = − − − −∑ ∑u u y e X y e Xβ β .  (5) 
 
by first taking the partial derivate of S with respect to iα
∗
 and setting them equal to zero, 
which gives 
 




= − = −i











= ∑ ,  1 Ti it
t=1T
⋅
= ∑x x . 
 
Inserting for ˆi iα α
∗ ∗
=  from (6) into (5) and taking the partial derivative of S with 
respect to β, we get  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1 1 1
ˆ
N T N T
W it i it i it i it i
i t i t
y y
−
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= = = =
   ′ ′
= − − − −      ∑∑ ∑∑x x x x x xβ  (7) 
 
which is called the least-squares dummy-variable (LSDV) estimator, because it may be 
implemented by interpreting ,...,i Nα α
∗ ∗
 as coefficients of dummy variables for 
individuals 1,…N. With many households (large N), as is the case for the regressions in 
this thesis, the computational burden when the dummy variables are included in the 
matrix of explanatory variables, is high. It is however not necessary to include the 
household specific dummy variables in the regression in order to estimate the β’s 
(which are the coefficients of our interest), as shown by (7). 
An alternative way of deriving (7) is the following: First, by premultiplying 
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T i T it
α= + +
= +
B y B e B X B u
B X B u
β
β   i = 1,…, N.   (9) 
 
In (9), the observations are transformed so that the means of each household’s time-
series are subtracted from the observed variables, and the household specific effects 
( iα ∗ ) are swept out (BTeT = 0T,1, since BT and eT are orthogonal). Second, by applying 












   
′ ′=       ∑ ∑X B X X B yβ      (10) 
 
which is the same estimator as was found in (7). The estimator is also often referred to 
as the within-individual estimator or the fixed effects estimator. It utilizes only the 
variation in the variables within each individual (in this thesis: household). The β’s 
represent the impact on y of an increase in its corresponding variable, given all other 
variables are kept constant. For instance, a positive β related to the wind variable then 
tells how much consumption increases with a small increase in wind. A negative β 
related to the price variable tells how much consumption is reduced with a small 
increase in price. 
The estimator ˆWβ is unbiased, and when either N or T or both goes to infinity it is 
also consistent. Its covariance matrix is equal to 
 









   ′
′= − − =      ∑β β β β β X X   (11) 
 
It should be noted that the regressions are performed with the software Stata, which 
uses an alternative but equivalent formulation of (3), by introducing an intercept µ (see 
StataCorp, 2005 or Gould, 2001) 
 
it it i ity uµ α= + + +x β        (12) 
 





=∑  is imposed. The intercept, 
µ , then represent the average value of the fixed effects, and αi the deviations from this 
mean. 
Stata runs ordinary least-squares on 
 
( ) ( ) ( )it i it i it iy - y y = + x - x x β+ u - u uµ α⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ + + +    (13) 









= ∑ ∑ , 1 1(1/ ) N Ti t= itx NT x== ∑ ∑ , 1 1(1/ ) N Ti t= itu NT u== ∑ ∑  and 
1 1




= =∑ ∑ .  This formulation has however no effect on the estimated 
βW’s. 
2 Discrete choice models 
 
In the regression models used in article II and IV, the regressand, i.e. the left hand 
dependent variable y was quantitative, and the right hand explanatory variables X were 
quantitative and qualitative (dummy variables). In article III, the dependent variable is 
qualitative. The model used is called a discrete choice model or a qualitative response 
regression model, because the dependent variable takes either of two values, which we 
conveniently set to 1, or 0. In this thesis, these values depend on a household’s choice 
between a new tariff and the old tariff. This choice is assumed to depend on explanatory 
household characteristic variables, as for instance the households’ ownership of energy 
management system, the electricity consumption pattern, income, etc. The objective of 
the model is to estimate how the probability that a household chooses the tariff, is 
affected by these characteristics (the model is also often referred to as a probability 
model). There are several approaches to develop a probability model for a qualitative 
binary response variable, the one used in article III is a logit model. For descriptions of 
the logit model, see for instance Biorn (2003), Gujarati (2003) or Green (2003). 
2.1 The logit model 
 
Article III aims at modelling households’ choices between selecting a new tariff 
and not selecting the new tariff that was offered in the experiment "End-user flexibility 
by efficient use of information and communication technology (ICT)". Let us assume n 
households are observed, and let2 
 
                                                 
2
 This corresponds to Eq. (4.1) in Article III if yi equals CPPi. 
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1  if household  selects the new tariff






 i = 1,…, n. 
 
We also assume that the households are observed independently of each other. Let 
us then say that Pi is the probability that a household selected the new tariff offered in 
the experiment (yi = 1). Also, say (1 – Pi) is the probability that the household did not 
select the new tariff (yi = 0). We do not observe Pi, but we observe whether each 
household chose the new tariff or not. Let 
 
( )i iP F x β=         (14) 
 
where the probability Pi  is represented by a function F, with a vector of explanatory 
variables 1 2 K(1, , ,..., )i i i ix x x x= and parameters 0, 1( ,..., )Kβ β β β ′= .  
The probability must lie between 0 and 1, and it is likely that Pi is nonlinearly 
related to the explanatory variables xi. Furthermore, the function must be monotonically 
increasing in its argument. The strategy is to choose F such that its domain is (-∞, +∞) 
and its range is (0, 1), that is 
 
F(-∞) = 0   F(+∞) = 1  F´(xiβ)   0 
 
 The households’ probability for choosing the new tariff can be represented by 
the logistic cumulative distribution function3  
 





i i i x x
eP P y F x
e e
β
β ββ −= = = = =+ +      (15) 
 
which satisfies the desired model properties just discussed. The response mechanism 
described in (15) is called the logit model. The probability of not choosing the new tariff 
can thus be expressed as  
 
                                                 
3
 This correspond to Eq. (4.2) in Article III. 
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   (16) 
 
2.2 Maximum likelihood estimation 
 
Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the logit model. For the households i = 
1,…,n, we have the sample of observations (yi, xi) = (yi, 1, x1i, x2i,…, xKi). We assume 
that (y1|x1), (y2|x2),…, (yn|xn) are stochastically independent, and let 
 
( )1     for 1,1










= − = 
− =      (17) 
 
i.e., Li is equal to the response probability if individual i respond positively and the non-
response probability if he responds negatively. Then, the joint probability, L, of 
observing the sample is given as the product of the individual probabilities 
 
  
( ) ( )
{ }{ }
1





i i i i i
i i i y i y
L L P P P P−
= = = =
= = − = −∏ ∏ ∏ ∏
   (18) 
 
where ∏ is the product operator, and ∏{i:yi=1} and ∏{i:yi=0} denotes the product taken 
over all i where yi = 1 and where yi = 0, respectively. The joint probability in Eq. (18) is 
called the likelihood function. By taking the natural logarithm, we obtain the log 
likelihood function 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
ln ln ln 1 ln 1
n n
i i i i i
i i
L L y P y P
= =
= = + − −  ∑ ∑ ,   (19) 
 
The Maximum Likelihood problem is to maximize the likelihood or the log 
likelihood function with respect to the β’s. Put differently, the objective is to find the 
unknown β’s that makes the observed sample most probable. The maximization is 
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performed on (19) since this is the easiest mathematical problem. Differentiate (19) 
partially with respect to each unknown gives 
 







i i ki i kix
i ik






= − = − ∂ + ∑ ∑     (20) 
 
where k = 0, 1,…,K. By setting this expression equal to zero (( ln(L))/( βk) = 0), we 















+ ∑ ∑ ,  k = 0, 1,…,K.   (21) 
 
which are nonlinear equations that requires an iterative solution.  
The sign of the β’s tell whether a change in its corresponding variable increases of 
decreases the probability to select the tariff (a positive sign means an increase in the 
probability, and the other way round). The estimated parameters can be used in Eq. (15) 
and (16) to estimate the probability of a household to select the new tariff, or not to 
select the tariff, given the household’s x-vector of characteristics. By differentiating (15) 
and (16) we get 
 





∂ ,  





β∂ − = − −
∂   (22) 
 
and by putting the estimates into these equations, we can find the changes in the 
probabilities if there is a change in one of the variables (given the other variables are 
kept at a chosen constant level, for instance at the sample mean). 
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